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1. Introduction
1.1 Objectives
International organizations (IOs) shape the world on every imaginable issue they face 
today,  be  it  environmental,  financial  or  humanitarian.  As  most  of  the  international 
organizations were formed in the 1940’s and 1950’s in the western hemisphere, western states 
still dominate those institutions, even if the scope of member states has expanded significantly 
since then.  As the decision-making process  often leaves  out emerging economies  and the 
power structure often only reflects the world order of the past, the legitimacy and even the 
longevity of those organizations is called into question in recent years. (Bergan 2011, Betz 
2008, Weisbrot et al. 2009) Specifically, financial institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund have to deal with the allegation that they are doing more bad than good in the process of 
supposedly helping poorer countries with money to develop their infrastructure and economy. 
Many  people  think  that  in  this  process,  they  actually  are  contributing  to  destroying  the 
economies they are trying to help.1 The World Trade Organization also is said to be actually 
only helping western countries to keep their wealth while exploiting emerging economies. 
(Wilkinson 2008) In recent years, emerging economies started demanding to be heard and 
desired to take part in decision-making processes in those organizations more actively. In the 
economic sphere, emerging economies have challenged the West considerably in more and 
more spheres in recent years. Additionally, the recent economic crisis and the European debt 
crisis  has weakened the power of western countries.  This paper takes a close look at  the 
question of whether emerging economies are able to translate their economic success into 
political leverage in IOs, specifically exploring the role of the Republic of Korea and the 
People’s  Republic  of  China.  Various  authors  (Mahbubani  2008,  Drezner  2007,  Weisman 
2006) suggest that only if rising powers can be incorporated into the framework of IOs, the 
future of those institutions, and therefore the system that was built up over six decades, can 
survive. 
Another important aim of this  paper is to find out if  it  is already too late to revamp 
existing international organizations. The surge of regionalism, especially in Asia, could be a 
sign for the decline of the authority of international organizations in Asia. Therefore, the paper 
1 Various NGO‘s and other nonstate actors dedicate their work to hold IOs accountable for their actions, for 
example by organizing antiglobalization campaigns. Also see: Vines, David; Gilbert, Christoper L. [Eds] 
(2003): The IMF and Its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture, New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
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will dwell on the question if emerging economies have already given up trying to gain a voice 
in existing institutions as they build their  own initiatives. To give an example,  in the last 
decade new organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), covering in 
parts the security and economic sphere as well as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) covering 
the financial sphere, have emerged in Asia. (Henning 2002, Bailes; Dunay 2007, Troitskiy 
2007) Additionally, there is even talk about an “East Asia Community” forming. (Shoji 2009) 
The  paper  will  discuss  if  those  organizations  are  either  built  up  to  challenge  established 
organizations, if they are kind of an “exit strategy” for participating countries, or if they are 
used as an alternative for IOs. 
The hypothesis in this paper states that since Asian countries are highly suspicious of 
Japanese intentions in Asia, it would be a difficult task to build up a security organization in 
the East Asian region. Therefore, IOs concerned with the security realm would still play a role 
in the region in the future. In the economic and financial sphere, however, it could be possible 
for Asian states to set up their own structures and leave western countries on the outside. This 
paper tries to find out if these assumptions are true by employing theories of power, authority 
and  regionalism  to  analyze  whether  a  true  process  of  shifting  power  has  occurred. 
Additionally,  by  finding out  if  afore  mentioned assumptions  are  true,  conclusions  can be 
drawn on the future of IOs and on how to manage emerging economies in the future. Also, 
with these findings, foreign relations can be adapted accordingly. Most importantly, finding 
out what place the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China want to play in 
international affairs can give an insight into possible future developments in the region.
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1.2 Key Research Questions
The overarching theme of this thesis is “Power”. For this purpose, the theoretical concept 
of  Michael  Barnett,  Martha  Finnemore  and  Raymond  Duvall  is  being  used.  Barnett, 
Finnemore and Duvall developed a new kind of approach to power in international politics 
and  identified  four  different  forms:  compulsory  power,  institutional  power,  structural  and 
productive  power.  These  forms  of  power  join  the  most  used  and recognized  concepts  in 
international politics and have the advantage of avoiding competition. 
The leading question in this paper is about the economic shift of power in the world and 
if it has already translated into international organizations. The question is if the economical 
shift of power from the West to the East already includes the shift of political and military  
power, as well. Furthermore, the question of an allegedly “waning power” status of IOs is 
being  explored.  Additionally,  the  question  whether  China  and South  Korea  even want  to 
challenge the global system and the U.S. as a superpower is being explored. As new regional 
organizations in Asia emerge, new questions arise. Do these organizations, in this paper being 
the  Shanghai  Cooperation  organization  and  the  Chiang  Mai  Initiative,  pose  a  threat  to 
established IOs? This idea presupposes that regional organizations are a challenge to the work 
and existence of established IOs. The next aim is to find out if  regionalism  is already a 
manifestation and a translation of the new economic power of East Asian2 states. The paper 
also considers the involvement of the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China 
in those new organizations. Finally, the question will be touched upon as to how they might 
shape or perhaps boycott decisions made by IOs in favor of their own newfound structure in 
Asia.
Regarding the power structure within IOs, the question lingers if those organizations can 
be shaped and run by their member states and if so,  if western states have lost their power to 
guide those organizations. This paper also explores if the Republic of Korea and the People’s 
Republic of China gain bargaining power because of their rising economic status and if so, 
how far they can go in this regard. Last but not least, it will be discussed if there is any chance 
of a longstanding cooperation in Asia that could join Japan, China and South Korea together 
and act as a powerful weight, alongside the EU and the U.S.
2 For the purpose of this paper, East Asia encompasses the People‘s Republic of China (referred to as China), 
the Republic of Korea (referred to as South Korea) and Japan.
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1.3 Methodology
In this paper, the power of international organizations as well as regional organizations 
shall  be  worked  out.  By  defining  the  power  of  IOs  as  well  as  regional  organizations, 
conclusions can be drawn whether or not regional organizations are a “threat” to the work and 
existence  of  IOs.  Within  this  work,  the  role  of  the  World  Trade  Organization  and  the 
International Monetary Fund on the international level will be explored. The aim is to detect a 
shift  of  power  in  the  behavior  of  China  and  South  Korea  in  the  WTO  and  the  IMF 
approximately in  the last  decade.  In the IMF, this  kind of extra  influence should include 
financial help, involvement in decision-making processes, and the siding of South Korea and 
China  with  other  countries.  Within  the  WTO,  voting  preferences  and  recent  bilateral 
agreements that stand in opposition to the work of the WTO should be explored. To measure 
the power of regional organizations, the perception of these organizations in the West will be 
explored, as well as the involvement of those organizations on the international level. In the 
end, these suppositions should lead to a conclusion.
How is this achieved? This paper touches on the model of content analysis, sometimes 
also  termed text  analysis,  and hermeneutics.  First,  the  aim of  content  analysis  should  be 
explored: Traditionally, content analysis analyses numerous amounts of texts. (Früh 2001: 27) 
As this method has its constraints, the work fails to find all the answers. In any case, text 
analysis aims to reduce complex matters as it tries to find characteristics that will lead to 
conclusions. The information outside of these characteristics, however, gets lost. Be that as it 
may, the main interest lies in the content that is communicated. The research question is the 
criteria  for  selection  and  how  conclusions  are  drawn.  As  there  is  so  much  information 
available, only the relevant content should be captured. 
To begin with, the search for clues starts with the hypothesis stated in the thesis. Does 
the hypothesis stand the arguments in the texts? In this paper, the hypothesis used is a so-
called “enclosed hypothesis”. A first step towards understanding the matter is the structural 
characters of the texts. Those characters mark the grounds for interpretation. (Früh 2001: 65) 
To find answers, content analysis relies on theoretical arguments. Therefore, the present state 
of  research  should  always  be  involved  in  answering  the  hypothesis.  The  main  basis  for 
interpretation is always the content of the text. (Mayring 2010: 50-51) Through this process, 
conclusions can be drawn and new information can be found.  (Früh 2001: 39) There are a 
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few ways to conclude a text analysis. Some might analyze the text and its impact on the 
recipient.  This  latter  idea  implies  the  question  of:  What  does  the  communicator  want  to 
transport through his/her saying? Alternatively, the diagnostic approach tries to understand the 
origin of the text. How is the relationship between the communicator and the message? What 
does the author try to achieve? Still another approach is the prognostic one. Here, one tries to 
find answers through messages and their impact on the recipient. This approach can also be 
interpretative. How does the reader react to this message?
As  this  method  has  its  limits,  it  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  additional  external 
criteria. Therefore, additional information about the recipient and communicator is needed. 
(Früh 2001: 42) Since every analyzer interprets texts firstly from his/her own perspective and 
his/her own experience, it is nearly impossible to stay objective or neutral in analyzing texts. 
To limit this impact as far as possible, the analyzer has to try to understand the author or even 
the recipients of the texts. 
Another  method of  analyzing texts  would be the  hermeneutical  text  interpretation. 
Hereby, the text will be analyzed by where it was written, who wrote it, when and in what 
society.  How is  the  text  written  and,  are  there  judgmental  statements?  A first  step  is  to 
describe the text in formal and descriptive parameters. Then, the first impression is given. 
After that, first conclusions can be drawn. (Früh 2001: 48) Passages that are unclear should be 
supplemented by other texts in order to understand the original. Special aspects of the material 
can be filtered out in order to fit the criteria decided beforehand. (Mayring 2010: 65) Through 
the hermeneutical text interpretation, the coherence and subjective impression is documented 
as the analyzer wants to find out “coded messages”. (Früh 2001: 64) Like content analysis, the 
aim is to find passages that fit to the hypothesis and then to find additional material for further 
understanding. Another important tool is structuring, where the material is filtered into certain 
aspects. Through previously decided criteria one can find those certain aspects that then can 
lead to conclusions about the material.  (Mayring 2010: 65) Although this analysis tries to 
incorporate all the material, the aim is to find the essence. 
This work tries to touch upon these criteria in order to come to some conclusions. 
1.4 Chapter Outline
The second chapter builds up the theoretical basis of the paper and begins by introducing 
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different sources of power and authority to discuss in the next chapters. Introducing those 
sources of power and authority helps to understand the inner workings of IOs better. To round 
out part two, the power of IOs is explored in the last section. Through the “classification of 
the world”, “the diffusion of norms” and “the fixing of meanings” IOs are able to shape the 
world according to their aims. A first step towards understanding the workings of the East 
Asian region is offered in the next section by introducing the concept of regionalism and 
regionalization,  as  well  as  how  globalization  plays  into  that  process.  The  third  chapter 
considers the various aspects of power mechanisms in the East  Asian region.  In order to 
understand why regional cooperation is so difficult in the region, historical implications, the 
alliance  with  the  U.S.,  and  South  Korea,  as  well  as  relations  with  Japan,  are  explored. 
Additionally, the role of ASEAN and the Asian Financial Crisis in regards to their relations in 
the  region and how they might  have  helped regional  initiatives,  is  discussed.  The fourth 
chapter explores two regional organizations that came about in East Asia in the last decade. 
One is called the Chiang Mai Initiative, a financial cooperation consisting of the countries of 
ASEAN, South Korea,  China  and Japan,  operating  with  an  IMF-link.  The other  regional 
organization is the Shanghai Cooperation organization that is dominated by China and Russia 
and which leaves out South Korea and Japan. The aim here is to find out if those regional 
organizations are aiming to replace IOs, if they strengthen regional cooperation, and if they 
have helped to make historical implications take the backseat when trying to set up regional 
initiatives. Finally, the last chapter then explores the work of the IMF and the WTO, how 
those organizations have had to change due to shifting power relations, and if South Korea 
and China have gained or are even wanting to gain more power within those institutions since 
their economies are on the rise. With all the findings in mind, the concluding chapter returns 
and aims to answer the research questions that have been formulated in the first part of this 
paper.
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2. Theoretical Basis
2.1 Sources of Power
Despite  power  being  omnipresent  in  daily  life  and  politics  especially,  a  clear-cut 
definition is difficult to establish. While there are many explanations they are mostly very 
broad. This is because “power works in various forms and has various expressions that cannot 
be captured by a single formulation.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 2) The discipline of power in 
international politics is mostly tending toward the realist view of power, stating the “ability of 
one state to use material resources to get another state to do what it otherwise would not do.” 
(Ibid.) For this study that concept would limit the outcome as it sometimes ignores power 
relations  within  international  organizations  (IOs)  and  states  that  want  to  influence  those 
organizations. Even though power is at the heart of many international negotiations, recent 
tradition underestimates the importance of power in international politics. 
This chapter is concerned with dwelling on these questions: Why is it that some actors 
have more power than others and can exercise this power against the intentions of others? 
Also, it will be touched upon what enables states to produce outcomes that are very different 
from the outcome other states want to create when taking the same actions. Furthermore, it 
will  be  discussed  what  constrains  actors  in  their  ability  to  generate  favored  outcomes. 
Following are the four forms of power in international politics identified by Michael Barnett 
and Raymond Duvall. By identifying four different forms of power, constraints in examining 
institutions or international relations are almost absent. In the sections that follow, it will be 
explored how these different forms of power interact and how they are connecting. Barnett 
and Duvall wanted to combine the most famous and most used approaches of international 
politics. Combining these four forms of power, the different schools avoid competing. As a 
result,  compulsory power resembles  the realist  approach whereas critical  theorists  tend to 
focus on structural and productive power. (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 4) Through this approach, 
Barnett and Duvall hope to help smooth out the rivalry between disciplines of international 
relations and give room to the most popular approaches, thus encouraging discussion. (Ibid.)
2.1.1 Compulsory Power
Compulsory power basically “refers to relations of interaction that allow one actor to 
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have direct control over another.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 3) This is achieved, for example, by 
the use of threats,  such as if  one country threatens another to change its policies, or face 
certain dire  consequences.  (Ibid.)  In  the classical  tradition,  this  concept  of  power is  very 
popular and Max Weber’s definition also falls into this category. He defines power as the 
“probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his 
own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability exists.” (Barnett; 
Duvall  2005:  13;  quoted  after  Max Weber  1947:  52)  While  the  weaker  actor  accepts  its 
inferior position, it obeys because of the legitimacy and authority of the superior actor. As a 
result, the weaker actor even admires the superiority of the powerful one. Following Weber’s 
argument, the stability of authority requires legitimacy and organisation, while power is the 
diffuse  “chance”.  (Müller  2007:  122)  As   authority  needs  to  be  justifiable,  the  “faith  in 
legitimacy” is required from the weaker actor. (Weber WuG 1921: 16, 19, 122 f.) Drawing 
from Weber, Barnett and Finnemore describe IOs as “rational-legal bureaucracies”. (Barnett; 
Finnemore 2005: 162) Weber credits “organisation” and “administration” for the stability of 
authoritative structures. The administration acts as an intermediate between the citizen and the 
state and fulfils the orders of the state. (Heins 1990: 58; Müller 2007: 123) For the purpose of 
this paper, IOs act as intermediates between states, and their objectives fulfil the requirements 
national states fail to fulfil on their own. Weber imagines an authority that goes against the 
will  of the ruled to be impossible,  because the expense of resources would render such a 
situation unreasonable. This argument begs the question: To what extent do IOs still  have 
legitimacy so that their intervention into national affairs of weaker states is even possible?. 
Another definition credited as most influential for scholars of international relations by 
Barnett and Duvall is Robert Dahl’s: He states that “power is best understood as the ability of 
A to get B to do what B otherwise would not do.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 13; quoted after 
Robert Dahl 1957: 202-03) IOs, especially financial institutions, tend to use this concept to 
persuade and convince member countries by offering monetary incentives to implement the 
favored policies of the institutions. (Betz 2007: 319-20) Dahl’s concept requires intentionality 
on the part  of Actor A. A wants to alter  B’s behavior  in a particular way. If  B alters its  
behavior “under the mistaken impression that A wants it to”, it would not count as power 
because there was no intent on the part of A. (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 13) A second requirement 
is  a  conflict of  desires.  B has  to  feel  “compelled  to  alter  its  behavior.”  Despite  its  own 
intentions, B has to abandon its own aspirations and follow the wishes of Actor A. The third 
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and most apparent requirement deals with resources each actor has in their bag of tricks. A has 
resources at its disposal “that lead B to alter its actions.” (Ibid.) However, there is another 
possible  line  of  argument  demonstrated  by  Bachrach  and  Baratz.  Surprisingly,  they  even 
detect power in the action of B altering its behavior without A’s intent. As plausible evidence, 
they  cite  the  example  of  victims  of  “collateral  damage”  of  bombing  campaigns.  Victims 
certainly feel  the power of  A,  even if  it  was  not  the intent  of  A to  create  such damage. 
(Barnett;  Duvall  2005:  14;  quoted  after  Bachrach and Baratz  1962:  952)  Here,  power  is 
perceived as the “production of effects” and is best understood “from the perspective of the 
recipient, not the deliverer, of the direct action.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 14) Powerful states 
can  use  their  material  resources  to  “advance  [their]  interests  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
interests of another state.” (Ibid.) They can “coordinate the actions of lesser powers so that 
they  align  with  their  interests.”  (Barnett;  Duvall  2005:  14;  quoted  after  Gilpin  2002) 
Multinational corporations have also adopted this approach and can “shape foreign economic 
policies  of  small  states  and global  economic  policies.”  (Ibid.)  How, then,  do  IOs exhibit 
compulsory power? The World Bank for example can influence the developing policies of 
borrowing  states.  The  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR)  can 
influence the lives of refugees, as mentioned later in this paper (see “Classification of the 
World”). 
Compulsory power not only includes material resources, but also symbolic and normative 
resources, for example demonstrated by the work of the UNHCR. This organization basically 
only has influential power, but because of its expert and moral authority [see 2.2.3 and 2.2.4], 
the  organization  is  considered  to  be  an authority and  in  authority  [see 2.2.5],  essentially 
representing  power.  In  recent  years,  the  rise  of  “civil  society”  and  its  demands  puts 
multinational  corporations  and governments  alike into place.  A prominent  example  is  the 
signing  of  the  land  mine  treaty  that  was  achieved  by various  transnational  activists  who 
basically “shamed” Clinton into signing it. (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 15, quoted after Price 1998) 
IOs  can  use  their  expert,  moral,  delegated  and  rational-legal  authority  as  a  resource  “to 
compel state and non-state actors to change their behavior.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 15; see 2.2 
Authority in this text) Another form of power IOs display on a regular basis is institutional  
power, described in the next section.
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2.1.2 Institutional Power
Institutional power describes control through indirect ways, “such as when states design 
IOs  in  ways  that  work  to  their  long-term advantage  and  to  the  disadvantage  of  others.” 
(Barnett; Duvall 2005: 3) Barnett and Duvall focus on “formal and informal institutions that 
mediate between A and B.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a : 51) The rules and procedures of those 
organizations  “guides,  steers,  and constrains the actions (or nonactions) and conditions of 
existence  of  others.”  (Ibid.)  Consequently,  A  cannot  “possess”  the  resources,  but  the 
institution constrains and shapes the behavior of B, with A taking a supposedly back seat. 
Even if institutions were established at a point were certain effects were not intended, they 
certainly can effect and shape the future choices of actors. Barnett and Duvall view “Long-
standing institutions” as  “frozen configurations  of privilege and bias  that  can continue to 
shape the future choices of actors.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 52) Institutions can even shape 
the  agenda-setting  process”  as  to  eliminate  points  of  conflict.  Therefore,  some decisions 
cannot be made because of limited opportunities.” (Ibid.) 
IOs  were  mostly  created  to  “achieve  mutually  acceptable,  even  Pareto-superior, 
outcomes”. (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 52) Even this, respectable intention, creates “winners” 
and “losers”, “to the extent that the ability to use the institution and, accordingly, collective 
rewards – material and normative – are unevenly distributed long into the future and beyond 
the intentions of the creators.” (Ibid.) The aim of this paper is to find out if this supposition 
rings true for the organizations analyzed here.
2.1.3 Structural Power
Structural power is often overlooked and put on the same level as institutional power. 
There is a difference, however, as “institutional power focuses on differential constraints on 
action”.  In contrast,  “structural power concerns the determination of social  capacities and 
interests.”  (Barnett;  Duvall  2005a:  53)  Structural  power  concerns  internal  relations  of 
structural positions, such as the structural position A “exists only by virtue of its relation to 
structural  position B.” (Ibid.,  see Bhaskar  1979;  and Isaac 1987) Barnett  and Duvall  cite 
master-slave and capital-labor relations as “classic examples”. The capitalist world-economy 
directs “social positions of capital and labor” and dictates the “respective differential abilities 
to alter their circumstances and fortunes.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005: 3) Seen in this way, the 
positions that are “mutually constituted are directly or internally related; that is, the social 
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relational capacities, subjectivities, and interests of actors are directly shaped by the social 
positions that they occupy.” (Ibid.) The “fates and conditions” are shaped in two ways, then: 
One, different structural positions generate different advantages and capacities.  Again,  the 
example of master-slave relations exemplifies this shape. Two, the social structure also shapes 
the self-understanding and the subjective interests of actors. Those structures lead to different 
interests of actors and “asymmetric privileges” that leave actors willing to “accept their role in 
the existing order of things.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 53; quoted after Lukes 1975, 24) 
Structural  power  can  “work  to  constrain  some  actors  from  recognizing  their  own 
domination.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 53) This self-understanding reproduces the structures, 
and actors are left unable to resist the “differential  capacities and privileges of structure.” 
Structural power works invisibly too, in that it also shapes the behavior of actors even when A 
does not exercise control over B. (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 53; see Benton 1981) Barnett and 
Duvall follow Lukes, Gramsci, Gill and Law’s arguments that “while power exists in coercion 
and institutional arrangements, to understand the workings of the global capitalist economy 
requires recognition of global production relations as constitutive structure.” (Barnett; Duvall 
2005a:  54;  quoted  after  Gill  and  Law  1989)  In  essence,  then,  the  “structure  of  global 
capitalism substantially determines the capacities and resources of actors.” (Barnett; Duvall 
2005a: 54; quoted after Rupert and Smith 2002) The actors’ outlook, ideology, interests etc. 
are pre-shaped in this sense. Therefore, this system helps to reproduce the “interests of the 
capitalists  and their  fellow travelers at  the direct  expense of  the objective (but  not,  then, 
recognized) interests of the world’s producing classes”. (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 54) This is 
why the work goes into the reproduction of the system, rather than the transformation of the 
system, the structure, and its relations of domination. (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 54)
Structural power draws many similarities to the World-systems theory. In World-system 
theory, the positions that states are identified with such as core, semi periphery and periphery, 
generate how they behave in the world system and what interests they have. (Barnett; Duvall 
2005a: 54; see Wallerstein 1996) Constructivists also identify with the concept of structural 
power.  Role  structures  determine  the  privileges  and capacities  of  actors.  (Barnett;  Duvall 
2005a: 54; Wendt and Duvall 1989) The point of Boli and Thomas is most interesting, since 
they argue that “there is  a world authority structure,  a set  of fundamental principles,  that 
constitutes  who  are  the  actors  of  world  politics,  what  are  their  identities,  what  are  their 
expressive purposes, and what are their differential capacities.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 55) 
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According  to  this  view,  the  world  authority  structure  is  “organized  around  rational-legal 
values” that “privileges the voices of international nongovernmental organizations.” (Barnett; 
Duvall  2005a:  55;  Boli  and Thomas  1999)  Striking  a  similar  chord  is  productive  power, 
explored in the next section.
2.1.4 Productive Power
Productive  and  structural  power  overlap  in  a  few  aspects.  Productive  power  is  also 
concerned  with  social  processes  that  are  “not  controlled  by  specific  actors,  but  that  are 
affected only through the meaningful practices of actors.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 55) Both 
examine “how the social capacities of actors are socially produced, and how these processes 
shape  actors’ self-understandings  and  perceived  interests.”  (Ibid.)  Productive  power  can 
determine “whose knowledge matters” and “what constitutes legitimate knowledge.” (Barnett; 
Duvall 2005: 3-4) 
The difference to structural power is that productive power works with “more generalized 
and  diffuse  social  processes”  instead  of  “direct  structural  relations.”  This  is  in  line  with 
Foucault’s  argument of power as a “productive process”,  where power is only productive 
when  raising  “social  forces.”  (Sarasin  2005:  147;  quoted  after  Foucault  1976:  267)  The 
dynamic of power is all-embracing. Power contains knowledge, institutions, discourse as well 
as  architecture,  Foucault’s  favorite  example  being  the  panopticon.3 Generally  speaking, 
productive  power  also  examines  the  social  relations  within  structures  and the  systems of 
knowledge and therefore “looks beyond (or is post-) structures”. (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 55) 
Foucault sees power as permanently changing and moving through its own dynamic. Power is 
all over the place because it arises anywhere. (Sarasin 2005: 151; quoted after Foucault 1976: 
114) Structural power concerns the struggle of the less powerful against the powerful actors. 
Productive power examines the “boundaries of all social identity”, examines the capacities 
and inclinations for action for the weak and the powerful alike, “as well as the myriad social 
subjects that are not constituted in binary hierarchical relationships.” (Barnett; Duvall 2005a: 
56) Following this argument actors are constrained to determine their own fate because of 
their social relations to others. Conversely, social relations to the “right” actors could also 
enhance  the  fate  of  weaker  actors.  Foucault,  then,  understands  resistance  not  in  a 
revolutionary sense, but in the sense that weaker actors want to change their fate, but not the 
3 In this context a panopticon describes a prison where the inspector can see the prisoners at all times, without 
being seen himself. 
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system itself. 
Power and authority are often put on the same level, but there are some differences. The 
next section tries to explore what these differences are and why they matter.
2.2 Authority
“International  organizations are bureaucracies,  and bureaucracies  are a  distinctive social  form that  
exercises authority in particular ways. Perhaps most influential and least noticed are the ways in which  
IOs use their authority to both regulate and constitute the world.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 9)
IOs are regularly seen as “byproducts of state action”,  hence their  “independence” is 
often overlooked by scholars and theories of international politics alike. (Barnett; Finnemore 
2004: vii) As a result, the “power structure” of IOs is regularly neglected because IOs are 
created  by  states.  However,  IOs  are  intentionally  given  some  autonomy  because  states 
themselves “are neither able nor willing to perform the IOs mission themselves.” (Barnett; 
Finnemore 2004: 5) This explains why the independent power of IOs is often overlooked and 
scholars only explore how states act through those organizations. Even if IOs are given some 
autonomy, it is true that more powerful states can direct the organization in some ways, since 
IOs are “almost always designed to give states, particularly powerful ones, a great deal of 
control.” (Ibid.: 4) Nevertheless, IOs can make the most of a seemingly meager autonomy as 
they can encourage states to act according to their view.
Barnett  and  Finnemore  claim  that  the  power  of  IOs  “lies  in  their  ability  to  present 
themselves  as  impersonal  and  neutral  –  as  exercising  power  but  instead  serving  others”. 
(Barnett;  Finnemore  2005:  175;  quoted  after  Fisher  1997  and  Shore;  Wright  1997) 
Meanwhile,  Betz  argues  that  the  power  of  IOs  is  limited  by  the  international  economic 
system.  In  his  point  of  view,  evidence  suggests  that  there  is  a  kind  of  resistance  if 
recommended measures affect state autonomy or the autonomy of the private sector. Bilateral 
agencies as well as civil society form competition to IOs. Consequently, the influence of IOs 
is restricted and the shortcomings in quota and voting structure take away the credibility of 
them. (Betz 2007: 316)  Hurrell  views institutions as a buffer between weak and powerful 
states. While powerful states could not intervene into national affairs of weaker states directly, 
the “buffer” of IOs makes this intervention possible. As far as he is concerned, institutions 
legitimize the “ever-deeper” intrusions into sovereign states. (Hurrell 2005: 56) Betz claims 
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that the influence of international financial organizations is limited with industrial nations but 
is still relevant in the case of developing nations. (Betz 2007: 322-3) Barnett and Finnemore 
are  in  accordance  with  Nye  and  Keohane,  who  view  IOs  as  policy  networks.  (Barnett; 
Finnemore 2005: 182; quoted after Keohane and Nye 2001)
The following are the four kinds of authority recognized by Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore. These two scholars look upon IOs as bureaucracies. As far as they are concerned, 
they view bureaucracy as “a distinctive social form of authority with its own internal logic 
and behavioral proclivities.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 3) Authority gives an IO “autonomy 
vis-à-vis states, individuals, and other international actors”, at least to some degree. (Ibid.: 5, 
25) Through their regulated agenda, institutions reinforce “practices of reciprocity”. Member 
states conform to the rules of powerful institutions so that other member states, and states that 
want to join such institutions, conform to those rules as well. Consequently, the behavior of 
other state becomes more predictable. (Keohane 1998: 86) In analyzing authority structures it 
is easier to understand how IOs develop a sphere of their own and how they become “experts” 
and respected organizations with concrete expertise on which even state authorities rely. 
2.2.1 Rational-legal Authority
Bureaucracies are an authority and are defined by Barnett and Finnemore as a “rational-
legal authority in their domain of action.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 20) As an authority, a 
bureaucracy is able to use their resources to get actors to do what it wants from them. Actors 
who enable the bureaucracy assign power and legitimize the actions of it. As far as Weber is 
concerned, there is little chance that a once established bureaucracy can be broken up. The 
“ruled” are already depending on the organization and its “permanent output” of its efficient 
bureaucratic administration. (Müller 2007: 142) This is a point worth dwelling on and could 
explain  the  persistence  of  established bureaucratic  organizations  and why already archaic 
structures like the World Bank or the IMF still exist and still are funded by states. Weber calls  
this the “objective indispensability” of the administration. (Müller 2007: 143; quoted after 
Weber  1972:  570)  The  mere  feeling  of  authority  makes  individuals  “defer  to  those  in 
authority.” People, as well as states, tend to “alter their behavior in ways that are consistent 
with the directions laid out by that authority.” (Ibid.) The power of authority lies not only in 
the ability to get people to do what they would not otherwise do, but also to tell them what is  
the right thing to do. Of course, authority is exposed to change. There could be competition 
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between a few authoritative voices and authority is not always obeyed by people or, in most 
cases of this paper, states. 
Consequently, to be powerful and authoritative, the actions must have value and a social 
purpose and above all must be seen as impartial and technocratic. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 
21) The organization has to act impersonal and neutral in order to exercise power that appears 
to  be  serving  others.  In  this  view,  the  organization  is  seen  as  “perfect”  when  it  acts  
impersonal,  and  when  love,  hate  and  every  other  personal,  even  irrational  feeling  or 
consideration is eliminated through the transaction of official functions. (Müller 2007: 141; 
quoted after Weber 1972: 563) The administration has to be impersonal, operating without 
hate and passion, without prestige of the person. (Müller 2007: 140; quoted after Weber 1972: 
129)  Following  this  argument,  it  could  explain  why  some  decisions  seem to  be  lacking 
compassion completely. Some decisions seem to be derived from reality entirely and ignore 
the opinion of the people. The outcome for the population is overlooked. For any international 
organization to appear neutral and to not look to be depending on powerful state members is 
crucial to its credibility, especially for financial organizations like the IMF. Still, this is not 
possible since,  as Barnett  and Finnemore put it:  “Bureaucracies always serve some social 
purpose  or  set  of  cultural  values.”  (Barnett;  Finnemore  2004:  21)  In  some cases,  even a 
neutral  standpoint  is  missing,  but  IOs  still  have  to  find  one  to  preserve  credibility  and 
impartiality. Rational-legal authority is not enough to explain the behavior of IOs, hence there 
are  other  ways for  IOs to  gain legitimacy,  authority  and influence,  described in  the  next 
sections. 
2.2.2 Delegated Authority
The authority of IOs is basically delegated authority from states. States delegate tasks 
which they cannot perform themselves. For example, member states have delegated to the 
IMF  the  authority  “to  act  on  certain  domains  regarding  international  financial  matters.” 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 22) Keohane compares the capability of institutions to reduce costs 
of  “making  and  enforcing  agreements”  for  individual  states  to  “transaction  costs”  in  the 
economic world. (Keohane 1998: 86) Hence an IOs’ authority represents “the collective will” 
of its members. Conversely, member states also have the authority to delegate tasks to IOs. 
Seen in that light, it appears that IOs cannot act on their own and states dictate the course for 
them. Indeed they possess authority, but seemingly little autonomy. Nevertheless, to make an 
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IO work, it must be an autonomous actor. (Ibid.) This runs counter to International relations 
theories,  which  claim that  states  guide  the  tasks  of  IOs  and that  IOs  lack  the  necessary 
autonomy to work on their own. Barnett and Finnemore argue in a similar vain, as commonly 
it is claimed that sovereignty is the only basis for authority, which would refuse organizations 
to possess authority. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 5) This explanation, however, fails to grasp 
the whole picture. 
How would IOs work against state interests then, as proven in a few situations?4 IOs need 
to be autonomous to reach decisions without considering state interests. Otherwise, their work 
would be impossible. As IOs are obliged to work in favor of their delegators, however, they 
can use their authority by preserving the appearance “that they are faithful servants to their 
mandates and masters.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 22) A lot of work of an IO also flows into 
balancing the interests of their “state masters”, who often have different interpretations of the 
existing rules and procedures. Accordingly, IOs can exercise authority by offering their own 
response to certain interests of member states while appearing impartial. While they are doing 
this, they have to “present themselves as acting not autonomously but at the behest of their 
principals.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 23) This is possible through their  moral and  expert  
authority, discussed in the sections that follow.
2.2.3 Moral Authority
Most  of  the  IOs  speak  out  on  behalf  of  certain  principles  and  on  behalf  of  the 
international community. The UNHCR serves as an example of “moral authority”, since the 
organization is primarily concerned with protecting refugees and gained the reputation of a 
responsible organization in general. The United Nations also serves as an example of moral 
authority. Since every member state has the same voting power in the U.N., mandates of the 
organization are recognized to be fair and respected by the world community. Even if the U.N. 
lacks  material  resources  to  execute  decisions,  going  against  mandates  could  damage  a 
country’s reputation for a long time. A case in point is the invasion of Iraq by the U.S. without 
4 To point out a few situations where IOs work against state interests, Barnett and Finnemore listed 5 types of 
Ios’ autonomous relations with states. For instance, Part 4 describes how IOs may act against state interests, 
when acting “contrary to the preferences of weak states, […], and often frustrate the will of strong states.” 
IOs may also work together with NGOs or form alliances with publics, other IOs, “and other states to protect 
policies from powerful states that oppose them.” Through those alliances, IOs can force powerful states to 
“initiate policies or establish agendas” that run against state interests of powerful states. These processes are 
often “oblique”. Direct confrontation with dominant states, however, is avoided when possible. (Barnett; 
Finnemore 2004: 27-8)
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a U.N. Security Council mandate. The war was even breaching the U.N. charter and deemed 
“illegal” by Kofi Annan in 2004.5 The U.S. public also highly values the work of the council. 
A poll6 conducted just before the invading of Iraq found that 67% of Americans surveyed 
“responded that it was necessary for the U.S. to get approval from the U.N. Security Council 
to  invade Iraq.”  (Fang 2008:  304)  The American  public  favors  multilateralism instead  of 
unilateral action, and the U.N. Security council is just the right forum for the U.S. to work 
along with the international community in a multilateral way. Similarly, Russia and China see 
the U.N. as an “independent authority” that is able to counter American unilateral action. 
(Schottenhammer 2006: 22-3) 
Hence,  moral  authority  alone  endows  IOs  with  some  autonomy  although  many 
organizations are obliged to member states due to funding issues. As IOs are supposed to be 
moral they should refrain from engaging in battles with governments. They channel much of 
their energy into demonstrating their neutrality, objectivity and impartiality and serving all of 
the countries, including the less powerful ones. Moral authority can be used to support their 
preferred interests and carve out some kind of autonomy, as the organization can sometimes 
go against the wishes of member states. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 23) Another source of 
authority is expert authority, which is also gained through immaterial sources.
2.2.4 Expert Authority
Expertise often gives IOs authority. IOs work daily on specialized matters ranging from 
human right  issues  to economic welfare.  Because of their  work,  they tend to  accumulate 
outstanding expertise and hence states ask their advice when running into special problems. 
The information is up to date and theoretically well-founded. Because of their knowledge, 
expertise and experience,  IOs possess authority and trust.  Weber attributes bureaucracy to 
“authority by knowledge” and strict orientation on predictable rules. Hence, the predictability 
of success is a given. (Müller 2007: 141; quoted after Weber 1972: 129) As a result, states 
tend to trust or depend on IOs in delicate matters. Even IO officials believe that they work for 
the sake of public good and therefore channel their knowledge “in ways that would improve 
society.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 24) Betz claims that the “expert” information constitutes 
a unique comparative advantage. (Betz 2007: 334) The granting of loans ensures obtaining 
5 MacAskill, Ewen; Borger, Julian (2004): “Iraq war was illegal and breached UN charter, says Annan“, The 
Guardian, September 16th, 2004. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq accessed on July 
19th, 2011) 
6 The poll was conducted between January 21 and 26, 2003. 
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information, for example by the IMF, about countries which otherwise would refrain from 
issuing reports about their economic situation. (Betz 2007: 335) This expertise can appear 
“depoliticized”  as  knowledge  is  “objective”  and  “numbers  can  speak  for  themselves”. 
Consequently, the advice of experts from IOs seems to be “unaffected by partisan squabbles”. 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 24) Nevertheless, experts may view the world differently from the 
people who are affected by their decisions. This is because the organization's professional 
training, norms, and occupational culture influence how such experts view the world. (Ibid.) 
Since the staff  of IOs is often composed of people from the western world, especially in 
higher  positions,  the  cultural  background  of  those  people  subconsciously  influences  their 
decisions. Decisions of people with a different cultural background can have damaging impact 
on the lives of people whom those decisions affect, even if involuntarily.   
Financial  organizations  serve  as  a  special  example  of  expert  authority.  Those 
organizations apparently lost  their  say in industrial  countries in the 1970’s (IMF) and the 
1950’s respectively (World Bank). (Betz 2007: 322) However, even if industrial nations do 
not  need financial  help  anymore,  they still  are  dependent  on those  organizations  when it 
comes to their “expert authority”. This falls under the category of compulsory power. Every 
country has to monitor their fiscal policy which is then also interpreted by the IMF. Those 
reports are quite a great source of authority and enable the organization to advise politicians 
on certain fiscal policies. Following Weber’s argument, this goes to show that the “ruler” has 
great interest in holding on to its authority, cultivating and reviving the faith in its legitimacy 
continuously. (Müller 2007: 127; quoted after Weber 1972: 122, 123) As a result, information 
equals power. In developing countries, the influence of financial organizations is still present 
and influencing the countries directly, since they need to accept “material resources” that then 
can alter  the weaker countries’ economic policies. How IOs become an authority that can 
implement such measures throughout the world is explored in the next section.
2.2.5 “In Authority” and “An Authority”
The four types  of  authority  described above make IOs authoritative in  two ways:  by 
putting them “in authority” or by making them “an authority” or a mix of the two. (Barnett; 
Finnemore 2004: 25) The framework of an organization given to it by member states alone 
puts  the  organization  “in  authority”.  Authority  derives  from  the  institutional  role  the 
organization occupies. Experience, credentials, training and education make an organization 
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“an  authority.”  Sometimes,  the  organization  is  first  “in  authority”  and  over  time,  with 
experience and training, becomes “an authority.” Of the four types, rational-legal and delegate 
authority  put the organization “in authority”.  Expert  authority makes the organization “an 
authority”  and  moral  authority  tends  to  serve  both  purposes.  At  times,  those  four  types 
compete and create a dilemma for IO staff. For example, state demands can run counter to the 
moral claims or expertise of an organization. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 26)
Beginning research, the impression was that states are able to shape IO behavior. After 
all, states created IOs, therefore IOs act as “principal agents” for states and perform actions 
that the state wants it to perform. In the process of forming an IO, however, the organization 
takes on a life of its own and acts on its own. It becomes a bureaucracy. As Barnett and  
Finnemore eloquently state: “The notion that IOs simply do what states want quickly runs 
afoul  of  the many instances in  which IOs develop their  own ideas  and pursue their  own 
agendas.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 2) International Relations scholars especially view an IO 
as an instrument for powerful states. The fact that member states erect IOs for the purpose of 
them doing the things the state cannot or does not want to carry out is evidence enough that 
member states expect an IO to exercise some autonomy. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 27) Even 
if states hope that IOs do not overrun their purpose, IOs sometimes extend their zone and 
work against state interests or transform them. The degree and kind of relation between IOs 
and its member states can be determined by a few types of autonomous relations of IOs with 
states. A variation in those relations can help us understand better how IOs can act on their 
own. Of utmost importance is that states know that they have to endow an IO with enough 
autonomy in order for the organization to further the state’s interests. IOs act on policy issues 
that are of no interest to states which give the IOs “wide latitude for autonomous action.” 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 28) Therefore, IOs can alter policy directions of states to “pursue 
its own distinctive interests.” (Ibid.) IOs can even go as far as to flat out run against state 
interests, which of course does not affect dominant states directly but can affect weak states to 
a  great  extent.  IOs  work  on  changing  the  “broader  normative  environment  and  states’ 
perceptions of their own preferences” so they can fit with IO preferences. (Ibid.) These five 
types of relationships give a new picture of how they use their autonomy. IOs can create the 
world they want in contrast to state demands and search for their own allies, perhaps using the 
public and NGOs. IOs can even go as far as changing the political, ethical and other values of  
states. The fact of recognizing that IOs can work autonomously follows that they can exercise 
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power. 
Having said all  that,  however,  it  is true that states influence IOs somehow, especially 
financial organizations.  The question is only how, when and to what degree states influence 
organizations. As Barnett and Finnemore explored IO behavior, they credited the influence of 
states. They found out that “states are a central fact of life for each of these IOs7” and that 
“state support is a crucial component of IO authority”. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 12) The 
question is now, what do IOs do to bring states in line with their attempted goals? The next 
section tries to find an answer.
2.3 The Power of International Organizations
In this  part,  the practicability of the concept of power and authority for IOs is  being 
explored. While power and authority can be applied to a lot of spheres, this part focuses on 
the  applicability  for  international  institutions.  It  will  be  discussed  how  those  institutions 
achieve their autonomy, how they act on their own and how they play states off against each 
other  to  achieve their  goals.  Also,  it  will  be considered why the international  community 
respects  those organizations  and takes  their  recommendations  without  any objections  and 
without questioning their intentions. Finally, it will be determined why states do not object to 
the idea of giving otherwise confidential information to those institutions and even uses their 
findings  and analysis  of  this  information  for  their  national  purposes  (and  simultaneously 
claiming the information to be their own).  An explanation can be found in the three ways for 
IOs to achieve that, defined by Barnett and Finnemore: the classification of the world, the 
fixing of meanings and the diffusion of norms. All of these mechanisms can have regulative 
and constitutive effects. 
2.3.1 Classification of the World
IOs were established to help states solve problems as they could not solve them on their 
own. This is one easily defined feature of IOs. The other purpose of IOs is to define many 
problems the world faces and to determine which ones should be solved. The best example is 
7 Barnett and Finnemore researched incidents where states influenced organizations at the International 
Monetary Fund, the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Peacekeeping Missions of the United 
Nations.
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the classification of “human rights”. Human rights were not always seen as important. They 
only  became  of  political  importance  once  an  education  process  started,  and  since  then, 
genocides are not seen as a conflict or a civil war that one country has to solve on its own, but  
as an international matter. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 31) Barnett and Finnemore eloquently 
put this practice into perspective: 
“Problems are not part of objective reality but are subjectively defined and constituted within social  
experience. Authorities help to create that subjective reality and to define what are the problems that  
require solutions.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 32)    
This  follows that  a  source  of  power for  IOs is  the  classification and organization of 
knowledge. An International Organization decides which information is more important than 
the other and which information should be passed on to the outside world. This is in line with 
the argument of Weber, who states that the heart of bureaucratic power is control based on 
knowledge. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 29; see Müller 2007: 141; quoted after Weber 1972: 
129) Bureaucrats have information and others do not. Therefore, those bureaucrats can dictate 
“what information other actors must collect and reveal”, so they can control outcomes. (Ibid.) 
Granted, this is not the only source of power. Bureaucratic power not only derives from the 
information it possesses, but also from the ability to “construct information in ways that give 
it  meaning.”  (Ibid.)  This  is  why  nowadays,  information  of  a  poverty-stricken  Africa  is 
perceived as a “development problem“. Eighty years ago the situation might have been the 
same, but the “interpretation changes as meanings change”. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 30) 
Another example is the killing of dissidents which eighty years ago might have been looked 
upon  as  “state  law enforcement”  but  nowadays,  is  a  major  human  rights  violation.  This 
perception is socially constructed and often achieved by bureaucracies. (Ibid.) How do IOs 
achieve  this  change  in  perception?  First,  IOs  have  different  ways  of  exercising  power 
depending on their situation. For example, the IMF can use monetary incentives to “shape the 
behavior of another actor”. Others tend to emphasize their rules and “deploy knowledge in 
order to change incentives and regulate behavior”. (Ibid.) It is especially true that the IMF’s 
categorization of economies and which economy is “on the right track” has great impact on 
countries. Economies failing to meet the right standard are cut from access to IMF funds or 
financing  at  reasonable  rates.  The  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR) classifies  which group of  people are  refugees,  and which  group of  people are 
merely migrants. This distinction therefore can decide their fate. With the ability to extend or 
discard  a  group’s  refugee  status,  the  UNHCR  holds  a  great  deal  of  power.  Also,  the 
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classification of conflicts as civil wars or genocides triggers a different set of responses by 
international actors and IOs. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 32) 
In a way, bureaucracies can construct reality as they can decide which information is to 
be collected and which information is  of importance.  They can set  the agenda to  impose 
topics that they want to discuss and not others. They can even decide which actors participate 
in  the  decision-making  progress  and  which  do  not.  This  is  how IO staff  can  “regulate” 
behavior into ways that are “consistent with their  preferences and with existing rules and 
mandates”. (Barnett, Finnemore 2004: 31)  Seen in this way, IOs can control the actions states 
take. Certainly, these examples show rather extremely how a “classification process” is a great 
source of power. Another source of power, the fixing of meanings, follows in the next section.
2.3.2 The Fixing of Meanings
Another important source of power for IOs is to “fix meanings in ways that orient action 
and establish boundaries for acceptable action.” (Barnett, Finnemore 2004: 32) Organizations 
achieve this through various analyses, for example through the “World Economic Outlook” 
and  other  corresponding  reports  where  the  established  view  of  developing  and  financial 
scholars is expressed. (Betz 2007: 336; quoted after Mallaby 2004: 71) Through this process, 
IOs establish “meanings” for international actors. They define what “development” is, and 
also redefine this meaning when insufficient. They determine for example “who gets to do the 
developing  (usually  states  or  IOs),  and  who  is  to  be  developed  (usually  local  groups).” 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 32) As a result, the reports and analysis of financial organizations 
are the basis for political decisions. Of course, the analysis of the World Bank or the IMF is 
also  published  in  international  financial  journals.  Even  agencies  base  their  decisions  on 
benchmarks of financial institutions. Recommended programs of international institutions are 
adopted, but slightly readjusted so as to fit with social policies of the countries in question. To 
be sure, governments mostly just want to add a certain personal feature as not to leave the 
field only to institutions. (Betz 2007: 336) 
Why  do  states  adopt  those  policies  without  questioning  them?  The  success  is 
accomplished  through  “framing”,  which  roughly  specifies  metaphors,  “symbolic 
representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative 
mode and to suggest alternative modes of action.” (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 33) IOs can use 
those  frames  to  “dictate”  the  direction  of  action  being  taken.  This  can  explain  why 
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“landmines” were  redefined from being “a  pedestrian  piece  of  military  hardware  into  an 
illegal source of large-scale human rights violations.” (Ibid.) Betz illustrates this with another 
prominent example: The definition of the term “good governance” was first introduced by the 
World Bank in 1992. In a critical report about Africa, this term was coined with regard to 
transparency in the action of governments, rule of law, accountability of governments and 
participation.  (Betz  2007:  335;  quoted  after  World  Bank  1992)  Consequently,  IOs 
accomplished this transformation by using the media to mobilize public opinion and appeals 
to the laws of war. A “constitutive” effect of IOs is the ability to shape social reality. They 
have a decided advantage over states or Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the way 
that their conferred authority gives them the power to define problems or morality and dictate 
the rules for a social situation. As a result, “IOs are able to use their authority, knowledge, and 
rules to regulate and constitute the world that subsequently requires regulation.” (Barnett, 
Finnemore 2004: 31) A third attribute by which IOs are able to define problems is by the 
diffusion of norms, following in the next section.
2.3.3 Diffusion of Norms
When IOs have achieved to “fix the meanings” and “classify the world” according to 
their wishes, what remains for the organizations is to spread their “defined” belief system, 
create international norms and also to enforce those global values and norms. Barnett and 
Finnemore call the staff of IOs the “missionaries of our time”. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 33) 
Through  the  process  of  spreading  their  beliefs,  IOs  “legitimate  and  facilitate”  their 
intervention into national affairs. Because of their authority, they are able to decide who gets 
to solve a problem and what the suitable solution is. Peace building operations are a good 
example of showing the intervention of IOs into national affairs and through that process, the 
diffusion of norms occurs. When trying to develop stable, legitimate states, the organization 
establishes  a  professional  police  which  renders  a  professional  judiciary  and penal  system 
necessary also. Consequently, this approach requires lawyers and law schools. A seemingly 
small  intervention  becomes  a  reform  to  transform  non-western  societies  into  western 
societies. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 34) Acharya, however, argues that local actors do not 
remain “passive targets”. (Acharya 2009: 7) He stresses the role of local actors, and not those 
of  external  actors,  in  “producing  norm diffusion”.  (Acharya  2009:  14)  Foreign  ideas  get 
“localized” and then developed into “congruence with local beliefs and practices”. (Acharya 
2009:  15) If  universal  norms fit  into the concept of local  norms, they are more likely to 
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succeed. Also, success in diffusing local norms can be achieved when the local norm has 
already  been  contested  from  within.  Acharya  gives  the  example  of  the  anti-footbinding 
campaign in China8,  that succeeded because it  fit  into the concept of the national  reform 
movement. The campaign against female circumcision in Kenya, however, failed because it 
was perceived “as an integral part of local culture and identity.” (Acharya 2009: 16) As far as 
the diffusion of norms is concerned, when is an actor compelled to change existing norms? 
Acharya states that  war or  a great  economic crisis  are  acts  that  call  for  change.  Another 
change can be brought  upon by “shifts  in  the distribution of power or the great  powers’ 
interests and interactions [that] can also generate pressures for normative change.” (Acharya 
2009: 16) While those norms are embedded into societies, that does not mean that local norms 
are replaced. Localization is easier to achieve, because new ideas can be embedded “without 
admitting  to  cultural  or  knowledge  inferiority  or  compromising  its  existing  identity”. 
(Acharya 2009: 17) Of course, sometimes outer pressure like pressure to open the economy, 
for example, forces countries to adapt to international norms. Adaptation, however, is not as 
long-lasting as localization. Therefore, “norm diffusion is the result of adaptive behavior in 
which local practices are made consistent with an external idea. Localization, by contrast, 
describes a process in which external ideas are adapted to meet local practices.” (Acharya 
2009: 19) Localization is a “dynamic and continuous process”. (Acharya 2009: 21) Therefore, 
prior unsuccessful ventures into localizing norms can be successful at a later point of time. 
Which of the above standpoints is proving true in this paper remains to be seen. 
2.4 Regionalism
In order to answer the question of the shift of power and if regional organizations want to 
counter the influence of IOs, definitional clarity is a prerequisite. Therefore, the definition of a 
region,  regionalism and regionalization  is  needed.  It  will  be discussed  what  constitutes  a 
region,  which  country  belongs  to  a  region and which  country  does  not,  and  how this  is 
determined. It might be the cultural factor, the geographical factor, the economic or yet the 
historical factor that determines what a region is. Also, it will be discussed how regionalism or 
8 In China, it was custom to bind the feet of young girls to prevent them from growing in order to achieve a 
patriarchal ideal of beauty. This custom was reserved to girls of the upper classes in the Tang (618-906) and 
Song Dynasty (960-1280) but later was practiced by all classes of society up until the late 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th century. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911, various anti-footbinding campaigns 
were carried out. Whereas before such campaigns only achieved little success, the campaigns of the Republic 
of China were successful because of the numerous cultural and political changes that took place during that 
time. (Griessler 2006: 195-197)
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regionalization work and if regionalization or regionalism are already evidence of a shift of 
power. Furthermore, the question is raised if this is evidence that countries want to counter 
IOs. Another aim is to find out what the purpose of building up regional organizations is. This 
chapter tries to touch on these questions in that it first tries to define what constitutes a region. 
The next section tries to define regionalism and regionalization. 
2.4.1 What Constitutes a Region?
There  are  many definitions  of  what  constitutes  a  region.  While  some state  that  it  is 
geographical proximity that “makes” a region, others find that political culture or “religious, 
ethnic, national, ideological and other ideational symbols and values give shape and meaning 
to societal affinities and solidarities on the one hand and conflicts of interest and perception 
on  the  other”.  (Camilleri  2003:  3)  The  argument  of  “geographical  proximity”  is  easily 
contested and demonstrated by the U.S. Even though the U.S. is geographically distant to the 
East Asian region, the country is in fact “geopolitically integral to it”. (Camilleri 2003: 5) 
That leads to the next definition of a region: Power and its distribution all over the world also 
play  a  role  in  constituting  a  region.  Dominant  powers  can  influence  regions.  Through 
economic  or  organizational  power,  military  capabilities,  or  physical  proximity  and 
demographic weight, states “are able to exercise systematic leverage over regional affairs.” 
(Camilleri 2003: 16) This point is again demonstrated by the U.S., who has influenced and 
shaped  the  East  Asian  region  for  decades  already.  Other  scholars  argue  that  economical 
interdependence  is  a  prerequisite  to  constitute  a  region.  But  as  Camilleri  points  out, 
interaction between countries has “quantitative and qualitative dimensions”. (Camilleri 2003: 
6) This indicates that while economic interdependence is a form of interaction, it does not 
necessarily lead to more cooperation. Other exchanges are needed in order to find a regional 
identity, common symbols and values. Regional identity and a common outlook on key issues 
are  a  prerequisite  for  a  successful  regional  integration.  (Beeson  2007:  6)  Serving  as  an 
example,  while  there  is  a  large  amount  of  economical  interdependence  in  East  Asia,  the 
countries in that region still find it difficult to work together in other spheres.
The most common feature is that states “make” a region. States and their internal and 
external  relationships define how the region works.  Thereby,  external influences could be 
policies  of  states,  as  well  as  transnational  corporations,  financial  markets,  international 
governmental  institutions  or  non-governmental  organizations.  Camilleri  argues  that  while 
states are important, it seems to be a mixture of states and their geographical, demographical 
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as well as historical, political and socio-cultural influences that define a region. (Camilleri 
2003: 5) Deutsch stresses the importance of communication. He states that “the experiences 
associated with past wars and the awareness of conflicting interests and perspectives can help 
to  forge  among  elites  but  also  among  the  wider  public  a  sense  of  community,  that  is  a 
readiness  to  seek  common ground  and new forms of  collaboration.”  (Camilleri  2003:  7; 
quoted after Deutsch 1957) Conflicts can work as a catalyst for regional cooperation, like the 
Western European integration after the Second World War. Conversely, conflicts can promote 
“regional segmentation, be it ideological, economic or strategic, with entire regions or sub-
regions sharply divided into opposing blocs or spheres of influence”. (Camilleri 2003: 21) In 
Asia, conflicts had the effect of dividing the region, as well as creating a rift that is hard to 
overcome.  The  countries  of  the  region  lack  the  “awareness  of  conflicting  interests  and 
perspectives”  and  politicians  in  the  region  exploit  past  experiences  for  their  political 
advantages.9 Still,  disagreements  did  not  hold  off  other  regions  to  create  their  regional 
initiatives. In a security community “the imperative to co-operate has achieved primacy over 
conflictual tendencies.” (Camilleri 2003: 8)  These communities are characterized “by a high 
degree  of  trust,  common  aspirations,  low  probability  of  armed  conflict,  and  clear 
differentiation  between  life  within  and  outside  the  community.”  (Camilleri  2003:  8)  The 
question lingers if a security community is unattainable for states who do not possess all of 
these prerequisites, such as in East Asia. Is it impossible for them to carve out some kind of 
security community? To clear up how and in which way this would be possible is another aim 
of this paper.
2.4.2 Regionalism and Regionalization
Regional trade agreements and other regional initiatives are on the rise, especially in East 
Asia. The logical question to aks is: Why is there such a new buzz for regional initiatives? 
One reason seems to be the stalling of the WTO’s Doha round.10 The uneasy feeling of being 
left  out  of  trading advantages  leads  countries  to  pursue  bilateral  trade  agreements.  Other 
factors are “the enlargement of the EU and growing Pan-American moves to increase free 
trade arrangements, such as expanding the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
into the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).” (Sohn; Lee 2005: 171) Sohn and 
Lee  also  give  credit  to  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis  which  prompted  the  region  to  pursue 
9 Recent attempts to create a common history of Japan, Korea and China are, for example, the efforts to write a 
joint history textbook in 2005, touched upon later in this paper. 
10 The stalling of the Doha round will be touched upon later in this paper.
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regional agreements in order to protect themselves from future crises. (Sohn; Lee 2005: 172) 
This section will touch upon a few definitions of regionalism as well as regionalization.
Regionalization can be seen either as an exit strategy because IOs fail to cater to the 
needs  of  particular  regions  and  states,  or  it  acts  as  a  substitute  for  them.  Still  another 
explanation  is  that  regionalization  is  built  up  to  serve  globalization.  Winters  defines 
regionalism economically as being “loosely as any policy designed to reduce trade barriers 
between a subset of countries, regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or 
even  close  to  each  other”.  (Winters  1999:  8)  Beeson  states  that  while  the  effort  for 
regionalism  is  intentionally  made  by  states  or  other  actors,  regionalization  describes  the 
outcome of this “political process of collaboration.” (Beeson 2007: 5) In another paper by 
Beeson, together with Yoshimatsu, they argue that regionalization “is taken to refer to the 
empirical manifestation of trans-border economic integration and is principally driven by the 
private sector.” (Beeson et al. 2006: 4) This rings especially true for East Asia, where regional 
integration was largely driven by corporate restructuring and investment in the region. Yet 
another explanation of Frost states that regionalization is “a manifestation of globalization”. 
Asia  “regionalized”  through  “revolutions  in  information,  telecommunications,  and 
transportation technology.” (Frost 2008: 14) Camilleri describes it that way: 
“Whereas regionalization refers to the diverse flows and processes, be they economic, technological, 
or socio-cultural, that bind together the constituent entities of any given region, regionalism describes 
the tendency of a region and its constituents to preserve or expand the benefits of regional interaction by  
developing institutions and mechanisms of various kinds that set, monitor and enforce the standards of 
interaction.” (Camilleri 2003: 12)
Though  rather  stilted,  Camilleri  emphasizes  the  same  as  the  others  before:  While 
regionalism is prompted by political factors as politicians seek to institutionalize cooperation, 
regionalization is the outcome of private sector developments. How globalization plays into 
the urge for regionalism and regionalization is explored in the next section.
2.4.3 Regionalism and Globalization
Globalization also plays a factor in regionalization processes. In the era of globalization, 
“regional  cooperation  offers  potential  benefits  to  states  and businesses  in  an  increasingly 
competitive international environment.” (Beeson et al. 2006: 5) In Asia, regionalism expresses 
itself especially in bilateral agreements. (Frost 2008: 15) Bilateral agreements are favored and 
give  the  countries  advantages  over  other  institutional  mechanisms.  For  that  reason,  the 
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question if globalization reinforces regionalization processes becomes all the more prominent. 
As Beeson states, “for some areas of the world, regional cooperation offered a way of warding 
off the possible negative impacts of global processes and providing a degree of insulation for 
regional  polities  and economies.”  (Beeson 2007:  5)  Even if  globalization  processes  were 
absent, regions would still  fail to be immune to international processes. Financial markets 
make it impossible for regions and states to escape global developments. Therefore, some 
regional initiatives try to protect themselves against globalizing processes and try “to counter 
the homogenizing tendencies that accompany cultural  globalization.” (Camilleri  2003:  11) 
Another interpretation also credits regionalism with stimulating globalization as regions try to 
adapt  their  economic  policies  in  order  to  fit  global  requirements.  (Ibid.)
In this section the question whether or not regional initiatives are a threat to already 
established multilateral institutions is being explored. Guerrieri and Falautano, citing a few 
authors,  argue  that  regional  trade  agreements  can  actually  get  member  countries  “to 
implement trade reforms to favour multilateral liberalisation (Summers, 1991; Whalley, 1996; 
Francois,  1997),  enable  progress  on  issues  too  complex  or  sensitive  for  multilateral 
negotiations (Lawrence, 1996), or reduce the number of actors in multilateral negotiations, 
making  collective  action  easier  (Krugman,  1993).”  (Guerrieri  and  Falautano  2000:  17) 
Winters argues that the benefits of liberalization do not stop when new regional organizations 
are created. She argues that multilateral organizations may also reduce disadvantages, if there 
even  are  any,  for  countries  left  out  of  regional  organizations.  (Winters  1999:  37)  Other 
scholars like Krugman, Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) feel that regional trade agreements 
could lead to countries becoming “more resistant to trade liberalization since they could see 
the  regional  agreement  as  a  powerful  device  for  erecting  trade  barriers.”  (Guerrieri  and 
Falautano 2000: 18) According to Levy (1996), countries might also “divert resources and 
political capital from their multilateral actions”, leading to resistant “support for a multilateral 
agreement.” (Guerrieri and Falautano 2000: 18) Finally, according to Bond and Syropoulos 
(1996),  multilateral  liberalization  could  become  a  difficult  undertaking  because  regional 
initiatives weaken multilateral enforcement. (Ibid.) Winters concludes that it is premature to 
draw conclusions about the possibility of a regional bloc being an effective mechanism to 
mitigate the influence of multilateral institutions. There is only the European Union that is 
“large enough and long-lived enough to have had identifiable  consequences on the world 
trading system itself”. It is “more or less impossible to sort out what is generic and what 
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specific among the lessons it teaches”. Winters concludes that the only “unambiguous lesson 
is that the creation of one regional bloc does not necessarily lead to the immediate breakdown 
of the trading system.” (Winters 1999: 34) 
In conclusion, this paper tries to find the answer to the question of if regional agreements 
“threaten” established IOs by looking at these definitions. The next chapter will explore the 
historical implications that shaped East Asia and how those implications dampen regional 
cooperation. The fourth chapter introduces two regional organizations in East Asia. The last 
chapter will then explore IOs and tries to clear the question if the WTO and the IMF have lost  
credibility and their right to exist due to the economic shift of power in the world. 
3. Power Relations in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific Region
3.1 Shift of Power?
There are many ways to determine a shift of power. A shift of power in the world can, for 
example, be visible in overall world production. One way to see this is by looking globally at 
proportions of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the world industry production, levels of 
foreign direct investment and foreign trade. Between 1980 and 2007, the proportion of the G 
711 on world production fell from 55,1% to 39,5%. In 2007, the proportion of Asia on world 
production was 28%. (Boris; Schmalz 2009: 629) This, however, has not yet translated into 
the proper representation in IOs. The question remains if East Asian nations even desire to use 
their  new-gained  status  in  the  world  to  boost  their  image  in  IOs.  Additionally,  the  little 
representation of East Asian nations in IOs could signify that an economic shift of power fails 
to translate into leverage in the field of political influence. For institutions like the G7, the 
shift in world production and wealth questioned the aim of the organization itself. Therefore, 
the G7 nations have had to include emerging economies in order to negate the risk of lost 
credibility and status. At the same time, there are those scholars whom argue that the newly 
initiated occurrence of regional organizations could also be due to the lack of presence of 
emerging nations in IOs. 
Nevertheless, the new “Material power” of emerging nations does not necessarily entail 
political power. Structural relations, many of whom have already been in place for decades, 
11 The Group of seven leading industrial countries are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, United States. Taken from the WTO website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/g7_e.htm, accessed on Sept. 5th, 2011
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are not likely to change in a period of just a few years. The power of the U.S., although 
waning economically, is still highly influential. With its military bases all over the world and 
its  astronomically  high  military  expenses,  the  U.S.  signals  that  it  is  not  a  country  to  be 
meddled with. Other countries do not even attempt to compete. According to the concept of 
compulsory power, weaker actors admire the power of the “superior” actor and accept their 
inferior position. When looking at the proportions of military spending on a global scale, the 
military power of the U.S. is both accepted and feared. While China is often cited as a country 
that  could  compete  with  the  U.S.  in  a  few years,  their  share  of  world  military  expenses 
suggests otherwise.  In 2010, the world share of military expenses of the U.S. was 42,8% 
compared to China’s 7,3%. Accordingly, the U.S.’ military expenses accounted for 698 $b in 
2010. In terms of spending, this is close to six times more than that of China, who ranks 
second with an estimated amount of 119 $b. To put this into perspective, the U.S. spent more 
than the following top ten spending countries combined.12 (SIPRI 2011) Schmalz stated in 
2010 that the U.S., with its military bases all over the world, possesses an unmatched “global 
violent monopoly”. (Schmalz 2010: 496) Granted, the official estimates of China’s military 
expenditures do not match the “real” expenditures and it is a rough task to measure due to the 
lack of transparency. Despite this, China still does not pose a threat to the U.S. While China 
estimated its  military expenses at  $78,6 billion in  2010, the U.S. Department  of  Defense 
estimates the “real” expenditures as somewhere around $160 billion.13 Some analysts even 
suggest the monetary amount of military spending to be, in fact, ten times higher than actually 
stated,  but even if  the numbers rank that high,  China is  not in the position and not even 
willing to compete with the military might of the U.S. The main concern for the Communist 
party is economic growth and a war or other various conflicts that would involve high military 
expenditures would only dampen economic growth and wealth for the Chinese people. 
In order to answer the questions of my thesis, it  is necessary to explore the relations 
between those countries located in the East Asia region. What did the economic shift of power 
do to the relations of the region? As Camilleri puts it: “We must turn to history to see what 
12 The top ten military spenders in 2010 were: 1. USA 698 $b; 2. China, estimated at 119$b; 3. UK 59,6 $b; 4. 
France, 59,3 $b; 5. Russia, estimated at 58,7$b; 6. Japan 54,5 $b; 7. Saudi Arabia 45,2 $b (this figure also 
contains public order and safety expenses, therefore this figure might be slightly overestimated); 8. Germany, 
estimated at 45,2 $b; 9. India 41,3 $b; 10. Italy, estimated at 37 $b (Background paper on SIPRI military 
expenditure data, 2010; http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex, accessed on May 24th, 2011.)
13 Ibid.;
Office of the Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments 
involving the People‘s republic of China 2010, p. 41, 
     http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2425  , accessed on Sept. 19th, 2011.
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continuities or discontinuities in cultural, political and economic experience have emerged, 
and how these have shaped over time the perceptions of amity and enmity and practices of co-
operation,  competition  and  conflict.”  (Camilleri  2003:  3)  In  order  to  understand  newly 
emerging developments in the region, it is necessary to know what drives the region. How 
strong or weak are inter-country relations? How and on what issues do they work together? 
The first section of this chapter discusses China’s rise and the implications for its neighbors. 
Due to the country’s economic growth, relations had to be readjusted and, accordingly, some 
countries even readjusted their foreign policy. China’s relations with ASEAN, Japan, and the 
U.S. are discussed below. Specifically, the role of Japan is a first step towards understanding 
the mechanisms of the region, some of which will be touched on later in the fifth chapter. The 
second section attempts to explore the role of South Korea, especially relations with Japan, 
China and the U.S. In the concluding part of the chapter, the question is explored whether the 
Asian  Financial  Crisis  brought  the  region  closer  together  and  gave  way  for  new 
developments. It may have been this financial blow that brought the states closer together and 
enabled them to work jointly on issues that could have had the potential  to endanger the 
region in the event of future crises.
3.2 The Rise of China and the Implications for its Neighboring Countries
China serves as a textbook example of a shift of power in world production, foreign direct 
investments  and  foreign  currency  reserves.  This  section  discusses  the  reactions  that  this 
economic power shift entailed. The responses of their neighbors, especially South Korea and 
Japan,  whom  have  held  an  alliance  with  the  U.S.  for  decades  already,  are  particularly 
interesting. The following sections attempt to shed light on when and why specific countries, 
at times, side with China and at other times, align with the U.S. Also, the point at which Japan 
and South Korea stopped aligning themselves too close with China is being explored. Another 
aim of this section is to find out what position China wants to occupy in the world. Through 
understanding the relations in the region, power centers can be determined. Therefore, this 
section also aims to find power centers in East Asia, and what countries adhere to those power 
centers.  Additionally,  this  section  also  aims  to  find  China’s  allies  and  their  influence  in 
arranging a more powerful position for China in IOs. 
Historically, over centuries, China has held the status of “superpower” in Asia. Beginning 
with the opium wars and the forced opening of China’s market for the West, China had to 
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grow into a new role and adapt to a new status in the world. In this new world order, China’s 
place was only marginal. This piqued in a kind of withdrawal from the world, where from the 
1950’s until the 1970’s China was an enclosed entity. Since the reform and opening process 
beginning in  December of  1978 under  Deng Xiaoping,  the situation is  turning again and 
China has found a new self-confidence. (Griessler 2006: 50) China‘s main goal in Asia is now 
to regain its “super power” status. Nowadays, China cannot risk an unfavorable reputation. 
For  that  reason  China  is  careful  not  to  make  any  rash  movements  that  would  upset  its 
neighbors, and therefore stresses the importance of a peaceful rise in power. China desires to 
be accepted in international forums and hopes to gain acceptance from the world community. 
Up until the 1990’s, China had emphasized bilateralism due to the constraints that come with 
membership  in  multilateral  forums.  (Schmidt  et  al.  2009:  27)  Presently,  international 
cooperation is seen as a means to gaining an equal voice in the world, but even when China 
stresses the “desire for regional peace, prosperity and stability”, Hernandez and neighboring 
countries think that the real intention of Chinese politicians is to seek “insurance to protect 
against an uncertain future”. (Hernandez 2009: 3) Shoji suggests that China is met with a 
“mixture of optimism and cautiousness” by its neighbors. (Shoji 2009: 177) To sooth tensions 
that might arise, China is now primarily concerned with taking on a more responsible role in 
Asia.  Consequently,  China  has  solved  a  number  of  border  disputes  that  had  become  a 
stumbling block to positive relations with neighboring countries.  Another goal of China’s 
foreign policy is to reduce Taiwan’s informal influence and to also be viewed as a positive 
influence so that in the event of a conflict, countries would be inclined to support China and 
not the U.S. (Kurlantzick 2008: 202) The unity of the country, as well as economic growth, is 
a  point  of  legitimacy  for  the  Communist  Party.  Therefore,  losing  Taiwan  means  losing 
legitimacy and that is why the “one China policy” is of high importance. (Griessler 2006: 51; 
54) 
One  of  the  additional  aims  of  this  chapter  is  to  explore  the  change  in  attitude  of 
neighboring  countries  towards  China.  Also,  how  the  countries  cope  with  the  remaining 
suspicion  regarding China’s  rise  will  be  discussed.  ASEAN nations  are  mostly  “pursuing 
cooperative approaches” due to the fact that China’s rise has substantial “implications for the 
stability and prosperity of the region.” (Tsunekawa 2009: 16)
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3.2.1 ASEAN’s Strategic Thinking Towards China
As ASEAN member states are fairly suspicious of China’s intentions, they have already 
started to provide for the future in the event that “China’s peaceful rise changes after China 
has fully  risen”.  (Hernandez 2009: 4) In looking at  the history of China in the region,  it 
becomes clear that “suspicion” is the predominant response to China’s foreign policy. Due to 
the fact that the Chinese Communist Party supported “domestic communist insurgencies in 
core  ASEAN14 countries  including  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the  Philippines,  Thailand  and 
Singapore,  as  well  as  the  South  China  Sea  disputes  involving  Malaysia,  the  Philippines, 
Brunei and Vietnam”, the relations of China with other ASEAN countries were tense, to say 
the least. (Hernandez 2009: 3) Economic ties with ASEAN changed the perception of China 
as a threat to Southeast Asian nations. With this, China could kill two birds with one stone. 
While trade with ASEAN nations was “effective in keeping its economy forward”, foreign 
relations became smooth at the same time. (Shoji 2009: 166) Still, recent military exercises 
conducted by China and Russia under the umbrella of the SCO does not help in reassuring 
neighboring countries.  Ironically, with the rise of China and the economic decline of Japan, 
ASEAN  states  expect  more  involvement  of  Japan  in  the  region  in  order  to  balance  the 
influence of China. (Shoji 2009: 183-184) The amount of support for China differs throughout 
the  five  major  ASEAN  nations.  While  Singapore’s  foreign  policy  is  always  pragmatic, 
Malaysia’s relationship with China has become “one of the closest and most stable between 
an ASEAN country and China.” (Tsunekawa 2009: 17) Thai policy makers appreciate China’s 
economic rise and view it  as ”an opportunity for economic cooperation”.  They also view 
China’s growth as a vehicle for integration into the regional community. (Tsunekawa 2009: 
18) As far as Indonesia is concerned, the relations with China are still somewhat ambivalent. 
While Indonesia wants to enjoy the economic benefits of cooperation with China, the country 
is still concerned over the long-term intentions of China in the region. (Tsunekawa 2009: 19) 
To underline the peaceful intentions of the country, China signed on to the ASEAN Treaty 
of  Amity  and  Cooperation  in  2003,  “which  commits  to  mutual  respect  among  signatory 
countries  with  regard  to  sovereignty  and  equality”.15 (Kurlantzick  2008:  197)  This  treaty 
14 The ten members  of  ASEAN are:  Brunei  Darussalam, Cambodia,  Indonesia,  Laos,  Malaysia,  Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. (http://www.asean.org/74.htm, accessed on May 5th, 2011)
15 Members of the treaty, which was first signed in February of 1976, are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Republic of Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Republic of 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Members outside of Southeast Asia are: Papua New Guinea 1989, China 
2003, India 2003, Japan 2004, Pakistan 2004, Republic of Korea 2004 and The Russian Federation 2004., In: 
„Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia“, www.aseansec.org/TAC-KnowledgeKit.pdf, accessed 
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created a “Code of  Conduct” on the South China Sea.  Furthermore,  through the ASEAN 
Treaty, China was also able to solve land disputes with Laos and Vietnam and, additionally, 
disputes  over  maritime  borders  were  resolved.  (Kurlantzick  2008:  197)  An agreement  to 
establish a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) was also established. (Hernandez 2009: 
4)  China’s  new multilateral  strategy  has  paid  off  as  evident  by  the  fact  that  at  ASEAN 
meetings, members first take into account how Beijing will react to a decision. According to 
the template used by Barnett and Finnemore, China appears to exercise all forms of power 
described  by  the  two  scholars.  China  exercises  control  through  indirect  ways,  which  is 
institutional power. As well,  China also exercises compulsory power, where weaker actors 
accept their inferior position. China, in return, gains legitimacy through economic success and 
its sheer size. Structural power concerns the placement of China in direct relation to the other 
South East Asian nations. The relations shape the capacities, subjectivities and interests of 
participating nations. China seems to have a more advantageous structural position in contrast 
to other South East Asian nations. Productive power, then, concerns how the social capacities 
are socially produced. Due to the fact that China brought South East Asian nations to behave 
in such a way, China “produced” a self-understanding where they first think of China, instead 
of themselves. Since China is such a great influence in the region “Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and India are taking steps to cooperate with ASEAN so as to ensure that the region’s 
future will not be dominated by Beijing.” (Hernandez 2009: 4) ASEAN states are “still wary 
about the growing clout of China.” (Shoji 2009: 183) Therefore, getting the U.S. involved in 
the region is also on top of the agenda for ASEAN countries. Since 2005, China and South 
Korea have also meet in the East Asia Summit. This summit is viewed by Hernandez “ ‘as a  
manifestation of its member states’ insurance policy (or hedging strategy) in the event that 
China’s full rise might have negative implications for the core national interests of regional 
states.” (Hernandez 2009: 4) Hernandez concludes that while neighboring states fear the rise 
of China,  in some way,  they also seize “whatever opportunities are  presented by a rising 
China, be they economic, political, diplomatic or cultural.” (Hernandez 2009: 5) Shoji argues 
this point with a poll conducted by the Japanese Foreign Ministry in February and March 
2008.  The  poll,  which  was  conducted  in  six  ASEAN countries  (Indonesia,  Malaysia,  the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), shows that while Japan had great influence 
during the Cold War, China was quick to catch up. One of the questions in the poll asked, 
on May 30th, 2011. 
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“which  country  was  an  important  partner  for  ASEAN”.  China  was  ahead  in  Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand, while Japan ranked first in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. 
(Shoji 2009: 183, citing 16) The rivalry between China and Japan gaining influence in ASEAN 
nations is still very much alive. 
In conclusion, while the countries of ASEAN admire China’s economic rise, they also 
attempt to protect themselves from a China that may not always offer peaceful intentions. 
ASEAN  sticks  to  the  formula  of  reaping  the  advantages  of  a  great  China,  while  afore-
mentioned arguments point to the fact that they are still unsure about the intentions of the 
country and try to secure themselves against a powerful China by bringing other great powers 
to the table. 
3.2.2 China and Japan
To understand the relations of other countries in the region with Japan, it is necessary to 
explore historical events in the last century that shaped and continue to shape the animosities 
against the country. The hostilities and sometimes flat-out hate for Japan in Asia is mostly 
rooted in the expansionist aspirations at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th Century. 
Japan colonized/occupied (every side uses different terms to describe the situation) Taiwan 
and Korea and initiated a war with China. After World War II, Japan was put under the guard 
of the U.S. to reassure Japan’s neighbors that the country was being kept in check. Moreover,  
the intention of the U.S. was to use Japan as a counterpart to the “communist threat” that 
lingered in the region at the time. Even though it is very unlikely that Japan will become 
aggressive again,  neighboring countries are  not convinced, as they cannot  forgive Japan’s 
leaders for never apologizing for the wars and aggression they initiated. In Asia, many cite the 
“Warsaw Genuflection” of Willy Brandt  as a  fitting gesture for apologizing for a deathly 
regime.  In  Japan,  war  heroes  were  not  shunned  as  they  were  in  Germany,  and  a 
“denazification” like in Germany did not occur. This resulted in the notion throughout Asia 
that up until and through World War II, the Japanese never really felt remorse for their actions 
and the resulting consequences in the region. Since this conflict was never solved properly, 
nowadays, seemingly little things like history textbook controversies or visits to the Yasukuni 
16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan: “Opinion Poll on Japan in Six ASEAN Countries (summary of results”, 
May  1st, 2008, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2008/5/1179528_1010.html, accessed on June 7th, 
2011.
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shrine17, which glorifies war heroes, spark protests all over the region. 
Although  the  two  countries  are  economically  more  and  more  intertwined,  historical 
problems  still  hinder  proper  collaboration.  China  is  Japan’s  number  one  trading  partner, 
whereas in China, Japan ranks fourth as an export and first as an import partner.18 Apart from 
historical problems, the two countries strive for leadership in the region. Both are hugely 
suspicious of one another; hence regional cooperation is nearly impossible. China and Japan 
only reestablished bilateral relations in 1972, after being blocked to do so by the U.S. when 
Communist China was established in 1949. (Tsunekawa 2009: 10) In 1978, the two countries 
concluded  the  “Japan-China  Treaty  of  Peace  and  Friendship”,  which  intends  to  promote 
“perpetual  peace  and  friendship  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  of  mutual  respect  for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s 
internal  affairs,  equality  and mutual benefit,  and peaceful  coexistence.”  Furthermore,  they 
confirmed “to settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of 
force.”  (Tsunekawa 2009:  11)  After  this  agreement,  the  two countries  enjoyed  “amicable 
relations” until the early 1980’s, when the textbook controversy and the visits to the Yasukuni 
shrines enraged Chinese and Korean people alike. At the same time, the thriving economy of 
China prompted Japanese business and political circles to promote the “China threat”19 theory. 
Meanwhile, military exercises against Taiwan, nuclear tests and a newly erupted dispute over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands further weakened the relations in the last decades. (Tsunekawa 
2009: 14) 
In China, the Communist Party owes much of its legitimacy to its „enemy“ Japan. Since 
this  hatred is  the party line,  the Communist  Party cannot,  to  a point,  afford to normalize 
relations. Keeping in line with Barnett and Finnemore‘s concept of compulsory power, the 
faith in legitimacy is required to keep power. The Communist Party is guarded in affronting 
the government of Japan too much; they keep their people quiet when necessary, but also let 
them voice their anger at the appropriate time. Here Weber‘s concept can be applied, that is 
17 For more information on the Yasukuni shrine controversy see: Yongwook, Ryu (2007): „The Yasukuni 
Controversy: Divergent Perspectives from the Japanese Political Elite“, In: Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 5 
(September/October 2007), p. 705-726
18 WTO trade profiles 2011 http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?
Language=E&Country=CN,JP,KR, accessed on Sept. 29th, 2011
19 The most prominent argument of the “China threat” theory is that China’s rise can not possibly be peaceful. 
China’s significant military build-up will lead to China trying to set herself up as a hegemonic power not only 
in Asia but all over the world and challenge the US. Also, China’s economic rise is a challenge for other 
countries by stealing other country’s people’s jobs and a threat to other country’s economies. (Al-Rodhan 
2007)
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the  “holding  on  to  its  authority”  by  “cultivating  and  reviving  the  faith  in  its  legitimacy 
continuously”. (Müller 2007: 127; quoted after Weber 1972: 122, 123) By readjusting the 
hatred for Japan every other time20, the legitimacy can be kept alive while trading relations 
remain  smooth.  Thereby,  economic  growth  is  assured  and  this  helps  to  reaffirm  another 
legitimacy  source:  power  through  economic  success.  (Griessler  2007:  51)  During  the 
administration of  Junichiro Koizumi,  who was inaugurated in April  of 2001, the bilateral 
relations  reached  an  all-time  low  with  his  “persistent  visits  to  Yasukuni  Shrine  and  the 
approval  by  the  Japanese  government  of  a  controversial  nationalistic  history  textbook.” 
(Tsunekawa 2009:  14-15) According to Tsunekawa,  the “future stability  of East Asia  will 
depend heavily on the relationship between Japan and China.” If these two countries refrain 
from  establishing  amicable  relations,  a  peaceful  environment  in  East  Asia  is  unlikely. 
(Tsunekawa 2009: 10)
In conclusion, China and Japan have a long way to go in putting history behind them. To 
achieve this aim, the official sides need to work more closely together and put a stop to the 
national tendencies of exploitation for their own political purposes. Due to the fact that the 
relations of the two countries have longstanding implications for neighboring countries, the 
two  also  have  a  responsibility  to  achieve  friendly  terms  and  prevent  the  hindering  of 
cooperation in important matters that bear consequences for the whole Asian region.
3.2.3 China and the United States
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S.-China relations have come a long way. Economically, 
the two countries are more and more interconnected and dependent on one another. China 
holds $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and is also the number one importing country in 
the U.S.21,22 Still, suspicion lingers among certain official circles. Politically, it is important to 
give the impression of holding a strong stance in China, as well as in the U.S. Whereas China 
is trying to act as a responsible partner and only criticizing the U.S. very carefully when 
necessary, U.S. official circles are at times still struggling with China’s economic power.
20 Debates over how China is using anti-Japanese sentiments to legitimate its own regime are not further 
explored here. To provide one example: China was opposing to Japan’s gaining a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council in 2005. Since China is a permanent member it can veto decisions made on the council. See: 
Bowring, Philip (April 12, 2005): “UN power play drives China protests” In: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/11/opinion/11iht-edbowring.html, accessed on Sept. 14th, 2011.
21 http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/04/15/london-headlines-231/#axzz1ZKX1NyPg  , accessed on Sept. 
29th, 2011
22 WTO trade profiles 2011 http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?
Language=E&Country=CN,JP,KR,US, accessed on Sept. 29th, 2011
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Only in recent years has the U.S. strayed away from the military aspect of the “China 
threat” theory that exists in some circles in the U.S. and, arguably, this has contributed to the 
economic success of China. Whereas in years prior annual reports of the U.S. Department of 
Defense warned of China’s military up building, in 2010 the threat was presented realistically. 
The Chinese build up their military, but to the extent to protect their own country, as any other 
country would. Also, the paper stresses the cooperation of the military of the two countries in 
order to reduce mistrust, enhance mutual understanding and broaden cooperation.23 Now the 
U.S. is  attempting to welcome China’s new place in the world and its  wish to become a 
responsible  power.  The U.S. is  encouraging China to play a greater  role  in  APEC (Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation) to strengthen economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. The 
U.S. also welcomes China to contribute to “future global financial  stability and economic 
growth”.  Furthermore,  even  if  China  is  not  a  member  of  the  OECD  (Organization  for 
Economic Co-operation and Development), the U.S. is encouraging China to also participate 
in discussions about global issues, like anti-bribery. Nowadays, the U.S. avoids viewing China 
as a threat, but instead looks at China’s prosperity as a vehicle for the U.S. to share in China’s 
success. Chinese companies are going global and foreign direct investment in China is also on 
the rise, especially concerning energy and national resources. As well, the U.S. argues that if 
China wants to be successful, the country must adhere to global standards. Consequently, the 
rise of China has the potential to benefit companies all over the world. (Hormats 2011)  U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in January of 2011 that “A thriving America is good for 
China and a thriving China is good for America.” (Eckert 2011) In the same speech Clinton 
urged China to take up greater responsibilities in the world on issues like “global recession, 
nuclear proliferation, terrorism, [and] piracy on the high seas”. Such problems affect all the 
countries in the world and China should participate in countering them. Clinton also urged 
China to appreciate the Yuan, but China stressed that they will only “satisfy the demands” if 
they are in China’s interest. (Ibid.) According to the concept of structural power, the structure 
of global capitalism determines the capacities and the resources of those involved. Due to the 
fact  that  China’s  economy  is  thriving,  the  U.S.  must  accept  China’s  unwillingness  to 
appreciate the Yuan. The U.S. can make demands, but China can choose to ignore them. The 
social relational capacities, subjectivities and interests of actors are directly shaped by the 
23Office of the Secretary of Defense: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments involving 
the People‘s republic of China 2010, p. 41, 
             http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=2425  , accessed on Sept. 19th, 2011
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social positions they occupy. Since China’s position in the world economy is now very strong, 
China can determine its own fate. Compulsory power could also apply here, since it describes 
the concept of the weaker actor admiring the power of the “superior” actor. Concerning the 
U.S.-China relation, this concept would apply to both countries. China accepts its inferior 
position regarding military and to some extent its political power and the U.S. must accept its 
inferior position regarding economic power.
China is deeply dependent on the world market because of the country’s export oriented 
growth system. Therefore, China has no desire to challenge U.S. power, as it is content with 
its status quo. Of course, the country wants adaptations in institutions to more realistically 
reflect the economic power of each country, but, all in all, U.S. hegemony is a comfortable 
way  to  keep  growing.  In  the  next  decades  a  “war”  over  resources  will  likely  end  in 
confrontations,  but  those are  only presumptions.  Even if  U.S.  power is  reduced after  the 
debacle in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military power still outgrows any other possible “great 
power”. China’s military is building up, but, in contrast to the U.S., it  is rather moderate.  
China has been specifically building up the coastal region, which again reflects the need to 
protect commodities. 
3.3 South Korea as a “Middle power” and Balancer in the region
South Korea‘s standing in the world is mostly shaped from its position in Asia and is 
related to the concept of structural power. As well, South Korea’s place in the world is defined 
through its neighbors. The country is squeezed between three major powers, China, Japan and 
Russia,  and is  oftentimes  ignored  or  has  fallen  victim to  the  whims of  foreign  interests. 
Additionally, South Korea is important for the strategy of the U.S. in East Asia and dependent 
on the U.S. as a protective power. Since China is a large trading partner of the country, South 
Korea is more vulnerable than bigger powers to trade sanctions, as proved by the “ ‘garlic 
battle’ in 2000 (in  which Seoul applied high tariffs to Chinese garlic imports and Beijing 
retaliated by banning the import of South Korean polyethylene and mobile phones)”. (Chung 
2009: 474) Hence, South Korea is unable to employ the “hedging strategy” adopted by Japan 
or the U.S. Due to this structural position, South Korea oftentimes feels overrun and therefore 
prefers international  forums where its  standing is  almost  equal  to other  “big players”.  As 
South Korea is geopolitically and strategically very important for the strategy of the “big 
players”  in  the  region,  some  authors  suggest  that  South  Korea  can  use  this  position  to 
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influence “alliance politics in Northeast Asia.” (Kim 2008: 127) With that said, while South 
Korea wants to “serve as a bridge between Asia and the rest of the world”, it will not do so “at 
the cost of the bilateral relationship with the United States”. (Lee 2008: 244-245)
 In the sections that follow South Korea’s relations with China, Japan and the U.S., its 
protective power, will be explored in an effort to understand the difficulties the country faces 
in finding a place in the region. 
3.3.1 South Korea and China
China’s relations with South Korea are slightly ambivalent. They share the same distrust 
of Japan and attempt to try to work together regarding North Korea, but the recent “Koguryo 
controversy”24 illustrates that relations lack real depth and understanding. Yet again there is a 
territorial dispute over a rock which is located near the Jeju islands and northeast of Shanghai. 
(Chung 2009: 483) The whole region is highly interconnected, and China and South Korea are 
no exception, specifically in an economic sense. China is South Korea’s number one trading 
partner. In China, on the other hand, South Korea ranks fifth as an exporting country and third 
as an importing country.25 A first step towards understanding the relations of the two countries 
is again to look at historical events that shaped the relations for years to come. 
After the Korean War (1950-1953) an official channel of relations between China and the 
Republic of Korea was absent. During the Cold War period, South Korea strategically relied 
on the U.S. for security and worked with the anticommunist coalition around the world. It was 
important  to  be recognized internationally  as  the “only legitimate country on the Korean 
peninsula,  and triumphing over North Korea politically,  economically,  and socially”.  (Lee 
2008: 225) Regionalism was not on top of the agenda for South Korea, but since the Cold War 
has ended, the country has been measuring its options. When China obtained a seat in the 
United  Nations  and  reapplied  relations  with  the  U.S.  and  Japan,  channels  were  open  to 
improve relations with Beijing. Economic cooperation was poised at the top of the agenda, 
especially  with  Russia  and  China.  South  Korea  also  signified  an  intention  to  “deepen 
multilateral cooperation”, especially in regard to North Korea. (Lee 2008: 226) South Korea’s 
wish, albeit somehow concealed, was to “break out on its heavy reliance exclusively on the 
24 This issue will be touched upon in more depth in chapter 5. The controversy centers around the question of 
history ownership. Some Chinese historians claim that the Koguryo kingdom is part of China‘s history, 
which triggered severe diplomatical frictures in the relations of the two countries.
25 WTO trade profiles 2011 http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?
Language=E&Country=CN,JP,KR,US, accessed on Sept. 29th, 2011
46
U.S.”  and  also  work  together  with  China  on  issues  of  security.  (Chung 2008:  162;  Kim 
Young-sam in  a  press  briefing  on  March 29,  1994) The goal  was to  “maintain  a  certain 
balance of its own between the U.S. and China”. (Chung 2008: 163) 
Dealing  with  North  Korea  has  brought  China  and South  Korea  closer  together,  even 
necessitating a “strategic cooperative partnership” in 2008. (Chung 2009: 481) South Korea 
was particularly hopeful for peace on the peninsula if relations with Beijing could proceed 
smoother into the future. Additionally, South Korea wanted to capitalize on China’s economic 
rise,  as  the  country  was  searching  for  export  markets.  (Chung  2008:  157)  While  this 
partnership could be viewed as a vehicle for engagement, the practice of China to extradite 
North Korean refugees back to their country, where they are most likely severely punished, 
leaves South Korea with the perception that China does not value this partnership. (Chung 
2009: 472) Also, there are those that fear that China does not prioritize the nuclear issue. The 
goal is now to preserve trust and not allow for historical issues to gain the upper hand in the 
relation.  Balancing  between  the  requirements  of  the  U.S.  alliance  with  the  economic 
dependence on China will be the most important task for South Korea in the years to come. 
The rise of China has had serious implications for the foreign policy of South Korea. 
South Korea is dependent on the U.S. for its security, but regarding investments and trade, the 
country is more and more dependent on China. Unlike Japan, South Korea, for many years, 
was not concerned that China posed a security threat to the region. South Korea perceived 
China  very  favorably  for  a  long  time  and  did  continue  trade  with  China  even  after  the 
Tiananmen  incident,  when  many  countries  shunned  China.  (Chung  2008:  160)  Since  the 
Koguryo controversy, the seemingly amiable relationship is in danger of crumbling. China 
can prove its “peaceful rise” when solving historical debates accordingly. 
3.3.2 South Korea and Japan
As already explored previously in China’s relations with Japan, the relations between 
South Korea and Japan are particularly rocky. While economically the two countries are very 
much interconnected, with Japan ranking under the top five trading partners in South Korea 
and  South  Korea  ranking  fourth  as  an  exporting  country  in  Japan26,  history  shatters  any 
projects that are undertaken. Issues, such as the question of ownership of Dokdo/Takeshima27 
26 WTO trade profiles 2011 http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?
Language=E&Country=CN,JP,KR,US, accessed on Sept. 29th, 2011
27 Dokdo/Takeshima are a group of islets located in the East Sea/Sea of Japan between Korea and Japan. The 
issue over territorial ownership of those islets is going on for decades already. 
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or whether to refer to the “Sea of Japan”, as such, or the “East Sea”, keep tensions alive. 
Another point of contention, which keeps the two countries from a stable relationship, is the 
issue of “Comfort Women”. It was during the 1990’s that the first “Comfort Women” came 
forward and made public the sexual and physical abuse they suffered under the Japanese 
military during the 1930’s and 1940’s. Revisionists in Japan very vocally called into question 
the existence of “Comfort Women” and the claims they made.28 Issues such as this  make 
proper collaboration all the more difficult.
A first step towards understanding the dynamics between the two countries is to explore 
the history of the 20th century in the region. Japan occupied/colonized Korea from 1910 to 
1945 and the after effects of that occupation/colonization still play into politics today. The two 
countries normalized relations as recently as 1965, but Japan failed “to show the remorse 
sought by the Korean nation”. (Rozman 2008: 179) While Japan granted financial assistance 
packages to South Korea at the end of the 1960’s, little other correspondence, which could 
have the potential to build up regional cooperation, such as summits or political or cultural 
exchanges, have occurred. Also, some suggest that financial assistance was only offered due 
to pressure from the U.S., whom wanted Japan to “ensure the security of the South” through 
supplying capital and technology to enable South Korea to enjoy an economic rise and, as a 
result, compete with North Korea. (Rozman 2008: 182) In order to keep in check the Soviet  
expansionism, the U.S. was eager to strengthen regional security in East Asia. Through the 
help of the U.S., South Korea was reliant on Japan, but still highly suspicious of the intentions 
of Japan in international matters. The first official visit to Japan of a Korean head of state,  
Chun Doo-hwan, was only made in 1984. (Rozman 2008: 183-184) 
Since there is a triangular relation between Japan, the U.S. and South Korea, it makes 
sense for South Korea to pursue favorable relations with Japan. Seoul would “be rewarded by 
Tokyo” with economic help and a better regional political position and security leverage. Last 
but not least, Seoul would also fare better with the U.S. Regarding North Korea and better 
relations between the three can also bring about positive results. After all, if Japan engages the 
North  alone,  the  North  gains  leverage  with  the  South.  (Rozman  2008:  197)  Managing 
relations with Japan, however, will always be a tough task due to the varying directions of 
incoming presidents in South Korea, Japan and the U.S. Whereas Clinton tried to facilitate 
28 More on the Comfort Women issue: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/koreas-comfort-women-
the-slaves-revolt-814763.html, accessed on Sept. 29th, 2011
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triangularity, the Bush administration “mitigated against it”. (Rozman 2008: 198) Kim Dae-
jung showed great foresight regarding Japan, but Roh allowed relations to again stagnate. The 
same  goes  for  Japan,  where  revisionist  presidents  have  destroyed  former  harmonizing 
relations by being insensitive towards South Koreans. The countries must strive hard to better 
cooperate  with  one  another  and  solve  historical  disputes  in  order  to  make  regionalism 
possible. 
3.3.3 South Korea and the U.S.
South Korea holds an alliance with the U.S. and is an important strategic factor for the 
security policy in the region. After the Korean War (1950-1953), South Korea and the U.S. 
signed a mutual defense treaty in 1953, which implied a defense guarantee and permanent 
troop presence. U.S. military bases all over the country currently help to maintain stability and 
security and many still believe that the “alliance is crucial for peace and prosperity in the 
Korean Peninsula.” (Kim 2008: 136) In recent years, the perceptions of North Korea as a 
threat are changing in the U.S. and this has put the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. 
to the test. Additionally, the economic dependence on China may change the relations of the 
U.S. and South Korea. To sum up, South Korea, as a middle power wedged between two 
“great power players”, “has no other choice but to work hard to be on good terms with both 
the United States and China”. (Chung 2008: 170)
The whole point of the security alliance was lost with the end of the Cold War. Since 
then, an attack by North Korea has become highly unlikely. Also, the possibility of China or 
Russia backing North Korea in a war against the South is nearly nonexistent. (Bandow 2010: 
5) Kim states that “the common perception that North Korea represented a serious security 
threat was the glue that bound the alliance [between South Korea and the U.S.] together.” 
(Kim 2008: 135)  In recent years,  the alliance has become strained due to disagreements 
between the policies taken by South Korea and the U.S. When Kim Dae-jung announced his 
“Sunshine policy”29, the country gained more support from China than the U.S. After 9.11, 
Washington classified North Korea as a “rogue state” along with Iran,  which worried the 
citizens of South Korea that  perhaps  the U.S. would potentially  make rash decisions that 
would endanger the South Korean people. Meanwhile, the U.S. perceives the security alliance 
29 The Sunshine Policy was Kim Dae-jung‘s take on “engaging and assisting North Korea without requiring a 
quid pro quo“. On the road to reunification, Kim Dae-jung wanted to build consensus between the four major 
powers in Northeast Asia in order to gain support for the reunification of Korea. While China supported this 
policy, Washington was not too „happy“ about it. (Chung 2008: 164-165)
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with South Korea as “outdated, unnecessary and dangerous”. Those opposed to the alliance 
state that it only holds risks for the U.S. and that South Korea is now able to defend itself  
alone in the event of a conflict.  In contrast,  South Korea is still  very insecure and highly 
dependent on U.S. troop presence. While South Korea prefers U.S. troop presence to preserve 
peace on the peninsula, the country is building up its own military to actively participate in 
international missions. (Bandow 2010: 2) The recent sinking of the Cheonan30 suggests that 
South Korea should “focus its military build-up on its own defense rather than regional or 
global  missions.”  (Bandow 2010:  7)  Kim suggests  a  strengthening of  the  relationship  by 
basing the alliance “not only on common threats but also on common values and interests.” 
(Kim 2008: 137) He also suggests an institutionalization of the relationship to manage the 
mechanisms  of the alliance more effectively. (Ibid.)
While the alliance between South Korea and the U.S. generally stands on strong legs, 
recent developments question the unequal positions on both sides. While South Korea feels 
that its position in the alliance is unequal and that South Korea is dictated by U.S. policy, the 
country is not prepared to defend itself alone. As far as the U.S. is concerned, it feels that the 
alliance is outdated and more responsibility should be given to South Korean troops. For the 
future, the alliance has to be adapted to the new circumstances in order to function properly 
and remain amiable.  
3.4 Did the Asian Financial Crisis Bring East Asia Closer Together?
Only when  the  Asian  Financial  Crisis  swept  through the  region  did  a  common goal 
become aroused. The crisis had serious consequences for the major powers in the region and 
for future institution building. While China faired well during the crisis and seems to have 
come out as the “winner”, gaining a positive reputation, “Japan suffered the greatest damage 
to  its  regional  leadership  ambitions  and overall  standing  as  a  result  of  the  crisis  and its 
aftermath.” (Beeson 2007: 204)
As China was “relatively untouched by the crisis”, the country promptly “adopted a series 
of  proactive  policies  to  rescue  ASEAN”.  (Shoji  2009:  167)  China  did  not  depreciate  its 
currency and therefore prevented an even more severe outcome of the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Despite  this  action  being  in  China’s  own  interest,  China  gained  the  reputation  of  a 
30 On March 26, 2010, a Chinese-made torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine sank a 1,200-ton corvette, 
the Cheonan. This incident put the US-ROK alliance to the test when the proper response was debated. 
(Bandow 2010: 2)
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“responsible great power” in the region and hence helped to “alleviate the perception of the 
China  threat  since  the  mid-1990s.”  (Schmidt  et  al.  2009:  25;  Tsunekawa  2009:  9)  This 
reaction  was  greatly  appreciated  in  the  region  and  the  policies  taken  by  the  Chinese 
government are thought to have contributed to the recovery of the East Asian economy. (Shoji 
2009: 167) Despite the fact that the contributions of China, in coping with the crisis, were not 
that huge,  the “high-profile gestures taken by China were highly impressive to  ASEAN”. 
(Shoji  2009:  167)  China  also  gained  profit  out  of  the  disappointment  with  the  IMF’s 
conditionalities  imposed  on  the  region.  (Shoji  2009:  167)  Disappointment  with  the 
“insensitive role played by the IMF” and the U.S. damaged their image for years to come.  
(Beeson 2007: 209) Since then, China recovered its reputation and has been able to emerge as 
a partner ASEAN is able to trust. Beeson describes the situation in that 
“whereas the U.S. became associated with heavy-handed, opportunistic interventionism in the wake of 
the crises as it used the IMF to force the pace of economic reform in the region, China began to be seen 
as a force of stability rather than a threat.” (Beeson 2009: 30) 
Shoji even suggests that the response of China to the Asian Financial crisis was a “turning 
point for China, shifting its image from a threat to a contributor”. (Shoji 2009: 169) Japan’s 
policies, on the other hand, were thought to be rather “sluggish and ambivalent”. (Shoji 2009: 
168) The disappointment with Japan was largely due to the failure of setting up an Asian 
monetary fund in 1997. Japan could not resist the large opposition from the U.S. and China. 
While the U.S. opposed the fund because they wanted to “maintain the IMF-centered financial 
order”, China was against the idea of a bolstered leadership role of Japan in the region. (Shoji 
2009:  168)  Furthermore,  Japan’s  crippled  market  could  not  absorb  all  the  exports  from 
ASEAN to ease the crisis as expected. As a result, the disappointment of ASEAN nations was 
great and it was concluded that Japan would be unable to manage the crisis as “a regional 
leader”.  (Shoji 2009: 168) Japan partly reestablished its position as a regional leader when it 
succeeded in helping to set up the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000. (Shoji 2009: 169) Beeson 
suggests that the Asian Financial Crisis was a “catalyst for consolidating and formalizing” the 
ASEAN+3 grouping. Any doubts that had been stated before had flown out the window when 
it was clear that “some sort of grouping with which to address more narrowly conceived East 
Asian concerns” was needed. (Beeson 2007: 233)
This point is further explored in the next chapter through the discussion of the origination 
of certain regional organizations, as well as why they came about in the first place. 
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4. Regionalism in East Asia
4.1 Cooperation Problems Between China, South Korea and Japan
Why is there allegedly no chance of a regional security cooperation in East Asia? Trying 
to find an answer is trifling. The most important factor appears to be historical implications 
that, as discussed in the previous chapter, take the upper hand in the debate. Additionally, 
nationalism is a very strong factor, as well as colonialism, which has left many countries with 
a strong feeling of distrust in relation to outside influences. Therefore, Asian countries, in this 
respect, particularly China, like to stress non-intervention, which runs against the notion of 
working together in the area of security. Moreover, the constant power play between Japan 
and China keeps the region instable. These points make cooperation far from being an easy 
procedure. These points make cooperation far from being an easy procedure.
 Despite the successes of economic cooperation in the region, cooperation in the ares of 
politics and security is still an “utopian” aim to achieve. Whereas in Japan, the “China threat” 
theory is persisting, the main concern in China is the strengthened alliance of Japan with the 
U.S.  and  their  increased  military  capabilities.  On  top  of  this  comes  the  issue  of  history 
ownership, different interpretations about history, resurgent nationalism and a rivalry between 
Japan  and  China  over  future  leadership  of  the  region.  Lee  suggests  that  the  U.S.  keeps 
upcoming regionalism in check by only maintaining bilateral relations. Regional initiatives 
are not welcomed or supported, “as evidenced by objections to Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir’s  notion  of  an  East  Asian  Economic  Caucus  (EAEC)31 in  the  early  1990’s  and 
Japan’s proposal for the establishment of an AMF in the late 1990’s.” (Lee 2008: 227) Many 
countries in the region point out that security cooperation would be possible only if Asia shifts 
to other security approaches and away from the monopoly of the U.S. (Ibid.) Another obstacle 
to  regional  cooperation  is  the  various  approaches  regarding  North  Korea.  While  China 
approves of South Korea’s engagement policy, Japan is still  pursuing the U.S.’s hard line 
policy of the Bush II era. 
31 EAEC stands for East Asian Economic Caucus. This idea was promoted by Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
Malaysia‘s former prime minister in 1990. This organization should operate “within the wider APEC 
grouping as a way of giving APEC‘s Asian members the opportunity to develop distinctive perspectives that 
more accurately reflected their particular circumstances and historical experiences.“ (Beeson 2009: 76) 
Mahathir encouraged Japan “to take the lead in driving the development of EAEC“. Japan, not wanting to 
„jeopardize its pivotal relationship with the USA“, was unprepared to take on that role. In the end, Australia 
and the US, both members of APEC, “saw the emergence of EAEC as a direct threat to APEC in particular 
and to ‘western‘ influence in the region more generally, and consequently did everything they could to 
discourage it.“ (Beeson 2009: 77)
52
The most important relations of the region remain those of China and Japan. Only if these 
two countries can succeed in solving their disputes is it possible for South Korea to also work 
together in building up regional initiatives. Since 2006, the bilateral relations between China 
and Japan “significantly ameliorated”. (Shoji 2009: 181) The two countries are aware that 
they “should collaborate in areas that may be complicated by their national interests”. (Shoji 
2009: 182) The idea of an “East Asia Community” is again put on the table, however, such a 
community could only focus “on areas where participants are able to easily cooperate without 
strong  objections,  avoiding  any  confrontation  among  national  interests,  particularly 
nontraditional  security,  even covering energy and food security.”  (Shoji  2009: 182)  Since 
Japan  has  to  maneuver  its  foreign  policy  with  historical  implications  in  mind,  such  an 
endeavor  is  all  the  more  notable.  How  such  a  community  would  play  out  with  all  the 
confounding factors is one of high interest.
In order to understand why historical implications make regional cooperation so difficult, 
the next section tries to discuss the interaction of common values and a common history and 
how the lack thereof in East Asia paralyzes many attempted regional initiatives.
4.2 The Lack of Regional Identity
As many institutional approaches have failed to materialize in East Asia, some propose 
that the region fails a “regional identity” that is needed in order to work together. In the article 
“Under  construction.  Identity  Politics  and  Constructivism in  Northeast  Asia”  the  authors 
Agyeo-wool Jung, Se-hi Park, and Jae-eun Shin point out that East Asia “lacks a common 
value among the constituent  nations”.  (Jung et  al.  2011:  84)  In order  to  form a  regional 
identity, “there are three prerequisites: a common threat, a common interest, and a common 
value”. (Jung et al. 2011: 84; quoted after Nah 2009: 260-263) These dimensions can form a 
common identity and overarch among different nations. The best example of such a regional 
community would be the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement. 
In  keeping with the idea of  regional  identities,  it  is  important  to acknowledge that  a 
regional identity consists also of a national identity and national identities have two layers:  
“Not only does a nation create its  own identity  through diplomatic encounters with other 
nations, but also builds upon stories about the national past”. (Jung et al. 2011: 84;  quoted 
after Gries 2005) Disputes over history ownership can threaten a national identity, its self-
understanding and its place in the region. The history of a nation characterizes its economic 
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and military agenda and historical “facts” shape the identity of a nation. Hence “stealing” 
history from a nation follows a conflict over identity and existence. If the history is pulled 
away from a  country,  the  inherent  meaning of  being  a  “Korean”  or  a  “Chinese”  will  be 
altered.  Jung,  Park  and  Shin  argue  that  “without  reconciliation  over  historical  disputes, 
regional identity is difficult to be established”. (Jung et al. 2011: 85) Since Korea, Japan and 
China  interpret  history  very  differently  from one  another,  the  historical  memories  differ 
immensely.  China  and  Korea  both  remain  a  victim  of  Japanese  actions;  even  if  it  is 
subconsciously done by Japanese people.  The Japanese,  on the other  hand,  also have the 
feeling of being a victim, as they were the first country attacked with atomic bombs and, to 
this day, are still living with the ramifications. The public itself can also sometimes spark 
disputes. For example, the voicing of anger over atrocities committed by the Japanese in the 
colonial/occupation period is a common topic of contention. 
Unfortunately,  sometimes  governments  themselves  ignite  disputes  over  history.  The 
Chinese  government’s  Northeast  Project  serves  as  an  example,  as  it  sparked  protests 
throughout Korea. The Northeast Project is an especially delicate issue, as it concerns the very 
problem of  history  ownership.  Simply  stated,  China  “claimed  that  Goguryeo,  an  ancient 
kingdom that ruled over northern Korean peninsula and much of Manchuria, was a part of 
Chinese  history”.  (Jung  et  al.  2011:  86)  Making  matters  worse,  “South  Koreans  soon 
discovered  that  China’s  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (MFA) had deleted  Koguryo from a 
summary  of  Korean  history  on  its  website”  (Gries  2005:  3)  Koguryo  is  a  particularly 
important part of history for South Koreans. Hence, in taking that part of history away from 
South  Koreans,  the  result  was an  additional  taking of  their  national  pride.  Disputes  over 
history  ownership   make  regionalization  almost  impossible  and  restrains  cooperation  in 
economic, military and political aspects. (Jung et al. 2011: 86) Jung, Park and Shin suggest 
the creation of a collective memory. This could be achieved, for example, through a regional 
history textbook. Wang states that “if textbooks and other narratives of history can become a 
source of conflict between different countries, then, conversely, their revision through joint 
writing can promote reconciliation and conflict resolution.” (Wang 2009: 106) In 2005, the 
three  countries  published  their  first  common  textbook  with  the  title:  “Future  Opening 
History”.  It  sold  over  2  million  copies.  (Jung  et  al.  2011:  86)  This  book  was  only  “a 
comparative historical narration of the three countries rather than a single, united account of 
the regional history.” (Jung et al. 2011: 86) Within the book, a historical breakthrough was 
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made in that Japanese historians admitted to the “validity” of Nanjing Massacre32. The use of 
“Comfort  Women” and the  accounts  of  testing  of  biological  weapons  on  humans  by  the 
Japanese army were also debated in more depth than ever before. (Wang 2009: 110) All three 
governments  should  support  such  projects  more  eagerly  as  they  “will  be  the  key  to  the 
convergence of different national identities into one regional identity.” (Jung et al. 2011: 87) 
Jung, Park and Shin also propose social interactions between citizens of the three countries, as 
well as sister city relations. Exposure to “the other” will lead to a better overall understanding. 
Only through such endeavors can a regional, collective memory of history be achieved, which 
then leads to a regional identity with common value. Without that, regional integration will 
remain strained. 
Although this outlook sounds optimistic and also practicable, authors like Lee disagree 
with this “easy approach”. Roh Moo-hyun (South Korean president from 2003-2008) also 
promoted social and cultural exchanges as a way to establish a regional “peace regime” and 
“economic community”. Lee argues that “intensifying economic and social interdependence, 
people-to-people  exchanges,  and  transboundary  environmental  problems  alone  have  not 
generated the necessary conditions for a regional community.” (Lee 2008: 243) Lee urges for 
“more traditional” approaches in the political  and military sectors,  since these demand “a 
strong commitment  and the will  to  achieve political  breakthroughs” of  the leaders of  the 
region. (Ibid.) Despite economic cooperation that blossomed over the years and “increased 
hopes for a more integrated community”, progress in the political and security realm have 
been meager. Lee points out that the “functionalist” approach of social and cultural exchanges 
has its limits, and the ongoing historical issues and territorial disputes are a confirmation of 
that  sentiment.  (Lee  2008:  244)  He  sees  a  future  in  bi-multilateral  cooperation  and 
institutional  design  of  regional  cooperation  efforts.  Multilateral  mechanisms  which 
“complement existing bilateral relations and alliances” will be essential in moving towards 
regional understanding and collaboration. 
The next section presents a few approaches of community building that already exist in 
the region. 
32 The Nanjing massacre refers to the Japanese invasion into China in 1937. The city of Nanjing was the stage 
for mass murder and war rape over a period of six weeks. Japanese revisionists deny the validity of the 
accounts. When working on the joint textbook, Japanese participants did not question the validity of the 
massacre, but disputes over the number of victims arose. In the end, three different numbers were used in the 
textbook. (Wang 2009: 113)
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4.3 Models of Regional Cooperation
Although  this  paper  only  focuses  on  two  regional  organizations,  the  Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and the Chiang Mai Initiative, regionalism is on the rise in East 
Asia. Many of the regional initiatives that came about in the last decades were initiated by 
ASEAN or the U.S. This section will introduce a few of these organizations and the impact on 
the relations in the region.
The rift between Japan and China is the primary reason why some proposed regional 
organizations never materialized and, in addition, why organizations such as the Chiang Mai 
Initiative still operate under an IMF-link. (see 5.4) Due to China’s new take on multilateral 
organizations, the region is reassured and believes that the country wants to have a “peaceful 
rise” and play a more constructive role in the region. (Kurlantzick 2008: 198) Still, there are 
“major concerns” regarding Japan-China relations. One concern is that ASEAN, in the event 
of a conflict,  would have to side with either  Japan or China resulting in a weakening of 
“ASEAN’s cohesiveness”. (Tsunekawa 2009: 10) It has been ASEAN, however, that brought 
the  three  East-Asian  nations  together  through  the  initiative  of  installing  the  ASEAN+3 
framework. As Beeson suggests, the institutionalization of the ASEAN+3 network in itself 
was the outcome of the Asian Financial Crisis. This would serve as evidence that conflicts can 
work as a catalyst for regional cooperation, as Camilleri argues. (Camilleri 2003: 21) The 
ASEAN+3 heads  of  government  first  convened  in  1997  on the  sidelines  of  the  ASEAN 
summit in Kuala Lumpur. It was only at a subsequent meeting in 1998 the “APT [ASEAN+3] 
process began to be institutionalized.” Beeson argues, “It was the Asian crisis that provided 
the decisive catalyst for the development of the APT process.” (Beeson 2009: 78) Henning 
believes that through cooperation the countries of Asia “could transform international trade, 
monetary, and financial relations” if they manage to overcome remaining conflicts. He also 
postulates that economic cooperation could improve political  relations. (Henning 2002: 1) 
Since Japan is  currently the largest  trading partner  of  China and tensions  are  high,  some 
observers doubt this notion. The same applies to South Korea. Since South Korea normalized 
trade relations with Japan in the 1970’s, trading has reached all time highs, but when political 
conflicts  arise,  the  painful  history  of  the  occupation/colonization  of  Korea  still  triggers 
feelings of hatred and brings people on the street to protest against Japan. Mahbubani, who is 
far more optimistic, describes ASEAN and its branches33 as a “diplomatic superpower” and a 
33 The most known branches of ASEAN are amongst others the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN 
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“peacemaker of the region”, because only in ASEAN forums can the three North East Asian 
nations, Korea, China and Japan, negotiate peacefully. (Mahbubani 2008: 97-98) The thriving 
of the ASEAN+3 process can also be attributed to the “relaxed attitude” of the U.S. to the 
grouping. Since the U.S. previously opposed many regional groupings such as the East Asian 
Economic  Caucus,  the  thriving  of  this  new  approach  seems  surprising.  As  the  U.S.  is 
preoccupied with its war on terror and generally neglecting East Asia, Japan has leverage to 
take on a constructive role in the organization. It may also be possible that the U.S. does not 
view the organization as a “threat to their vital interests and is unlikely to amount to much.” 
(Beeson 2009: 78)  
Another regional approach is the institution of the Six-Party talks that started in 2003 to 
end  North  Korea’s  nuclear  program.  Participating  countries  are  North  and  South  Korea, 
China, Russia, Japan and the U.S. North Korea is a threat to every neighbor in the region and 
even China has a hard time attempting to control Kim Jong Il‘s aspirations. The institution of 
the Six-Party Talks actually improved North East Asian relations and created a North East 
Asian security mechanism “despite historical and structural sources of fissure between China, 
Japan and South Korea, and despite the inclusion of the U.S. and Russia in this proposed 
regional security mechanism.” (Hernandez 2009: 4) Even if some believe that China intends 
to prevent North Korea from approaching the U.S. directly, China actually views multilateral 
cooperation as an instrument for solving international problems and supports the Six-Party 
talks. (Schneider 2006: 99) South Korea prefers the talks “as a lasting institution not only for 
dealing with future uncertainty about North Korea but also for advancing a regional security 
agenda in Northeast Asia.” (Rozman 2008: 195) While North Korea left the talks in 2009, the 
five other participating countries still hold talks in order to bring North Korea back to the 
negotiating table. This suggests that the talks greatly strengthened regional cooperation and 
also served as a mechanism to build trust and confidence in the region.
While regional cooperation is on the rise, Japan, China and South Korea do not agree 
with how the architecture of such a regional cooperation should work. Every country favors 
different approaches. China developed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional 
approach, in Japan Foreign Minister Aso Taro proposed an “arc of freedom and prosperity”, 
while South Korea preferred the Six-Party Talks. Rozman argues that none of these three 
economic ministers (AEM) and ASEAN+3. http://www.aseansec.org/index2008.html, accessed on May 24th, 
2011. 
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approaches toward regionalism “is apt to gain dominance in the next decade”. (Rozman 2008: 
195) It is of great interest to see which one of those approaches will succeed in the end. 
4.4 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
In 2001, one form of regional integration was established in the form of the Shanghai 
Cooperation organization (SCO). This organization was formed by China, Russia, Kirghistan, 
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan in the mid-1990’s and aimed at greater cooperation in the region. 
The organization intentionally leaves out “western” powers, which also implies leaving out 
South Korea. Since the SCO approved of Iran as an observer country and started joint military 
exercises  in  the  region,  the  U.S.  looks  suspiciously  on  the  aims  of  the  organization. 
Meanwhile, politicians of the region insist that the aim is to work together on issues such as  
security, energy and, in addition, terrorism. The focus on terrorist threats was considered a 
particular problem in the region long before September 11. Beeson notes that the organization 
is significant as 
“it contains in China and Russia two of the world’s most important strategic actors, who are acting  
increasingly cooperatively  to  balance  American  power,  but  it  also  offers  China  an  opportunity  to  
entrench its political influence in a region of pivotal importance as a source of future energy supplies.” 
(Beeson 2009: 90) 
Put together, the members of the organization collectively possess about “17,5 percent of 
the proven oil reserves, 47-50 percent of known natural gas reserves and some 45 percent of 
the world’s population.” (Bailes; Dunay 2007: 3-4) As this initiative is still in its beginning 
stages, how the SCO will shape regional cooperation in the future and if this organization 
works  as  a  model  for  future  regional  cooperation,  remains  to  be seen.  The next  sections 
touches upon these critical questions.
4.4.1 The Aims of the SCO
Formed in the mid-1990’s and originally called the “Shanghai Five”,  the organization 
renamed itself into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after adding Uzbekistan in 
2001. The aims of the organization as taken from the website of the SCO are:
“The main goals of  the SCO are strengthening mutual  confidence and good-neighbourly relations  
among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science 
and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism, environmental protection 
and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region, 
moving  towards the  establishment  of  a  new, democratic,  just  and rational  political  and  economic  
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international order.”34 
Initially,  the  Shanghai  Cooperation  Organization  was  designed to  enhance  trade  with 
member countries, act as a forum for border demilitarization, enhance the relations of China 
and Russia and realize joint policy goals, as well as emphasize the leading role of the two 
powers  in  the  region.  (CSSCI  2010)  The  cooperation  between  China  and  Russia  was 
especially fragile in the beginning. Russia mainly joined the organization to ensure influence 
in  the region.  Yet,  Russia  quickly became skeptical  of  China’s involvement,  accusing the 
country of an alleged hidden agenda and using the SCO as a tool to control the region. (Ibid.) 
China, on the other hand, feared Russia’s western influence and felt that it fought a lonely 
fight to promote the organization and solve the problems of the region. A large part of the 
tensions  between  Russia  and  China  was  in  regards  to  border  and  disarmament  disputes. 
Tensions on the borders of China with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan became 
a  multilateral  issue  in  the  1990’s.  Therefore,  the  five  countries  signed  the  “Shanghai 
agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area, followed in 1997 
by the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas.” (Bailes; 
Dunay  2007:  4)  Additionally,  “relations  were  further  stabilized  by  a  series  of  bilateral 
agreements on frontier delineation, trade and cooperation”. (Ibid.) Through those measures, 
the organization successfully  solved “century-old border problems between China and the 
former Soviet states”. Guang even goes as far as to suggest that this approach could also be 
used to solve all the other border problems China has with India and Japan. (Guang 2007: 46-
47)  Since  all  of  the  member  countries  have  their  own  struggles  with  separatist  groups, 
extreme  Islamic  rebel  groups  and  terror  organizations,  the  SCO  signed  the  “Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism” as early as June 15, 2001, 
which was also the founding date of the Cooperation. (SCO 2001) Since the organization is 
based  on  the  principles  of  non-interference,  like  ASEAN  and  other  organizations  in  the 
region35, there was no resulting joint military. Furthermore, Russia and China failed to work 
34 “Brief introduction to the Shanghai cooperation organization“, In: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp, 
accessed on August 16th, 2011.
35  Non-interference is prominently termed as being a feature of the “ASEAN Way” by western scholars. 
Acharya describes the ASEAN Way as “to be known for its informality, preference for consensus over 
majority voting, avoidance of legalistic procedures, preference for non-binding resolutions and tendency to 
avoid contentious bilateral issues in multilateral discussions.” (Acharya 2009: 79) Acharya attributes the 
preference for non-intervention to the intervention of global superpowers into national affairs during the Cold 
War. Regional organizations were seen as “an important arena for developing principles of conduct because 
of their initial lack of representation at global institutions such as the United Nations”. Foreign policy was 
hence conducted through regional organizations. Also, third world countries found that global institutions 
could not prevent intervention into national affairs. Therefor, non-intervention was all the more important. 
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together  properly when it  came to sharing information about  terrorists,  which limited the 
function of the agreement. (CSSI 2010) As western military operations in the region increased 
and plans are put into place to institutionalize those operations through NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization) structures, China‘s response was to transform the SCO in 2002 “from a 
forum  of  border  demilitarization  and  trade  promotion  into  a  regional  security  structure 
capable of conducting joint anti-terrorist operations.” (Denison 2002) 
Russia’s initial goal was to enhance relations with former Soviet nations and secure its 
traditional influence, although its expectations for joining were proportionally low. Since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union, Russia‘s relations with “authoritarian Central Asian leaders has 
offered Russia the most comfort and continuity that could reasonably have been expected”. 
The SCO serves now as a “supplementary and consolidator” of the status-quo. (Bailes; Dunay 
2007: 10) Another factor for Russia was the rise of China. Through the SCO Russia can now 
cooperate  with China in an institutional  framework and at  the same time control  China’s 
aspirations in Central Asia. As a framework, the SCO helped to adjust Russia’s and China’s 
varying approaches of correspondence within the Central Asian region. As the motivations of 
China and Russia differ significantly, conflicts  and contradictions can be cleared up in an 
institutional  framework.  (Mozias  2009)  Additionally,  many  analysts  believe  that  Russia 
intended to compete with the U.S. and the NATO by founding the SCO. By being a member 
of the SCO, Russia signals to western countries and organizations that there is an alternative 
to “substantive rapprochement with the West”. Most importantly, economic cooperation with 
the SCO makes “long-term prospects of Russian gas supplies to Europe” uncertain, resulting 
in a nervous EU. (Troitskiy 2007: 33)
For China, working together with Russia serves multiple purposes. Through the SCO, 
China can reach Central Asian nations and secure energy resources without affronting Russia. 
As a result, China avoids any military confrontations on its borders and allows “its economic 
strengths [to] do their own work at minimum strategic cost”. Furthermore, with the SCO, 
China can secure economic influence and, through long-term agreements, reserve for itself the 
energy in the region. Lastly, China can prove itself as being capable of establishing a regional 
organization independent from the West. (Bailes; Dunay 2007: 13) For Central Asian nations, 
the framework of the SCO makes it possible to “avoid having to choose between their two 
dominant  (and  nuclear-armed)  neighbours.”  (Bailes;  Dunay  2007:  15)  Economic 
(Acharya 2009: 25) 
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institutionalization became a focus only later on, in 2005. This is mostly due to the resistance 
of Russia and Central Asian nations, as a free trade area would imply fierce trade competition 
from China. Also, “over-close SCO integration” might imply that Central Asian nations would 
have  to  give  up  “cooperation  with  Western  customers  and  Western-inspired  pipeline 
schemes”. (Bailes; Dunay 2007: 17) Nevertheless, the established plan is to build “a zone 
favourable for the free movement of products,  capital,  technology and services” by 2020. 
(Bailes; Dunay 2007: 26) A common denominator for all of the participating countries is the 
rejection of any hegemonic aspirations of any one country, which would cause interference in 
national affairs. 
How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is perceived in the U.S. and how it reacts to 
such opinions is explored in the next section.
4.4.2 The SCO and the U.S.
As the organization is often seen as a tool to counter hegemonial tendencies of the U.S., 
this  section tries  to find answers to  the validity  of  this  claim.  The U.S. first  ignored the 
organization but, over the last few years, a drastic and telling attitude change has taken place. 
In China, the attitude change is perceived to have gone from “brushing aside”/”ignoring” the 
organization, to “doubting” the goals of the organization, and now “attaching importance” to 
the organization.36 This perceived new respect  implies  that  the U.S.  must  adapt  to  a new 
competitive situation, which prior, was absent in a place like Central Asia. Evidence suggests 
that suspicions have been rising at a steadier rate since the organization was founded, just 
three  months  prior  to  9.11.  Due to  the  events  of  9.11,  the  U.S.  consequently  established 
security relations with Central Asian nations, such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. At that time, the U.S. still maintained bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This 
was  mutually  beneficial,  as  the  U.S.  could  use  the  bases,  airfields  and  already  in  place 
infrastructure, which was located in the proximity of Afghanistan. There is no question that 
Central Asian states benefited as well, as th countries hoped to improve their image through 
the provision of resources and obtain support in their own “battle to suppress Islamist rebel 
groups”. (Denison 2002) Additionally, Central Asian states received monetary compensation 
and, in fear of a growing China, hoped to install security relations with the U.S. to outweigh 
China‘s pressure. China, on the other hand, distrusted the continued western influence in the 
36  漠视, 怀疑, 重视
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region, especially on its borders. The main concern for China became the containment of U.S. 
influence in the region. As there was no timetable for the security presence of U.S. troops in 
these countries, their operations in the region were perceived “as an extension of their military 
reach” (Denison 2002) and China doubted the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops even after 
an end of the war with Afghanistan. 
The  first  time  the  SCO  flexed  their  muscles  was  in  2005,  when  the  organization 
demanded  a  troop withdrawal  of  U.S.  forces  from Uzbekistan.  (Zhao  2010:  33)  This  is, 
according to Chinese analysts, the turning point for the perception of the organization in the 
U.S. (Zhao 2010, CSSI 2010, Qi 2010) After the demand of troop withdrawal, the SCO was 
not a project anymore, but instead an organization that could not be dismissed. After all, the 
goals of the organization had become a threat to the strategy of the U.S. in Central Asia. 
Regardless  of  whether  or  not  the  U.S.  believed  in  the  longevity  of  the  organization, 
cooperation was required. (Qi 2010) A primary cause for the sudden risky strategy of the SCO 
was  the  “Colour  revolutions”37.  These  revolutions  swept  through  Central  Asia  and  were 
believed to be funded by the U.S. in an effort to bring democracy, and therefore unrest, to the 
region. The ultimate result would be the scoring of allies to work against the goals of China 
and Russia. This interference was perceived as a severe affront, as the member countries of 
the SCO supported the U.S. in its war against terrorism and cooperated with the U.S. strategy. 
The  SCO never  attempted  to  provoke the  U.S.  with  military  power  or  economic  means. 
According to Qi, the organization is aware of its range of power. They refrain from building 
up a military, as they are well aware of not being able to counter problems of energy, natural 
resources,  human  trafficking,  drug  smuggling,  terrorism  or  trade,  alone.  (Qi  2010)  The 
members of the SCO intentionally avoid positioning the organization “as either a collective 
defence or collective security institution”, despite holding security and anti-terrorist exercises. 
(Bailes; Dunay 2007: 36)
However, those joint military exercises very well  serve the purpose of showing one’s 
strength. In 2005, when the frictions with the U.S. grew to an all time high, China and Russia 
carried out a joint military exercise observed by other SCO states. The forces used “were 
unusual  and apparently excessive  for  a  counter-insurgency operation”.  They tested  “long-
37 The term “Color revolution“ defines revolutions which were mostly nonviolent and occurred in former Soviet 
and Balkan states. The movements used colors or flowers as a symbol. The goal was to overthrow 
authoritative or corrupt regimes and promote democracy. In the texts regarding the SCO the tulip revolution 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and the riot in Andijon (Usbekistan) are mostly mentioned.
62
range bombers, command posts and airbases, the neutralization of anti-aircraft defences and 
achievement  of  air  superiority,  enforcement  of  a  maritime  blockade,  simulation  of  an 
amphibious  landing  and  control  of  sea  areas  among  others”.  (Bailes  et  al.  2007:  22-23) 
Though the exercise was carried out under the guise of being related to playing out a scenario 
of “terrorism, separatism and extremism”, 
“the fact that the exercise took place so soon after the SCO’s Astana summit, at which the organization 
made its clearest ever protest against U.S. involvement in Central Asian affairs, indicates that the signals 
it conveyed about Chinese-Russian capacity and resolve were not aimed exclusively at potential non-
state adversaries.” (Bailes et al. 2007: 23)
Mate, however, suggests that it is difficult to argue that the organization is specifically 
aimed against western influences when most of the member states are also members of NATO 
and are involved in security missions along with the U.S. and NATO. (Mate 2009: 15) He 
argues that while this exercise could be perceived as being aimed at the U.S., this was only a 
bilateral exercise conducted by China and Russia. Other multilateral military exercises were 
all  aimed at  fighting a “probable terrorist  and separatist  threat”.  (Mate 2009: 19) He also 
states that due to the fact that every single member country has been a victim of terrorist and 
separatist attacks in recent years, the focus on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism is 
believable. (Mate 2009: 17) The U.S., in contrast, perceives the growing power of the SCO as 
a threat to security strategy and accuses the SCO of having a hidden agenda of wanting to 
minimize the influence of the U.S. in the region. The U.S. does openly state these beliefs, and 
Chinese authors are quick to defend those accusations by stressing the peaceful nature of the 
organization and above said insufficient economic and military power. (Qi 2010) As there are 
currently ongoing military maneuvers on the part of both China and Russia, the pleas of a 
peaceful  organization  do  not  calm  the  U.S.  The  U.S.  wants  to  prevent  the  SCO  from 
becoming an instrument with the sole purpose of serving Russia and China alone. Contrary to 
the pleadings of China’s peaceful intentions, they yet hold off granting the U.S. observing 
status in the SCO. The fear of Daniel Drezner is that China and India might create their own 
organizations which leaves the “U.S. on the outside looking in”. (Drezner 2007: 2) If the U.S. 
is  not  welcome  inside  existing  IOs,  this  might  prove  true  in  the  formation  of  future 
organizations. The SCO, with India as an observer country, has all the ingredients the U.S. is 
prepared to fear. One of the biggest fears is that China and India will join together and leave 
the U.S. out.  To prevent any further alienation, the U.S. has no choice but to leave some 
leverage to these two countries in IOs, thereby alienating Europe, whose countries have a 
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strong voice in human rights and democracy promotion. As Drezner puts it,  the issue is a 
delicate one: “keep the United States’ old friends close and its new friends closer.” (Drezner 
2007: 7) Mate concludes that while Russia and China would want to balance against the U.S., 
they are unable to do so without consent from the other member countries. Up until now, the 
Central Asian states like prefer to resist such endeavors and instead attemtp to “hedge their 
bets  between Russia-China and the West”.  In the end, he argues that the U.S. should not 
overreact to the military exercises, as his study suggests that there is no reason to fear that the 
SCO is anti-western. In order to prevent the SCO from ever becoming an organization aimed 
at  hedging  against  the  West,  Mate  suggests  that  western  states  should  entertain  positive 
relations with Central Asian states and prevent presenting themselves as a possible security 
threat. (Mate 2009: 21)
So, thus far, what do the conclusions drawn above imply for international organizations? 
The question remains if the Shanghai Cooperation Organization tries to replace IOs or their 
influence in the region. The next section tries to explore that question as well as looking into 
the future aims of the organization.
4.4.3 Does the SCO Aim to Replace Established International Organizations?
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization charter from June 2002 firmly states that the 
SCO is “not directed against other States and international organisations.” It even stresses the 
need to work together with other states and IOs on “the most topical international issues”.38 
Russia,  particularly,  “has  often taken the lead in  rejecting the idea that  the SCO may be 
directed against any rival state or group of states”. (Bailes et al. 2007: 36) How this fits with 
the argument of many authors, that Russia is in fact the one to push for the organization as a 
tool for countering western influence, is discussed briefly below. 
After analyzing texts of various Chinese authors, the general stand is that the organization 
does not desire to replace any other organization and that it  is also aware that it does not 
possess the means to do so. (Qi 2010, Qiu 2007, Zhao 2010) Qi stresses that the military and 
economic power would not be adequate enough to challenge the U.S. (Qi 2010) Even if the 
economic and military power was present, the organization would avoid using that power, as 
it  would  contribute  to  increasing  tensions  in  the  region.  Generally,  China  intends  on 
38 Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69, accessed on 
Oct. 12Th, 2011
64
maintaining peace and stability,  especially  on its  borders,  and focus on its  economy.  The 
organization cannot face the problems of the region alone and needs outside help from entities 
such as U.S. (Qi 2010) Some evidence suggests that the organization is primarily focused on 
combating “separatists” and “terrorists” in their own countries and little on “balancing against 
the  West”.  (Mate  2009:  3)  Additionally,  China’s  foreign  policy  aims  to  prevent  a  direct 
confrontation  with  the  U.S.  (Schottenhammer  2006;  Weigelin-Schwiedrzik  et  al.  2006) 
National security can no longer be achieved unilaterally through military or economic force. 
Therefore,  China  desires  to  work  together,  in  the  forum of  multilateral  organizations,  on 
issues  of  security.  Guang  attributes  this  new faith  in  multilateral  organizations  to  a  new 
Chinese diplomacy. Traditionally, Chinese diplomacy focused on bilateral relations, but due to 
the success of the SCO, Guang argues that China has more “confidence in participating in 
and, in some cases, even initiating multilateral processes”. (Guang 2007: 48) China wants to 
seek a multipolar world order where it works together with the EU and Russia, with China 
acting as one of the five poles (the five poles being the U.S.,  Russia,  Europe,  Japan and 
China) (Jiang 2008: 31) Working together with the EU and Russia would be beneficial in 
preventing  American  troops from encircling  China’s  borders.  (Schottenhammer  2006:  35) 
Notwithstanding, China has to engage in parallel strategic relations with the U.S., as well as 
the EU, so as to prevent a one sided power influence and to also affirm its own regional 
position. (Weigelin-Schwiedrzik et.al 2006: 54) President Hu Jintao confirmed this policy line 
when  introducing  four  measures  that  would  stimulate  world  harmony.  He  addressed  this 
matter in a speech given on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations on September 16, 2005. 
One of the measures stated was to create  a  new security of mutual  trust,  mutual benefit, 
equality and collaboration and establish a fair and effective collective security mechanism. A 
provoking SCO would run counter to the claims of President Hu Jintao.  (Jiang 2008: 33) 
Kurlantzick  finds  that  China’s  new take  on  multilateral  organizations,  engagement  in  the 
world and its more constructive role in the region, makes the insistence on the “peaceful rise” 
more believable. (Kurlantzick 2008: 198) As well, from 1990 to 2007, China has participated 
in U.N. peacekeeping operations and has sent 7,500 men on 22 Peacekeeping missions around 
the world. Prerequisite for partaking in these missions is the resolution of the U.N. security 
council and the approval of the country in question. (Schmidt et al. 2009: 29) The intention to  
build up the organization in order to counter U.S. influence is more an idea originating with 
Russia,  but  even if  Russia  wanted to  realize this  aim,  the organization would suffer  if  it  
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“developed in a way that prevented them from playing their own ‘balancing’ games and from 
seeking both common cause, and profitable deals, with the USA and its allies (or other players 
such as Japan) when it suits them”. (Bailes et al. 2007: 28) Additionally, most of the other 
various  regional  organizations,  such as  APEC or  the  Six-Party  talks,  have  the  U.S.  as  a 
participating member. 
As it appears, the SCO refrains from stating their wish to replace other institutions. The 
next section explores the accomplishments of the organization in relation to regionalism in the 
area. It also discusses if the organization is a fitting instrument for bringing the countries 
closer together.
4.4.4 Does the SCO Strengthen Regionalism?
Various aspects point to the fact that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization strengthened 
regional cooperation. Specifically, China put much effort into presenting itself as a peaceful 
nation with the intention of working together with other states to achieve regional security and 
peace.
Chinese authors stress that the organization wants to establish peace in the region and in 
no way has intentions of endangering the stability by provoking other nations or IOs. The 
underlying tenor is that the SCO wants to be a stabilizing factor, hopes to work together with 
other organizations in spreading peace and even desires to unite with other countries and 
organizations over similar goals and work together to achieve the fulfillment of said goals. 
Such goals could include prosecuting drug smuggling or human trafficking along with the 
U.S. Considering China‘s history before 194539, it is not surprising that the country generally 
stresses a “peaceful rise”, nonintervention and sovereignty. China’s foreign policy after 1989 
was to seek strategic partnerships with multiple countries, as well as bilateral relationships. 
China also sought to take on a more active part in regional cooperation with Asia pacific 
countries,  ASEAN members and Central  Asian nations.  Since then,  China has established 
diplomatic relations with more than 40 countries, the first being Israel in January of 1992. 
(Jiang 2008) This was all achieved with stability and security in mind, as those are the pillars 
of the Communist Party. In that sense it is also not surprising that China does not use the 
gigantic foreign exchange reserves to invest extensively, so as not to upset the U.S. or the EU. 
39 The  country  experienced  five  civil  wars  which  cost  the  lives  of  millions  of  people  and  five  foreign  
interventions until 1945. (Armanski 2010) Among those are the first and second Sino-japanese War (the first  
from 1894-95, the second from 1937-45) and the Japanese intervention into Manchuria in 1931.
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Foreign investments are designed not to irritate other states. China wants to gain worldwide 
influence  and  become  a  “regional  superpower”  through  respect  and  creating  “strategic 
partnerships” with important  countries and also former “enemies”.  The country wishes  to 
have a voice in world politics. (Schottenhammer 2006: 10; 36) As well, China has sought to 
become a member, or seek observer status, in as many organizations as possible. China is, 
amongst others, a permanent observer in the Organization of American states (OAS), the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI) and so on. (Jiang 2008: 35) Of course, this goes to illustrate 
the growing influence China hopes to have in Latin America. 
Regarding regionalism, Bailes and Dunay argue that the SCO is formed by states with 
“more  or  less  autocratic  forms  of  government”  and  the  organization  itself  lacks 
“transparency” and a “significant means of democratic control.” Therefore, the organization 
“could prove just as fragile as individual regimes, as and when the latter face more serious 
challenge from both pro-democracy and pro-autonomy forces at home”. (Bailes; Dunay 2007: 
9)  Of  course,  those  are  only  assumptions.  What  can  be  said  thus  far  is  that  the  SCO 
strengthened regionalism in that it “consolidated the results [of historical forces and shifting 
power balances] and created channels that did not exist before for addressing and dispersing, 
or  at  least  easing,  intra-regional  state-to-state  tensions  through dialogue.”  (Bailes;  Dunay 
2007: 21) The greatest strength of the organization is that it has built up trust throughout the 
region. This is also achieved by cultural cooperation that the SCO initiated. The members of 
the SCO cooperate “in such fields as culture, disaster relief, education, tourism and media”. 
(Guang 2007: 49) As the organization not only works together in the economic and security 
sphere, the conclusion can be drawn that the SCO builds regionalism as it weds “quantitative 
and qualitative dimensions”. (Camilleri 2003: 6) Common symbols and values are necessary 
in order to find a regional identity. As regional identity and a common outlook on key issues 
are a prerequisite for a successful regional integration, the SCO seems to be going in the right 
direction. (Beeson 2007: 6) 
However, there seems to be truth in the argument of Winters, within she states that it is 
premature  to  draw  conclusions  about  the  possibility  of  a  regional  bloc  to  mitigate  the 
influence of multilateral institutions. Since the SCO in this form has existed for just over a 
decade, possible future outcomes can only be speculated upon. As it seems, China established 
the  organization  for  security,  as  well  as  economic  reasons,  and  to  enlarge  its  sphere  of 
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influence. The organization has done a great deal to bring the region together in that it solved 
century-old border disputes, built up trust and made possible regular exchange. As it seems, 
the institution is primarily focused on combating terrorism, separatism and extremism that 
lingers in the region, and refrains from “taking over” other institutions. 
4.5 The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 Asian countries promoted the installment of a 
regional security network in order to prevent future financial breakdowns. Japan was quick to 
propose an “Asian monetary fund as a framework for promoting financial cooperation and 
policy coordination in the region.” (Park 2002: 121) This proposal gained restrained reactions 
from the IMF, the U.S. and the EU, although the proposal was welcomed in a number of East 
Asian  countries.  Subsequently,  in  May  2000,  the  finance  ministers  of  ASEAN+3  (+3 
represented by China, Japan and Korea) agreed to set up “a system of swap arrangements 
within the ASEAN+3 countries.” (Park 2002: 121) In contrast to the proposal of an Asian 
monetary fund, this agreement was welcomed by both the IMF and the U.S. The general 
stance was that some form of regional security mechanism was needed in order to prevent 
future crises. How the organization works and what this cooperation entails for the region is 
discussed in this chapter. Most importantly, this section dwells on the question of whether or 
not the organization is designed to counter the IMF. Additionally, it touches upon whether or 
not  Asian  states  will  avoid  future  IMF  help  and  the  consequences  of  such  actions. 
Furthermore, the question of whether or not the organization is a sign of rapprochement in the 
region is explored. This chapter first investigates how this organization came into existence 
and it tries to touch upon the question of whether or not this organization has led to increased 
cooperation  in  the  region.  A further  section  explores  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the 
organization can bring about better collaboration in the region when there is an IMF-link. 
4.5.1 The Aim of the CMI
The  primary  aim  of  the  Chiang  Mai  Initiative  is  financial  security  in  the  region. 
Therefore, collaboration flowing over to the political sphere is somehow unlikely. Despite 
this, many authors suggest that even a minimal amount of collaboration and institutionalized 
mechanisms, as well as meetings in forums and general communication, can lead to better 
collaboration in other spheres. First, we must look upon the work of the CMI and how the 
organization came into existence.
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ASEAN had already utilized a system of swap arrangements since 1977. Members were 
able to exchange local currency for U.S. dollars on a short-term basis to facilitate temporary 
liquidity problems.40 Each member contributed a portion of their reserves and swaps could be 
used for  1,  2,  or  3  months  and were renewable for  an  additional  3  months.  These swap 
arrangements were used only five times in small amounts by Indonesia in 1979, Malaysia in 
1980, Thailand in 1980 and the Philippines in 1981 and 1992. (Henning 2002: 14) This swap 
agreement, however, was not used in the course of the Asian Financial Crisis, which led to the 
questioning of  this  mechanism altogether.  In  an  attempt  to  prevent  “an  extreme crisis  or 
systemic failure in a country and subsequent regional contagion such as occurred in the recent 
Asian financial crisis”, a new kind of swap agreements was envisioned by the ASEAN+3 
countries.  In  this  agreement,  countries  that  had  problems  of  balance  of  payments  could 
receive  help  from the  CMI.  The CMI would then provide  liquidity  support.  (Ibid.)  If  an 
exchange rate crisis occurs, a country can “swap one currency for another and reverse the 
transaction in the future when the crisis had passed.” (Beeson 2009: 84) The project was 
named after  the  city  where  the  finance ministers  established the agreement,  Chiang Mai, 
located in Thailand. The aims of the Chiang Mai Initiative were agreed upon these lines (this 
list is taken from Rana 2002: 8): 
• An  expanded  ASEAN  Swap  Arrangement  that  would  include  all  ASEAN  countries  and  a  
network of bilateral swap and repurchase agreement facilities among ASEAN countries, PRC, Japan, 
and Korea.
• Use  of  the  ASEAN+3  framework  to  promote  the  exchange  of  consistent  and  timely  data  and  
information on capital flows.
• Establishment of a regional financing arrangement to supplement existing international facilities.
• Establishment of  an appropriate  mechanism (early warning system) that  could enhance the ability  
to provide sufficient and timely financial stability in the East Asian region. 
Being that Asian countries blamed volatile capital flows for the Asian Financial Crisis, 
the countries of the region were particularly interested in monitoring such flows among other 
40 Quite simply, swap agreements are “short-term reciprocal lines of credit“ between participating banks. Doing 
a swap transaction is for example when a country borrows foreign currency in order to purchase its own  
currency in the foreign exchange market. In theory, the demand for the country‘s currency and its foreign 
exchange value are increased. Then, the country‘s banks can also provide its own currency to foreign central  
banks through swap arrangements. Another way to explain is that a country “can borrow a foreign currency 
from one of the other [participating] ones in order to buy its own domestic currency on the open market. 
Swap arrangements  allow participating institutions to  effect  changes on their  exchange rates,  while  still  
allowing  their  currencies  to  trade  according  to  market  factors.“  http://financial-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Swap+Arrangement, accessed on May 24th, 2011. 
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countries  in  the  area.  (Henning  2002:  12)  In  addition,  the  finance  ministers  agreed  “to 
establish a network of research and training institutions to strengthen the human capital of 
official in the financial, banking, and fiscal areas throughout the region.” (Ibid.) Japan, China 
and  South  Korea  were  eager  to  offer  expertise  in  this  realm.  The  financial  ministers  of 
ASEAN+3 approved to initially stock the fund with $1 billion. (Park 2002: 122) It was agreed 
that countries can borrow the maximum of twice their contribution and swaps can be drawn 
for up to six months, with an extension for another six months. (Henning 2002: 15) Since 
many  Asian  economies  are  export  oriented,  the  countries  of  ASEAN+3  hold  significant 
amounts of foreign exchange reserves. Henning noted in 2002 that “by dedicating a moderate 
portion of total foreign exchange reserve holdings in the region to financial stabilization, say 
10 to 20 percent, these countries could mobilize more resources than would be available to 
many  of  them  from  the  multilateral  financial  institutions  and  Group  of  Ten  countries.” 
(Henning: 2002: 13) Since then,  the foreign exchange reserves have grown in astronomic 
proportions and China holds now $2,850bn.41 
The  following  section  touches  upon how the  organization  works  and if  it  is  a  truly 
regional establishment.  
4.5.2 Is the CMI a Regional Organization?
In actuality, the Chiang Mai Initiative, although created in Asia, works in accordance with 
the aims of the IMF. Although the organization appeared to be a breakthrough in setting the 
region free from the influence of the U.S., the achievement of setting up an organization in a 
pure “Asian”, rather than “Asia-Pacific” form, has produced “changes [that] have not been as 
dramatic or far-reaching as might have been expected”. (Beeson 2009: 84) The organization 
works under the umbrella of the IMF and initially only 10 percent of the funds were not 
subject to IMF conditionality. At this time, if the then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir 
Mohamad, who was a “longstanding critic of the IMF”, had not protested the “IMF-link” and 
delayed negotiations, even the 10 percent would have been subject to IMF conditionality. 
(Henning  2002:  17)  Shortly  after,  in  May  2005,  at  the  8th ASEAN+3  finance  ministers 
meeting in Istanbul, there was an agreement made on increasing the “size of swaps which 
could  be  withdrawn  without  the  IMF-supported  program”  to  20  percent.42 Furthermore, 
41 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/12d8558c-1d5c-11e0-a163-00144feab49a.html#axzz1LTKXzwXw  , accessed on 
May 5th, 2011
42 Ibid.
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Malaysia agreed to the link only on the condition of a monitoring or surveillance system that 
allows the organization to function independently. (Park; Wang 2005: 96) Beeson detects “a 
good deal of nervousness on the part of those countries that would be expected to provide the 
bulk of the funds [which would be Japan and China] to underwrite any swap arrangements 
about making an open-ended commitment to their impoverished neighbors.” (Beeson 2009: 
85) Ravenhill declares the arrangements to be merely symbolically. He also points out that the 
IMF-link is owing to Japan and China, who “have been keen to maintain links with existing 
IMF-determined conditionality.” (Beeson 2009: 85; quoted after Ravenhill 2002: 167-95) This 
also goes to show that there are deeply rooted suspicions of institutions led by great powers, 
even if these great powers are Asian. (Acharya 2009: 81) Park and Wang also note that China 
and Japan believed that  the  IMF-link enhanced the  credibility  of  the organization.  (Park; 
Wang 2005: 96) 
The question remains, what does the IMF-link entail? The CMI is a kind of henchman to 
the IMF, helping the IMF to collect economic information on East Asian countries and also 
working in sync to prevent a future financial crisis. Therefore, if a country wants to draw 
“most  of the funds through the swaps,  the borrower must  have completed,  or  be nearing 
completion on, an agreement with the IMF.” (Henning 2002: 17) As a result, countries must 
take  on  policy  reforms  in  order  to  take  out  funds  from the  CMI.  Hence,  the  IMF  still 
determines the “policy conditionality for most of the swaps.” (Ibid.) Ironically, whereas U.S. 
influence  is  looked  upon  suspiciously  in  the  region,  East  Asian  states  do  not  mind  the 
financial realm being subject to U.S. intervention. Only the Japan-China swap, which was 
signed in March of 2002, does not include the IMF-link. (Henning 2002: 20) Furthermore, 
China and Japan do not swap U.S. dollars, but instead swap Yen for Renminbi. (Henning 
2002: 19) Additionally, China and South Korea swap Won for Renminbi. (Park; Wang 2005: 
95) Swaps amongst other countries are done using U.S. dollars.
As it seems, the Chiang Mai Initiative is not at all a threat to the work of the IMF and is  
even  welcomed  by  both  Japan  and  China.  Some  evidence  suggests  that  regionalization 
actually helps strengthen global institutions. Specifically, this fund is helping regionalization 
and  the  IMF  eagerly  supports  this  undertaking.  Dominique  Strauss-Kahn,  former  IMF 
managing director even credited the CMI as “an important complement to IMF financing”. 
(Politi 2010) Now, the question must be considered: If the organization is dependent on the 
IMF, can it be seen as a tool for strengthening the region? The next section attempts to explore 
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the “Asian” attributes, if any, of the organization.
4.5.3 A Vehicle for Further Cooperation?
As it is hoped that a financial crisis would only turn up occasionally, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative would be infrequently used. This points to the fact that such an organization can 
scarcely be viewed as a vehicle for increased cooperation in the region, such as an “Asian 
EU”. Also, the likability of the arrangement to prevent a future crisis, or to be of help in a  
future crisis, is called into question due to the relatively small amounts of swaps. A further 
problem is demonstrated by the likely inability of the fund to borrow if more countries apply 
for help. Since creditors can opt out of the arrangements, the security for countries to draw a 
swap is insufficient. Moreover, if a second country applies for a swap, the first country is 
unable to renew a swap. (Henning 2002: 15) So, what purpose does the organization even 
serve? Evidence suggests that the organization strengthens regionalization in Asia and also 
ASEAN as an organization itself. Additionally, the organization makes financial cooperation 
more transparent than bilateral swap agreements. In addition, ASEAN has even set up its own 
surveillance process, which has the potential to “provide a foundation for more productive 
regional dialogues in the future.” (Henning 2002: 15) However,  this notion is doubted by 
Beeson,  who views the “peer  review” process  as  “unlikely to  generate  confidence  in  the 
region’s capacity for self-regulation.” (Beeson 2009: 85) Also, according to Beeson, the IMF-
link  demonstrates  that  there  is  still  the  preference  “for  limited  interference  in  domestic 
affairs”, as is the ASEAN way. (Ibid.) 
 However,  as  Asian markets  are  highly interdependent,  they have little  choice but to 
cooperate  to  some  degree.  As  there  is  much  intraregional  investment,  the  countries  are 
mutually  vulnerable  to  financial  contagion.  Nevertheless,  disagreements  sometimes  still 
hinder decision-making processes and thus, that is why the question continues to linger on 
how “this process will operate or develop.” (Beeson 2009: 85) In view of the fact that the 
“technical and bureaucratic competence” is rather uneven in the region, it is still unclear as to 
how an overall surveillance process would function assuming functionality is even possible. 
This is clear example as to why the IMF-link is of vital importance as a level of security. An 
even greater doubt, however, is the lack of faith in Japan’s “ability to internationalize the yen 
and make the region as a whole less reliant on the U.S. dollar.” (Beeson 2009: 85) Also, the 
IMF-link  could  be  rendered  unnecessary  if  the  funds  provided  by  the  member  countries 
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actually have the power to prevent a crisis. Thus far, the organization cannot prevent a crisis 
on its own with “only” 2 billion Dollars.43 Only if the fund were to be greatly enlarged, would 
the organization be able to work on its own. (Park; Wang 2005: 95)
Some view the involvement of the IMF as a sign that the CMI is not a real regional  
organization. (Rana 2002) In this sense, the organization does not want to take over and is no 
rival of the IMF. According to Barnett and Finnemore’s concept of the diffusion of norms, the 
IMF established itself  as  an organization  where  its  belief  system and its  norms enforced 
already previously accepted and practiced global values and standards. Even if Asian nations 
had intended to set  up an independent organization,  perhaps it  was impossible due to the 
overwhelming norms the IMF had already established over the years. Through the diffusion of 
norms, IOs can legitimize interventions in national affairs. Consequently, this concept would 
explain  why countries  in  Asia  were  unable  to  set  up an  independent  fund on their  own. 
According to Barnett and Finnemore, the more powerful institution decides both the issue of 
who solves the problems and who decides the suitable solution. In this case, the IMF decided 
what is best for Asia and comes out as a winner, as now the CMI does some of the work the  
IMF was originally intended to do. In fact, the IMF welcomed regional financial cooperation 
and  hoped to  work  together  with  the  newly formed  organization.  Horst  Köhler,  the  then 
managing director  of  the  IMF, viewed the Chiang Mai Initiative  in  2000 as  a  vehicle  to 
enhance regional cooperation in Asia. The initiative should “be made to fit well into a strategy 
of addressing economic issues of importance to the region, as well as of providing broad 
international support for countries in need.”44 He looked forward to working jointly with the 
cooperation and coordinating assistance with the organization. Additionally, he was enthused 
to be helping an organization that avoided opposition to the IMF, and instead, worked together 
for  the  “good  of  all”.  The  Joint  Ministerial  Statement  issued  in  2000  of  the  ASEAN+3 
Finance  Ministers  Meeting  directly  states  that  “In  order  to  strengthen  our  self-help  and 
support mechanisms in East Asia through the ASEAN+3 framework, we recognized a need to 
establish  a  regional  financing  arrangement  to  supplement  the  existing  international 
facilities.”45 Some member countries opposed the linkage to the IMF and “have proposed a 
43 On the 8th ASEAN+3 finance ministers‘ meeting, the finance ministers agreed to double the SWAP 
arrangement from 1 billion dollar to 2 billion dollar. In: „The joint ministerial statement of the 8th ASEAN+3 
finance ministers‘ meeting. Istanbul, Turkey, 4 May 2005“, http://www.asean.org/17448.htm, accessed on 
August 2nd, 2011.
44 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2005/pr05199.htm  ,  accessed on Nov. 18, 2010
45 “The Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN + 3 Finance Ministers Meeting“, 6 May 2000, Chiang Mai, 
Thailand. http://www.aseansec.org/635.htm, accessed on May 10th, 2011
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gradual increase of the 10 percent automatic draw down to abolish the IMF linkage after a 
period of transition.” (Park 2002: 123) Since then, the automatic draw was increased to 20 
percent, an amount that is still insufficient. 
According to these quotes, the CMI views itself as a “supplement” to the IMF. As well, 
the  IMF  itself  believes  that  the  CMI  “avoids  opposition  to  the  IMF”.  The  next  section 
explores the question of the possibility of the organization gaining more confidence and the 
ability to break free and form a “real” regional organization. Alternatively, the question is 
raised:  Is  the  institutionalized  process  a  vehicle  for  founding  still  another  “real  regional 
financial organization”.
4.5.4 Independence Despite IMF-link?
Initially,  the  IMF was  against  the  idea  of  an  Asian  monetary  fund because  it  feared 
displacement that could “undercut its ability to secure policy adjustments from borrowing 
countries.” Only when the ASEAN+3 countries “promoted the CMI not as an alternative to 
the IMF, but rather as a complement to financial multilateralism”, were the U.S., Europe and 
the IMF were reassured. (Henning 2002: 2) Henning argues that due to the fact that Asian 
states lost trust in the IMF after the Asian financial crisis, they accumulated large amounts of 
foreign  exchange reserves.  These exchange reserves  can  unsettle  markets,  therefore  using 
such exchange rates in a fund is the best route. Advocates for the CMI argue that “by giving  
greater confidence of access to a safety net, […] the mobilization of the region’s reserves in a 
crisis could enable countries to reduce reserve holdings.” (Henning 2002: 6) Since then, the 
international  community  is  “publicly  neutral  with  respect  to  the  CMI”  as  long  as  it  is 
complementing the work of the IMF. (Henning 2002: 2) After the Asian Financial  Crisis, 
Washington was in favor of “regional facilities” that could prevent future crises. Since the 
CMI did not pose a threat to the IMF, the path was open to create the CMI. The role of Japan 
should also not be underestimated.  Behind the scenes,  “the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) undertook informal  negotiations  to  gain  explicit  support  from the  United  States.” 
(Beeson et al. 2006: 11). Beeson and Yoshimatsu not only give credit to the Japanese MOF 
because of its successful lobbying in Washington, but they also attribute the Japanese MOF 
with the creation of “feasible surveillance mechanisms in East Asia”. (Beeson et al. 2006: 11) 
This suggests that Japan is very much interested in some kind of regional mechanism, but 
fails the confidence to promote a “real regional” institution, as Japan was called off when 
74
promoting the Asian Monetary Fund. In addition, Japan has no desire to risk its alliance with 
the U.S.
Still, critics fear worst-case scenarios in which regional organizations separate from the 
multilateral idea by “reject[ing] global standards, disburs[ing] funds too generously, and thus 
magnify[ing] moral hazard[s] and delay[ing] needed policy adjustments.” (Henning 2002: 3) 
Henning believes that these fears are unfounded and concludes that the CMI “is considerably 
more  sensitive  to  multilateral  institutions,  the  IMF  in  particular,  than  are  comparable 
arrangements.”  (Henning  2002:  3)  He  prefers  a  mix  of  regionalism in  cooperation  with 
multilateralism. Since the IMF has such diverse members from all over the world and its size 
is remarkable, Henning concludes that while these are “sources of strength, [many members] 
are also causes of weakness.“ (Henning 2002: 8) Since “small groups of countries are able to 
block  access  to  IMF resources“  and  the  U.S.  can  block  important  IMF decisions,  alone 
decision-making is a long process and and programs “are not always flexibly adapted to local 
circumstances.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, a regional financial cooperation can speed up decision 
making and can help to bring financial  assistance more quickly to  the forefront.  He also 
believes  that  the  West  “should  support  regional  financial  cooperation  in  East  Asia  and 
encourage its evolution in ways that are compatible with multilateral institutions.” (Henning 
2002: 3) For multilateral institutions, it is the uncertainty of access to resources that gives way 
to regional financial cooperations. All the more, regional cooperations can then supplement 
IMF resources, where their quota, and hence their borrowing capacity, may be constrained. 
(Henning 2002: 8) Also, regional cooperations can help the IMF monitor the region and “can 
supplement surveillance and early-warning exercises based in the IMF.“ (Ibid.) Due to the fact 
that regional cooperations share regional markets, they have more up-to-date information and 
also “a stronger material interest in corrective action.” (Henning 2002: 9) 
While organizations such as the CMI do not lead to tangible results or, for example, when 
the success of the organization has yet to be seen,  Pascha suggests,  the symbolic sign of 
setting up a regional organization can be enough to boost the profile  of a region in  IOs. 
(Pascha 2007: 444) Beeson believes that there are signs that the effort of financial integration 
in East Asia is not in vain. Since the Asian Financial Crisis, the finance ministers of the region 
have met on numerous accounts and have created institutionalized networks. Furthermore, 
outside factors may dictate the future more than others. Since recent events in the American 
economy,  with  its  “non-transparent  economic  practices  and  relationships”,  East  Asian 
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countries might reassess the U.S. “status as a source of economic stability”. (Beeson 2009: 
86-87) Park and Wang believe that in the long run, the CMI can break free from the IMF 
linkage. This would result in the borrowers having to “adhere to sound and macroeconomic 
and  financial  policies  by  imposing  conditionalities”  from  the  CMI.  For  that  reason,  the 
tradition of non-interference in the region, a “policy coordination mechanism”, is still a thing 
of the future. (Park; Wang 2005: 96) In some countries, the overall welcome of the CMI is 
lukewarm. Park notes  that  “Singapore and Brunei  have  shown little  enthusiasm from the 
beginning for promoting the CMI”, as they believe in the bilateral swap agreements as being a 
“one-way arrangement” where they would have to provide large amounts of liquidity. (Park 
2002: 124) Japan brought in Singapore when it offered to negotiate a BSA “that uses local  
currencies rather than the U.S. Dollar.” A similar BSA agreement was negotiated with China. 
Indonesia is largely preoccupied with “resolving domestic economic issues and managing its 
huge foreign debts”, therefore not particularly involved in the organization. (Park 2002: 124) 
Still, the CMI gives Asian countries the opportunity to draw out twice, or even five times, 
their IMF quota. (Henning 2002: 22-24)
In conclusion, the organization helped to bring the countries of the region closer together 
in a working relationship,  which is an accomplishment,  even if  it  is only in the realm of 
financial cooperation. A crisis initially prompted the launching of the organization and the 
ongoing economic crisis may bring the region even closer together. Breaking free from the 
IMF-link will be an arduous undertaking; being that many countries of the region are allied 
with the U.S. This is especially true of Japan’s standing, which is crucial. While Japan wants 
to take on a more responsible role, the country is held back by the U.S. Furthermore, a general 
lack of faith in the power of Japan on an international level, and in the region, is a major 
stumbling block for a “real regional financial” integration. 
5. International Organizations: The WTO and the IMF
5.1 The Power of States and International Organizations
Now that  the conceptualizations  of  power and authority,  as  well  as  the  relations  and 
power centers of Asia are established, this section attempts to determine the allocation of 
power. If an organization is seen as its own construct, the analysis is different than if one was 
to view it as being shaped by its various member states. It seems difficult to measure a shift of 
power within IOs when it is assumed that IOs are bureaucracies and states cannot shape their 
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behavior. If it is the organization on its own, how then can a shift of power away from one 
country to another be determined? If this analysis would prove true, then there is nothing to 
determine, as the organization works on its own. Taking these thoughts into account, there is 
reason to suspect that countries can influence IOs in some ways, even if it can initially be 
overlooked on the surface. Searching for those instances where countries are able to influence 
institutions, be it whichever way, is the direction to follow. 
Barnett and Finnemore believe that member states “may initiate change with calls for 
reform, and they may block (or slow) it, but IOs themselves play a large role in determining 
the character and content of that change”. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 158) IOs are dependent 
on resources provided by member states. Given the complex nature of IOs, their working field 
and  their  objective,  there  must  be  some  form  of  shuffling  or  intervention  from  various 
countries.  Accordingly,  IOs  tend  to  cater  to  the  powerful  states  that  provide  the  most 
resources. As most of the IOs are designed so that economically powerful states have the most 
influence, IOs sacrifice their impartiality and nondiscriminatory principles to secure needed 
resources. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 168-169) Case in point being financial bailouts of the 
IMF. Bailouts are often only guaranteed to states that are of interest  to powerful member 
states. When this occurs, the legitimacy of the organization falls into dispute. Certainly, these 
are  strong examples of  IOs serving the interests  of powerful  states  and not  acting in  the 
interest of the general public, whom they are supposed to be serving. Recently, and at a higher 
frequency, the “medicine” prescribed to borrower governments was brought into question by 
activist groups and the population of affected states. This should not come as a surprise as IOs 
have taken on more and more affairs and have become increasingly involved in the domestic 
affairs of states. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 169) In recent years, the criticism brought upon 
IOs from Non-government Organizations (NGOs) and protest groups from the left and the 
right alike, have not fallen on deaf ears. The requested transparency and involvement of the 
local population is being implemented to preserve legitimacy. This approach not only revamps 
their  image,  but  also helps them to rethink their  policies and again become substantively 
legitimate.  In other  words,  they are enhancing their  expert  authority.  (Barnett;  Finnemore 
2004: 169) The IMF and the World Bank have now come to the realization that “consent of 
the governed is essential to their legitimacy and have used participation as a surrogate for 
consent”.  (Barnett;  Finnemore 2004:  170) Even if  transparency of implemented programs 
increases through website postings which highlights ongoing progress in recent years,  the 
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transparency of  internal  decision-making processes  still  leaves  much to be desired.  Many 
member  states  do  not  allow  the  implementation  of  procedures  that  would  “meet  basic 
standards of procedural legitimacy”; meaning, IOs will continuously face legitimacy problems 
in the future. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 170) IOs have mostly outgrown the founding fathers 
intended scope of action, but the accountability factor has not grown with it. Who is to be held 
accountable when the organization fails? Does the answer lie in placing the blame on the 
organization itself or the member states that allowed the organization to act in such a way? It 
is  of  great  importance  to  adapt  this  factor  to  the  new  situation  so  as  to  reestablish  the 
legitimacy of the organization. Without accountability, the organization can act without being 
sanctioned.  The  absence  of  accountability  is  troublesome  as  it  “matters  because  of  the 
presumption that its absence means that those in power have the capacity to act without regard 
for those who authorize their actions and for those whose lives are affected by those actions”. 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 171)
One of the aims of this chapter is to introduce the World Trade Organization and the 
International Monetary Fund. The first  section attempts to find an answer to the question 
whether  or  not  IOs  really  are  influenced  by  the  more  powerful  “western  states”.  In  the 
following section, the WTO and the various problems it has encountered, as related to facing 
a shift of economic power in world production and trade, are touched upon. Finally, in the last 
section, the IMF and its problems of holding on to its right to exist are examined. The aim is  
to shed light on if and how the organizations are affected by a shift in economic power and 
what changes these shifts prompted in the organizations.
5.2 Are International Organizations in Favor of “Western States”?
Barnett  and  Finnemore  believe  that  international  organizations  work  in  favor  of 
liberalism and a liberal  global  order,  as  most  of these organizations  were founded in the 
western  world.  (Barnett;  Finnemore  2005:  162)  Taking  the  post  World  War  II  order  into 
account, it is not surprising that the institutions modeled in the 1940’s are thought to be led by 
the U.S. After all, international institutions like the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank “were 
crucial  for  the  consolidation  of  U.S.  hegemony  during  the  post-World  War  II  period.” 
(Chorev,  Babb  2009:  461)  Hurrell  argues  in  the  same  manner  in  that  he  criticizes  the 
conditionality requirements imposed on countries willing to join an IO. Given that western 
scholars,  politicians  and  advisers  defined  those  requirements,  they  carry  some  kind  of, 
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admittedly  also  unintentional,  moral,  national  and  religious  input.  Hurrell  thinks  of 
conditionality as a hidden instrument to shape “how other societies are organized.” (Hurrell 
2005: 39) Hence, it  can be said that organizations have “western rules”. The organization 
decides what defines human rights, when an intervention into national politics is necessary 
and what economic course to take. 
The concept of liberalism is the belief in progress and of managing conflicts and this is in 
line with the goals of an IO. International institutions mostly want to promote commerce and 
interdependence between states. The values are typically “western” as they stand for freedom, 
autonomy and liberty.  (Barnett;  Finnemore 2005: 165-66) However,  in order  to enjoy the 
mutual “gains” guaranteed by those institutions, developing states must carefully balance such 
gains  by  simultaneously  keeping  the  strong  states  engaged,  yet  also  constrained.  The 
developing states must accept “painful concessions” to the special interests of the stronger 
powers.  Holding  on  to  sovereignty  becomes  a  balancing  act  that  requires  important 
endeavour.  (Hurrell  2005:  47)  Hurrell  criticizes  that  while  there are  many discussions  on 
topics such as human rights or other international issues, the extremely intrusive legal order of 
IOs is not on the agenda. (Hurrell 2005: 36) In contrast, Betz claims that since the 1990’s, the 
influence  of  Bretton  woods  institutions  is  stagnating.  (Betz  2007:  317)  Despite  the  large 
amounts of criticism directed at international financial organizations, most of the programs do 
not even reach their goals. 40 percent of the programs of the IMF were canceled in the 1980’s, 
and more demanding long-term programs even had a 56 percent dropout rate. This indicates 
that between 1973 and 1997 less than half of the recommended programs were completely 
funded. (Betz 2007: 324; quoted after Remmer 1986 and Mussa; Savastano 1999) Even if 
Betz uses this argument as a way to emphasize that the power of the IMF is not entirely 
sound, it still implies that half of the initiated programs were completed, which nonetheless is 
enough for intrusions.  
In the next section, the WTO and the IMF and the question of whether or not they are 
“liberal” and ruled by western states will be discussed. This section will also touch upon the 
question  of  whether  developing  countries  have  the  means  to  influence  the  organization. 
Finally, the attempt is made to find out if the economic shift of power prompted any changes 
in the organization.
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5.3 The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
along with the World Bank, all emerged in the post World War II order led by the United 
States. Members who joined the organization first were able to decide the rules, which Robert 
Keohane calls the “first mover advantages”. (Wilkinson 2008: 6; quoted after Keohane 2002: 
253) Therefore, the rules served “the needs of the dominant actors”. In this case, new markets 
for  industrial  products  were  created,  while  the  agricultural  and  clothing  sector  remained 
protected. (Wilkinson 2008: 6) At first the predecessor of the WTO, the General Agreement 
on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  was  established  in  1947.  After  the  devastating  war  the 
agreement  was  designed  to  reduce  trade  barriers  in  manufactured  goods.  Free  trade  was 
intended to help improve living conditions all over the world and to bring wealth to all people. 
Trade barriers had contributed to the Great Depression and so the “primary mission of the 
GATT was to reduce or eliminate the border barriers”. (Ostry 2005: 459) China signed the 
GATT in 1948 but left one year later. The country rejoined the organization only in 2001, after 
8 years of negotiations. Korea had desired to join the organization as early as the 1950’s, but 
only became a member in 1967. Wilkinson attributes the willingness of so many countries to 
join an organization that, in his view, only benefited the industrial nations, to the fact that they 
could manifest their new sovereign status, and were eager to do so, by being a member of an 
IO. (Wilkinson 2008: 10)
The World Trade Organization is of particular interest as the organization is not built on 
monetary incentives,  but instead operates mostly on commitments given to it  by member 
states. Unlike the IMF, the WTO cannot use monetary incentives to compel other states to 
comply. The WTO uses its “expert authority” through years of experience attending to matters 
of trade. Compared to the IMF, the WTO is designed to be more “democratic”, with every 
member given the same vote. Rules formally apply to every member, although sometimes 
there  are  exceptions,  especially  for  developing  countries.  At  the  same  time,  because  the 
organization is not dependent on financial resources, it is relatively neutral and can restrain 
member  countries  that  want  to  influence  the  organization.  The  organization  is  “member-
driven” and decisions are reached by consensus of all participants. This is why the WTO is 
generally considered to be able to survive the shifting power structures lying ahead, whereas 
the IMF, with its anachronistic voting structure, will have a hard time adapting to the new 
“world order”. (Chorev, Babb 2009) 
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Even if the WTO receives much, if not as much criticism as the IMF for its measures, the  
WTO structure gives  developing countries  a  form leverage.  Within the WTO, developing 
countries have a voice, as their vote is the same as that of developed countries. However, 
because of these features, it is much more difficult to detect a shift of power. Power cannot be 
executed through money, but only through bargaining power. Therefore, it is problematic to 
find out how those states, which feel underrepresented, would try to change the organization. 
It will be of particular interest to determine if they use their bargaining power when voting or 
if they hold up negotiations in order to achieve the outcome they desire. Additionally, how 
and if these states find allies in the organization to achieve a greater voice is to be touched 
upon  in  the  subsequent  sections.  Finally,  the  question  is  explored  of  whether  or  not 
developing  countries,  when  feeling  underrepresented,  exit  the  organization  entirely  and 
pursuit their own ideas in regional organizations. 
5.3.1 Bargaining Power Within the WTO
The World Trade Organization is a member-driven, consensus-based organization and, on 
the surface, highly democratic. Decisions are agreed upon by all countries involved, which 
lends to the impression that every country has the same, equal voice. If a new country wishes 
to join the organization, two thirds of the member countries have to accept the new member. 
Ministers meet up every two years to discuss certain issues and ambassadors and delegations 
meet up regularly in Geneva. Since the membership numbers have risen significantly since 
the founding of the organization, from 23 to 15346, the decision-making process has become 
an arduous undertaking. To make the process easier, the “Green Room” was invented. It is 
here where the most powerful states retreat to negotiate amongst themselves and agree upon 
certain points. In the beginning, the “major” members retreated alone and made decisions for 
everybody else. They were called the “Quad” or the “Quadrilaterais”, consisting of Canada, 
the European Union, the U.S. and Japan. Since the Doha Round, which began in 2001, the 
organization has also sought to represent developing countries and at times includes Brazil 
and India, as well as Australia, as a representative of the Cairns Group47, into the negotiations 
of  the  Green  Room.  Other  developing  countries  can  set  up  coalitions  with  negotiating 
46 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm  , accessed on August 11th, 2011. 
47 The Cairns Group represents Argentian, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand 
and Uruguay. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm,  accessed on August 11th, 
2011.
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member. Coalitions are, for example, the “Cotton 4” or the G-20.48 49
Nevertheless, emerging countries are excluded from one of the most important processes 
that  take  place  within  the  WTO. Decisions  that  are  made in  the  Green Room cannot  be 
disputed  afterwards  and  member  countries  only  have  the  choice  to  agree  upon  the 
arrangements. This raises questions about the “democratic process” within the organization. If 
a  few  countries  make  the  decisions  for  all,  can  the  organization  still  be  considered 
democratic? Since the idea behind the WTO is to bring wealth to everybody, the organization 
carries social norms that can hardly be dismissed. Since the last round, however, developing 
countries have felt left out and the social values and social purposes seem to be lost. The 
organization appears to take the side of the developed states and is therefore not impartial, 
which is required to remain powerful. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 21) For a long time now, 
NGOs have criticized the process in that it leaves out developing countries. Advocates of the 
Green Room state that coalitions are built upon interests and not upon the economic power of 
member states. Therefore, they believe there is nothing wrong with the setup, as developing 
countries can be well represented by developed countries. Other voices declare the unfairness 
of the whole organization, since the U.S. does not abide by the rules. A 2005 ruling declares 
that  U.S.  cotton  subsidies  are  against  WTO  law.  Despite  this  ruling,  however,  the  U.S. 
continues “its generous payments to politically powerful cotton farmers” and pays Brazil not 
to implement countervailing measures.(Beattie 2011; Bergan 2011)
One incident that has really put the organization to the test is the Doha Round. Due to 
serious resistance to proposed trading changes, the Round has been stalling for a decade. Is 
this seemingly purposeful delay a manifestation of the power of emerging economies? The 
next section attempts to answer this question.
5.3.2 The Doha Round
The Doha Round is used to carve out a recent example of how the WTO and its members 
are changing their behavior within the WTO. The Doha Round, which commenced in 2001, is 
the first round in which developing countries can start to rebel against the decision-making 
48  The „Cotton 4“ consist of Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/cotton_subcommittee_e.htm, accessed on August 11th, 2011. 
49 The Group of 20 consist of: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States of America, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx, accessed on Nov. 
4th, 2011.
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process. Firstly, developing countries only agreed to negotiate if the focus of the negotiations 
would be development.  (Gallagher 2008: 62) The Doha rounds’ plan was very ambitious. 
Basically, protectionist barriers would cease to exist and developing countries would gain free 
access to western markets. Since the launching of the round, negotiations have frequently 
stalled as  developing states  retreat  due  to  the  effects  of  proposed measures  only “further 
constrain[ing] their policy space.”50 (Gallagher 2008: 62) Soon, the gap between the ideas of 
the developing countries versus the ideas of the developed countries became unbridgeable. 
While the “rich” countries avoided making concessions, developing countries resisted giving 
in. However, it was not only the developing countries holding up the rounds. The U.S. and the 
EU, the first wanting a reduction in fishery subsidies, the other calling for a “freeze of import 
tariffs while the deal is worked out”, brought negotiations to frequent halts as other countries 
opposed their advances. (Beattie 2011) Developed countries soon made it clear that they were 
unprepared to make any concessions without getting something in return. In the meantime, 
negotiations have already continued on for ten years, and there is no end in sight. Still, the 
WTO is not ready to declare the negotiations dead, as Beattie writes in her article. (Ibid.) 
Since the Doha round failed, bilateral or regional agreements become increasingly popular, 
especially in the East Asian region. Although the East Asian region has its own organization 
to boost trade, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), this organization has never 
threatened the work of the WTO and has not carved out a place of its own. This is in line with 
the argument of Acharya, who states that adaptation is not as long lasting as localization. Here 
it  seems  that  an  organization  was  pushed  upon  the  region  from the  outside  and,  in  this 
particular case, the outside force was the U.S. However, since the organization was unfitting 
for the region, it was not “localized” and therefore unsuccessful. As APEC and the WTO 
could not push effectively for trade liberalization in the region, they “did more than anything 
else to undermine confidence in multilateralism and heighten interest in bilateral agreements.” 
(Beeson 2009: 50) 
The question remains, what are the main goals of the round and why did negotiations 
stall? The negotiations regarding goods trade collapsed in 2006. Average tariffs would have 
been  reduced  by  at  least  30  percent  and  this  would  have  signified  enormous  losses  of 
government revenue. Losses for developing countries would approximately amount to 63,4 
50 In this case, Gallagher defines policy space as the “flexibility under trade rules that provides nation states 
with adequate room to maneuver to deploy effective policies to spur economic development.” (Gallagher 2008: 
63)
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million dollars. Since developing countries rely on tariff revenue for government revenue and 
expenditure,  they would be limited in their  ability to foster new industries.  Lacking tariff 
revenue would also mean that they would have limited means to conduct an industrial policy 
or social policy in their respective countries. To put this into perspective, Gallagher gives the 
example of least developing countries that “rely on tariffs for more than one quarter of their 
tax revenue.” (Gallagher 2008: 77) Particularly, countries with “little diversification in their 
economies” rely highly on tariff revenues; in a few cases up to 40 percent of all tax revenue. 
(Gallagher 2008: 77; quoting after South Centre 2004) Liberalization in the service sector 
includes the liberalization of the financial market. Developing nations,  such as Brazil  and 
India,  were open to the idea, given that some kind of safeguard mechanism was inserted, 
which  developed  nations  disapproved  of.  (Gallagher  2008:  77)  Using  subsidies  and 
countervailing  measures  to  correct  market  failures  expired  in  2000.  Renegotiating  these 
measures has been unsuccessful up until now. (Gallagher 2008: 77-78) The goal of the round 
was to open markets for developing and least-developed countries so that those countries can 
also enjoy the benefits of the system. China, despite its economic success, is still a developing 
country in many ways. Therefore, opening the markets of developed countries would greatly 
benefit China, and trade imbalances would grow all the more. The trade deficit of the EU and 
the U.S. with China grew to 200 and 250 billion dollars from 2001 to 2009. (Mattoo et al.  
2011: 4) China is dubbed the “Elephant in the Green Room” by Mattoo et al. The blame for 
the stalling of the round is placed on increasing Chinese imports. The planned benefits of the 
round would further help China to enlarge their potential markets. Essentially, it is “fear of 
competition from a dominant China” that keeps the round from moving forward. (Mattoo et 
al. 2011: 1) In contrast, as stated by Kim, South Korea is seen as “a strong guardian of the 
WTO system and an active supporter and participant in the on-going round of trade talks”. 
(Kim  2005:  212-213)  Kim  attributes  a  large  chunk  of  Korea’s  recovery  after  the  Asian 
Financial crisis to the membership in the WTO, for the reason that the recovery was trade-
driven. 
If talks failed, it would be a great blow for the ideals of the organization and the first 
round  that  did  not  end  successfully.  Beattie  writes  that  many  officials,  albeit  privately, 
admitted that the round will never conclude. The compromise is now to negotiate minimal 
packages,  proposed  as  the  “early  harvest”,  so  at  the  very  least,  some  lesser-developed 
countries  can receive assistance.  Nevertheless,  even such smaller  versions of  negotiations 
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stand no chance as the U.S. wants to reap benefits for its own economy in turn for concessions 
on  their  part.  (Bergan  2011)  Since  the  Doha  round has  come to  no  conclusion,  western 
countries try to sneak in bilateral contracts with developing countries that, in fact, further put 
the developing country at a disadvantage. (Ibid.) Bergan concludes that if the WTO is unable 
to help the least developed countries as part of the development agenda, the “relevance” and 
the “multilateral trading system” of the organization “must be questioned”. This stands in line 
with Barnett  and Finnemore’s  argument that if  an organization wants to be powerful,  the 
actions must have a social value and a social purpose. They also must be seen as impartial and 
technocratic to function. (Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 21) The WTO failed to appear impartial 
and therefore the social value of the organization is under question. Acting neutral is crucial 
for  an authority.  Barnett  and Finnemore  argue  that  it  is  not  entirely  possible  to  act  truly 
neutral,  as  “bureaucracies  always  serve  some  social  purpose  or  set  of  cultural  values.” 
(Barnett; Finnemore 2004: 21) In the last few years, however, the organization did not even 
attempt  to  look neutral  in  the  eyes  of  many least  developed countries,  calling  the  moral 
authority of the organization into question. Though the organization itself is kept in a state of 
deadlock by some of the contracting parties, a reform of the organization could help to bring it 
back on track. The Doha round was called the “Doha Development Round” intentionally. It is  
essential that there be a narrowing of the gap between developed and developing countries.
As it is, Duncan Green proposes to kill off the Doha round, which has greatly weakened 
the organization,  in order to save the WTO. (Green 2011) The Doha round was launched 
during circumstances that no longer apply. Since then, emerging economies, such as China, 
have made their way without free tariffs. Green argues that the problems faced today need to 
be discussed more fervently, like fluctuating food prices. Pascal Lamy, the WTO’s director 
general, argues similarly in that he says that the world and trading relationships have changed 
a great deal since 2001. For emerging economies, it  is no longer vital to gain access into 
western markets. (Larry; Heather 2011) Since the trading round ran into so much resistance, 
why is it that countries stay in the organization or try so desperately to become a member? 
China serves as an example that gained great benefits from joining the WTO, albeit at the 
disadvantage  of  other  developing countries.  In  the  next  section,  a  discussion  of  how the 
accession of China in the WTO changed the organization will be presented.
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5.3.3 China’s Accession as a Problem for Developing Countries
Since the Uruguay Round in 1994, where the WTO was established, developing countries 
feel overrun by developed states. They feel that the benefits of the system only reach the 
western world, whereas the South is left out. Gallagher argues that on the contrary, economic 
estimates  show  that  the  developing  world  has  benefited  from  the  Uruguay  round.  He 
acknowledges,  however,  that  there  have  been  winners  and  losers.  (Gallagher  2008:  73) 
Particularly, least-developed countries were left out and left worse off than other developing 
countries. (Ibid.) China entered the WTO only in 2001 and covers now most of the textile 
market, which left the poorest members of the WTO in an even worse situation. Nations that 
had previously demanded the liberalization of textiles and apparel were now left out due to 
China’s rise.  The gains from the Uruguay round aimed at  developing countries were now 
mostly reaped by China. (Gallagher 2008: 74) Entrance into the organization, however, was 
and is actually risky for China, since the country subjects its people to the irregularities WTO 
membership entails, like unemployment. Meaning that within China, social stability is under 
question. Since nowadays the Communist Party gains legitimacy through social stability, the 
Party itself is called into doubt if WTO membership fails. (Griessler 2006: 52) As the social 
gap in China is now growing wider and wider, unemployed and dissatisfied people are the 
greatest threat for the rule of the Communist Party. A positive side of the membership of 
China  in  the  WTO  is  the  exposure  to  the  Dispute  Settlement  System51 that  serves  as  a 
catalyzer  for  installing  ever  more  “internationally-accepted  rules  and standards”.  Through 
this, China is becoming “more integrated in the world economy.” (Wang; Wang 2005: 60) 
Wang and Wang view China’s role in the WTO as a protector of developing countries and 
believe  that  China “will  be able  to  present  its  trade philosophy to the international  trade 
forum.”  (Wang;  Wang  2005:  60)  Since  China  entered  the  WTO,  at  least  in  part  as  a 
developing country, Wang and Wang see China as playing a key role in “representing the 
interests of the developing countries in the organization.” (Wang; Wang 2005: 68) Drezner 
claims that U.S. trade negotiators are now “clamoring for greater participation from China in 
the hope that Beijing will moderate the views of more militant developing countries” in the 
Doha round negotiations. (Drezner 2007: 5) Depending on which side of the fence countries 
51 The dispute settlement system of the WTO should ensure that if a member country believes that a fellow-
member country is violating any trade rules, it will “use the multilateral system of settling disputes instead of 
taking action unilaterally.” This system should ensure that all the member countries abide by the rules and if 
not, trade sanctions can be imposed. http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm, 
accessed on August 11th, 2011.
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stand, they view China either as an advocate for developing countries or as an aide to help 
reason with developing countries. Jiang pursues the same argument in that he writes, “China 
is in a position to advocate its own sovereignty and that of other developing countries in the 
U.N. and other international forums.” (Jiang 2008: 32) Wang and Wang point out, however, 
that  although China entered the WTO at  least  in  part  as a developing country,  under the 
protocol of the WTO, China was given developing country member status on only a few 
occasions. (Wang; Wang 2005: 71) In the view of Wang and Wang, China is an influential 
member due to the country’s standing in the U.N.; China being one of the five Permanent 
Standing Members of the Security Council. They believe the WTO constitutes the “economic 
United Nations”. (Wang; Wang 2005: 60) Another point made by Wang and Wang is that 
China can “solidify its  international image as a world power” as a member of the WTO. 
(Wang; Wang 2005: 66) Upon China’s accession, the WTO’s Director General stated that, 
“China’s membership is also a major step towards fully developing the organization into a 
truly  global  trading  regime.”  (Wang;  Wang  2005:  71)  With  the  accession  of  China,  the 
organization now represents nearly ninety percent of the world’s population, whereas before 
the WTO only represented “slightly more than two-thirds of the world's population.” (Wang; 
Wang 2005: 71) As well, dealing with Taiwan through the WTO reduces much of the pressure 
and Wang and Wang have hope that  China  will  be able  to  solve  political  problems with 
Taiwan through the organization’s measures. (Wang; Wang 2005: 66) Still, China is concerned 
with  trade  protectionism against  developing  countries  on  the  behalf  of  other  developing 
countries. Even more unsettling is the concern over the enforcement of the dispute settlement 
mechanism. It still is unsure if decisions concerning developed countries, like the U.S. and the 
EU,  can  be  enforced properly,  or,  to  put  it  bluntly,  if  said  countries  will  abide  by those 
decisions. (Wang; Wang 2005: 66)
5.3.4 Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO
As prior sections determined, regional trade agreements are on the rise. One reason for 
regional  trade  agreements  is  the  failing  of  the  negotiations  of  the  Doha  round.  As  these 
regional  trade  agreements  would typically  be considered to  be impairing the aims of  the 
organization, it is of particular interest to explore the legal conditions the WTO established for 
such agreements. 
The WTO actually offers legal support for regional agreements that would otherwise run 
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counter to the principles of non-discrimination. To meet with the challenges of regional trade 
agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) first offered “a series of 
mechanisms for ensuring the maintenance and creation of regional integration agreements 
otherwise  incompatible  with  the  most  favoured  nation  (MFN)  obligations  of  Article  I.” 
(Guerrieri;  Falautano  2000:  18)  To  be  compatible  with  the  GATT/WTO  rules,  regional 
initiatives need to eliminate “internal barriers and general liberalization applied to all sectors 
[…] to avoid limited sectoral approaches and to enlarge their scope”. Additionally, regional 
initiatives “should not involve raising barriers against third countries.” The time of creation of 
the free-trade area must be given in order of “transparency”. Finally, “the procedures must be 
codified  for  notifying  the  relevant  multilateral  bodies  […]  of  the  signature  of  regional 
agreements.” (Guerrierei; Falautano 2000: 19) The WTO website states, “As of 15 May 2011, 
some 489 RTAs, counting goods and services notifications separately, have been notified to 
the GATT/WTO.”52 Two hundred and two of those regional trade agreements are currently in 
force. Not all of the members are WTO members and this agreement has already been in place 
since 1976.53 Regarding regional trade agreements, South Korea is somehow concerned and 
wants to ensure that regional agreements are in accordance with WTO rules. (Kim 2005: 206) 
South Korea was unwary entering regional trading agreements because it was suspicious of 
“exclusive trading blocs that could undermine the multilateral trading system”. (Kim 2005: 
208) In the last few years, however, South Korea changed its view and RTAs “are increasingly 
seen  as  an  effective  way  of  maintaining  export  markets  and  for  inducing  foreign  direct 
investment into Korea”. (Kim 2005: 208-209) The change in attitude can also be attributed to 
Japan pursuing Free Trading agreements on its own and the fear of being “left out of any 
RTAs altogether”. (Kim 2005: 209) In general, the failure of the WTO to achieve the aims of 
the Doha round contributed to the process of regionalism. Specifically, East Asian countries 
that are “largely dependent on world trade do not want to be left to the mercy of multilateral  
trade talks, and have pursued FTAs [Free Trade Agreements] with like-minded economies”. 
(Sohn et al. 2005: 171) 
Regardless of the standards set by the WTO regarding regional trade agreements, many of 
those initiatives resist this understanding. As a clear definition of the clauses is absent, what is 
to be done in case of a violation is unclear. The system “to ensure basic compatibility between 
52 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm  , accessed on Sept. 9th, 2011
53 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowRTAIDCard.aspx?rtaid=140&lang=1&redirect=1  , accessed on Sept. 9th, 
2011
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regional arrangements and multilateral liberalisation seem very incomplete, ambiguous and 
difficult to apply.” (Guerrieri; Falautano 2000: 20) Not only are the regulations conflicting, 
the  interpretations  of  the regulations  also differ.  The question  of  whether  or  not  regional 
integration movements are building blocks or stumbling blocks remains unanswered. While 
regional agreements could be viewed as a threat to IOs, such as the WTO, according to Rana, 
they are “increasingly seen as building blocks rather than stumbling blocks for an integrating 
world”. (Rana 2002: 5) It is clear, however, that most regional initiatives do not satisfy “the 
two conditions of liberalisation of trade in all  products and not raising external barriers.” 
(Guerrieri, Falautano 2000: 20) It remains to be seen what these developments hold for the 
future.
5.4 The International Monetary Fund
Defining  power  within  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  is  relatively  easy,  as 
power comes from funds given to it by member governments. Voting power is defined by the 
funds a country contributes, the country’s GDP and other economically related numbers. The 
IMF is an interesting case to examine,  as it lost  much of its credibility in Asia in how it 
handled the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. Particularly, South Korea was subject to IMF 
conditionalities  that  had  severe  consequences  for  the  Korean  society.  Following  this 
argument, it is interesting to explore how the IMF still exercises power in Asia. In the next 
sections, the formation, the aims and the future of the IMF will be discussed. It touches upon 
the handling of emerging powers in the IMF structure, the adaptation of the IMF to the new 
world order and its reactions to criticism. Also, to be discussed is if the organization is willing 
to change or if it has already become a “frozen configuration” so that the structures do not 
allow the organization to adapt further.
5.4.1 The Aim of the IMF
The IMF was established in 1944 when the power structure was hugely different from the 
structure that exists today. The fund was established to help countries after World War II and 
was particularly designed “to control the spread of international economic crises through a 
special  stabilization fund providing loans to  countries suffering from balance-of-payments 
deficits.” (Chorev, Babb 2009: 464) To operate efficiently, the fund had to have access to 
economic resources and thus give wealthy countries the “right” to make and revise rules. 
(Chorev, Babb 2009: 464; quoted after Pfeffer, Salancik 1977) Since the change of voting 
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structure in 200654, this “right” also flows to new emerging powerful states in Asia, which is 
difficult to accept in Europe and the U.S. For the reason that the fund is responsible for the 
handling of large amounts of money given to it by member states, the fund is beholden to its 
member governments. The U.S. is historically the greatest financier of the IMF, which likely 
makes the fund more accountable to the U.S. than to other countries. The U.S. is also the 
country  with  the  greatest  quota  portion  of  17  percent,  even  after  the  change  of  voting 
structure. Therefore, the U.S. can veto any decision, “because an 85 percent vote is required 
for many IMF matters, including amending bylaws and changing the quota shares.” (Weisman 
2006) The Fund is designed by a system of shareholder control and weighted voting structures 
that nowadays reflect only the world order of the past. If the voting structure would reflect the 
real power structure, Europe would have to abandon a few quota shares that would shift to 
new economically powerful  emerging states like those in Asia.  Since European states  are 
unprepared to make these concessions, the voting structure remains unfair. What is even more 
difficult for the organization to explain is why the EU, with its ever more “common policy on 
foreign  affairs  and  security”,  should  have  25  votes  whereas  other,  economically  more 
important countries, have only one. (Drezner 2007: 6) Since European countries hold veto 
power and privileged positions in “many key postwar institutions”, “they can resist U.S.-led 
changes.”  (Ibid.)  Ironically,  least  developed  countries  support  the  resistance  of  European 
states for change due to the fear of losing the little share they currently possess in powerful 
institutions. The Bush administration certainly failed to help in obtaining the trust of countries 
on  the  periphery.  They  questioned  the  motives  of  the  U.S.  in  favoring  amendments  and 
thought of them as an excuse to “free itself from the strictures of preexisting multilateral 
arrangements.” (Ibid.) Therefore, amending those institutions becomes an even more difficult 
task. Betz criticizes that although the West wants China to engage constructively in issues of 
global governance, the meager voting power China possesses in the IMF or invitations to the 
G8 summits are insufficient. (Betz 2008: 6) An even better argument for endowing China with 
a little more bargaining power would be the advantages for the West. U.S. policy members 
have “encouraged China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system, so 
54 The voting and quota share of a member country determine the possibilities a member country has to 
influence the IMF. In 2006, emerging economies were granted greater quota and voting shares. Another 
change was agreed upon in 2008, and yet another in 2010, to even better represent emerging economies. The 
new quota shares of those economies, however, will still be “too modest to have major influence on how the 
IMF operates or the sense of legitimacy which it generates around the world“, since European countries still 
do not want to give away much of their share. http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0409_imf_linn.aspx, 
accessed on August 11th, 2011.
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that the management of the differences between the two countries can be negotiated in a more 
stable framework of shared political, economic, and security interests.” (Roett et al. 2008: 9-
10)
In terms of the IMF’s institutional power, according to Barnett and Finnemore, it can be 
viewed as a “frozen configuration”. When the organization was formed, the founders did not 
intend the concessions that are demanded nowadays. Due to the organizations long-standing 
existence, this effect came into being over the years. However, because the organization has 
now been operating for decades already, reforming it is perhaps too painful a process, as the 
institutional power may be too powerful in and of itself. As a result of the IMF’s institutional 
power, decisions that would be made quickly in other forums cannot even be made because of 
“limited opportunities” that have formed over the years. Following Barnett and Finnemore’s 
argument, structural power is responsible for the inability of the IMF to transform itself. The 
“powerful actors” in the organization are working for the “reproduction” of the system and do 
not work in favor of the “producing classes”. The IMF is particularly unfair in structure since 
rules  only  apply  to  members  who  take  on  credits  of  the  fund.  Countries  that  are  mere 
members of the fund only have to deliver  annual  reports  on the shape of their  economy. 
Countries  who desire  help  have  to  implement  serious  policies  that  often  change national 
mechanisms. Since the 1980’s and 1990’s, the IMF intrudes in ever more fields of national 
politics, which is the foundation of harsh criticism. The topic becomes even more sensitive 
considering that the last time a western country sought help from the fund was in the 1970’s. 
Since then, only countries that were vulnerable to IMF conditionalities had to rely on the 
fund.  This  perception  might  change when the IMF helps  out  European countries  in  their 
current debt crisis. Nevertheless, more and more countries attempt to seek help outside of the 
fund. They seek help from institutions with less conditionalities, taking on credits without 
having  to  erode  its  own  national  mechanisms.  So,  does  the  fund  even  hold  relevance 
anymore? The next section raises this question and attempts to find an answer.
5.4.2 The IMF Tries to Hold on to Authority
As much as the International Monetary Fund is criticized, it was just recently given new 
financial resources from all member states to counter the economic crisis of 2008. Weisbrot 
does not believe that the “new resources” will 
“[...]reverse the trend of governments avoiding, whenever possible, the Fund’s lending and influence, 
91
they will help to re-establish an unreformed IMF as a major power in economic and decision-making in 
low-and-middle income countries,  with little or no voice for these countries in the IMF’s decision-
making.” (Weisbrot 2009: 4) 
Weisbrot suggests that the IMF will only exist to collect information on countries and to 
assist governments in the future. Due to the fact that the IMF’s “medicine” for states in debt 
has at times had devastating repercussions, countries try to avoid getting IMF help and only 
finance the organization. Therefore, even if the IMF has a legitimacy crisis, it will continue to 
exist and maintain its authority. Even if the organization lost much credibility, this signals that 
there is still faith in the work of the organization. As well, the European debt crisis might help 
the  organization  to  reclaim  some  of  its  authority  and  legitimacy.  Following  Barnett  and 
Finnemore’s  concept  of  compulsory  power,  the  IMF has  material  resources  on  hand and 
therefore still has power. Barnett and Finnemore’s concept also stresses that in order to gain 
compulsory power,  weaker  actors  must  accept  their  inferior  position and also  admire the 
“superior”  actor.  Also,  the  IMF  was  very  successful  in  establishing  itself  as  an  “expert 
authority”. Looking at the grants South Korea and China pumped into the organization after 
the financial crisis in 2008, it seems evident that faith and admiration still exists. 
However, due to the Asian financial crisis and how the IMF handled bailouts, does it still 
have enough credibility in Asia? Following the Asian financial crisis, Asian states lost their 
faith in IMF bailouts when strict policy prescriptions took its toll on civil society. Layoffs 
were so common that the IMF was “cynically referred to an acronym, ‘I’m Fired’,  by the 
local media.” (Jin-seo 2010) At the time, the IMF was criticized immensely for its approach in 
South Korea. Despite this, in 2008, the organization was granted quite a large sum by Asian 
states such as South Korea. How is this possible? According to the  Korean finance minister, 
Yoon Jeung-hyun, who met with then IMF managing director Dominique Strauss-Kahn and 
other officials during a visit to Washington in April of 2010, Korea and the IMF are now “on 
an equal platform” and cooperation is necessary. Still, Yoon Jeung-hyun reminded them of the 
image problem the IMF still maintained in South Korea and urged the fund to “try to improve  
the  image  by  more  actively  listening  to  the  voices  of  emerging  nations.”  (Jin-seo  2010) 
Following Barnett and Finnemore’s way of thinking, the IMF continues to be organized all 
over  the  world,  is  still  reported to  every year,  still  issues  recommendations  on economic 
approaches worldwide and is still regarded as an “expert authority”. Seemingly, the expert 
authority structure does not wane despite large blunders in South Korea. In the case of the 
IMF, the fund can rely both on its  “expert  authority” but also on monetary incentives.  If 
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countries  negotiate  a  deal  with  the  fund,  they  are  sure  to  receive  financial  help  when 
implementing certain measures. Those countries must generally trust the IMF on its expertise, 
as the fund has decades of experience dealing with countries and their balance of payments 
problems. In recent years and especially after the Asian financial crisis, the fund has received 
a great deal of criticism for its recommended measures. It is believed that the organization 
took to heart the criticism which followed the Asian financial crisis and changed some of its 
policies, for example reducing “the number of structural conditions55 attached to its lending.” 
(Weisbrot  et  al.  2009:  8)  This  would  explain  why  once  again  there  is  faith  in  how  the 
organization approaches crises. Still, Weisbrot criticizes that the IMF once again recommends 
procyclical and other “inappropriate” policies that “could unnecessarily exacerbate economic 
downturns in a number of countries”.56 (ibid 3) Procyclical policies were the exact problem 
that contributed to the vulnerability of South Korea after the Asian financial crisis. 
As Weber insists, authority against the will of the ruled is impossible and it must follow 
that the “ruled” of the IMF are still  willing to adhere to the IMF. Weber also stresses the 
interest of the “ruler” to hold on to its authority by continuously cultivating and reviving the 
faith in its legitimacy. (Müller 2007: 127; quoted after Weber 1972: 122, 123) If the IMF is 
interested in holding on to its authority, the organization is aware that it has to adapt to a few 
changes. A statement by Clay Lowery, the assistant secretary for international affairs at the 
Department of the Treasury, emphasized Washington’s position at a meeting in Singapore in 
the fall of 2006: “We came to the view awhile ago that if we do not take action to recognize 
the growing role of emerging economies, the IMF will become less relevant and we will all be 
worse off.” (Drezner 2007: 5) Timothy Adams, the undersecretary for international affairs at 
the Department of the Treasury, emphasized that by reforming the voting structure of the IMF, 
Washington hoped to give China a “bigger voice” and a “greater sense of responsibility for 
the institution’s mission.” (Weisman 2006) The reform of the voting structure in 2006, and 
again in 2008 and 2010 were a step into the right direction, but it still does not reflect the 
actual power relations of the world today. The organization is still very much antiquated and 
does not know how to approach this new situation. The world-systems theory could explain 
this imbalance: How states are identified by one another is how they behave. Since the West 
55 Structural conditions are those conditions that are mostly criticized since they deeply changed national 
economics. Such conditions were for example privatizations, pension or labor market reforms. Those policies 
deeply impacted lower and middle-income wage earners. (Weisbrot et al. 2009: 8)
56 Currently, the IMF has signed agreements for lending for countries such as Hungary, Georgia, Latvia, Serbia 
and Belarus. (Weisbrot et al. 2009: 4)
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has been very successful and many states desired to follow their example, they gained some 
kind of authority that still appeals to many emerging countries. How states were seen by other 
states determines how they behaved in the world community. It seems that the success of 
Asian states in the last decades is not yet enough to take on a leading role in world matters. 
The  social  structure  in  the  world  shapes  the  self-understanding  of  countries.  Different 
structural positions also generate different advantages and capacities. It seems Asian states 
have not quite figured out how to use their economic success to their advantage in world 
matters. 
One of the aims of the next section is to explore why there were so many problems with 
the conditionalities on IMF borrowing, especially when the granting of IMF loans was and is 
a sphere where member countries are able to interfere into the work of the organization. 
5.4.3 Conditionalities and IMF Borrowing
In theory, states that apply for credits are to be treated equally, but, in reality, some are 
treated “more equal” than others.  Specifically,  countries  with a higher GDP receive more 
support  from other  countries  when  it  comes  to  being  granted  a  loan,  as  they  are  more 
important to the world economy. When wanting to obtain a loan from the IMF, “a country's 
real GDP growth, government consumption, the government’s budget deficit, the change in 
international  reserves,  and  the  current  account  balance  do  not  significantly  influence  the 
number of conditions.” (Dreher, Jensen 2007: 115) Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen proved 
that borrowing country’s voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly determined to what 
conditionalities loans were granted. Dreher and Vaubel (2004) analyzed 206 IMF letters of 
intent from 38 countries between April 1997 and February 2003. (Dreher, Jensen 2007: 110) 
If countries voted with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly they “systematically received 
IMF  loans  with  fewer  conditions.”  (Dreher,  Jensen  2007:  121)  Evidence  suggests  that 
countries also receive loans with fewer conditionalities prior to elections if they are closer 
allies with the U.S. and “the more often a country voted in line with the United States in the 
U.N. General Assembly.” (Dreher, Jensen 2007: 116) With a little help from the U.S., the IMF 
“helps the political survival of incumbents.” (Dreher, Jensen 2007: 110) This proves that the 
U.S. uses the fund to “enforce its own political agenda.” (Dreher, Jensen 2007: 107) This also 
presupposes that the U.S. government is in fact using the IMF for their own purposes and 
shaping the world order according to their wishes. Generally, closeness with all of the G7 
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countries guarantees fewer conditions for countries wishing to obtain a loan. (Dreher, Jensen 
2007: 119)
Now that the power structures transform themselves, the IMF has to find a new position. 
In the post World War II order, the structure seemed to be clear, the West was powerful and 
the South was not. As the South comes on stage, the structural positions in the world change. 
How does “A” behave towards “B” when “B” gains the same influences “A” has already 
enjoyed? It seems that the West is still unsure of how to cope with this new situation. As 
Mahbubani views it, the hesitation on part of the EU to change anything or to give up power 
or protectionism in favor of the “South” is basically fear of a new world where the EU no 
longer has a say. Mahbubani fears that the U.S. could also become as unconfident as the EU 
and retreat into its “fortresses”. (Mahbubani 2008: 52) What is interesting is that the very 
objective of organizations like the IMF was to erase poverty and raise economic power all 
over the world so that all could enjoy wealth. Now that the South is in the process of enjoying 
this  wealth,  the organizations  retreat  and the  U.S.  and the  EU are afraid of  takeovers  of 
western  businesses  by  Asian  firms.  Taking  structural  power  into  account,  the  changing 
economic  order  of  the  world  leaves  Asian  states  wanting  more  out  of  their  new  social 
structure.  Their  social  structure is  different  from the social  structure they occupied in the 
1940’s and 1950’s respectively, but as their structure changes their advantages do not change. 
This is also why the IMF feels as antiquated as it appears now. Chorev and Babb argue that  
whereas the actors within the WTO want to change the system of the organization to gain 
advantages, actors that feel marginalized within the IMF structure tend to exit the system and 
are not interested in changing the organization. Foucault sees resistance as a way for weaker 
states to change their fate, but not as revolutionary. (Sarasin 2005: 153-154) Is the resistance 
of actors to turn to the IMF for help revolutionary then? The refinancing of the institution 
would suggest that it is not revolutionary, but since Asian states are unwilling to get help in 
critical times and turn to other canals for financial help, it  would suggest otherwise. Still, 
Asian states are in on the refinancing. Maybe this turn of events suggests that Asian states 
want to enjoy the privileges of the organization as well,  but not the obligations that only 
borrowing states “enjoy”. What these developments entail for the future will be explored in 
the next section.
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5.4.4 The Future of the IMF in a Changing World
Only  this  year  was  the  IMF subject  to  a  few  transforming  events  when  Dominique 
Strauss-Kahn  resigned  amid  scandal  in  May  of  2011.  Traditionally,  the  IMF  managing 
director is from Europe, but this time around emerging states quickly stated their wish to also 
be kept in mind in the selection process for the managing director position. Their argument: 
Deciding on the position only on the grounds of nationality calls the legitimacy of the fund 
into question. The position of managing director should be decided on merits through the 
process of a transparent competition. Furthermore, the representation of emerging economies 
should  also  be  reflected  in  such  a  position.  When  Strauss-Kahn  took  office,  emerging 
economies were reassured informally that the next candidate would not be decided on its 
traditional  approach but  rather  on merits.57 Therefore,  a  debate about  potential  candidates 
from emerging economies was soon opened. Potential candidates were the financial minister 
of Singapur, Tharman Shanmugaratnam, former Indian Worldbank Manager, Montek Singh 
Ahluwalia, and the governor of Mexico’s central bank, Agustin Carstens. Also, the South-
African financial minister, Trevor Manuel, and former minister of economic affairs in Turkey, 
Kemal Dervis were considered.58 In the end, Christine Lagarde, another European, sealed the 
deal. She was first backed up by Europe and then later even by China and Russia. Only in the 
end did she gain support from the U.S. It seems that the IMF not only newly legitimized its  
procedures, but that it also gained an even broader front with Russia and China. Now, the 
question lingers, why did China back a candidate from Europe so easily? An argument, put 
forward by German chancellor Angela Merkel, was that the Eurozone is particularly weak 
nowadays and needs special attention. Moreover, Strauss-Kahn’s term was still running when 
he resigned and that is why the next candidate, in Merkel’s view, should also be European. 
Merkel acknowledged that in the “foreseeable future”, emerging economies should also be 
given a chance, but for now a European candidate is more fitting.59 It remains to be seen if 
emerging economies will be given a chance next time around.
In conclusion, the IMF failed to adapt fully to the new structures of the world today. It 
restructured and reformed some mechanisms but failed to reform others. However, due to its 
decade-long  existence,  its  expert  authority  and  data  on  so  many  issues,  an  alternative 
57 "Schwellenländer wollen IWF-Chefsessel besetzen“, “Emerging economies want to take boss‘s seat on IMF“, 
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/geld/nach-ruecktritt-von-strauss-kahn-schwellenlaender-wollen-iwf-chefsessel-
besetzen-1.1099436, accessed on June 29th 2011.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
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organization is hard to imagine. What can already be said is that emerging economies are 
unafraid to voice their opinions and also flex their muscles when necessary. To set up another 
institution to counter the IMF is not their intention. Apparently, emerging states try to demand 
a reform from within and make sure that  their  voices  are  heard.  Additionally,  due to  the 
European debt crisis, Asian states seem more stable, which adds to their importance within the 
organization. It is essential to include emerging economies better into the framework of the 
IMF, because
“If the fast-growing economies of Asia and Latin America feel disenfranchised from the I.M.F. — there 
is still a strong undercurrent of hostility in Asia over the fund’s handling of the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis — it will be difficult for the I.M.F. to raise money to deal with Europe and potentially Japan [its 
huge debts make a future IMF program in Japan in the next decade very likely] and to credibly do its 
work in emerging markets now and in the future.” (Rogoff 2011)
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6. Conclusion
The findings of this paper suggest that in order for international organizations to survive, 
they have to incorporate emerging economies more actively in the future. If they leave their 
voting  structure  and  decision-making  processes  unchanged,  the  credibility  of  the 
organizations will suffer. As it is, being a member of an IO is still an advantage for many 
countries that would otherwise suffer from being discriminated against on the world market. 
Therefore, it is not too late to revamp the system. 
Regarding  South  Korea  and  China,  as  they  enjoyed  economic  success  for  the  last 
decades, they have not yet succeeded in translating their success into political leverage in 
international  organizations.  The current  European debt  crisis  might  change that  even if  it 
seems that they prefer to leave the field to the U.S., as their economies grow comfortably 
while the U.S. takes the lead in most of the international decisions. It appears that power 
structures that existed for decades cannot be changed in just a few years. While the economic 
power of the U.S. is waning, the political and military power of the U.S. is still unmatched. 
Even if the U.S. does not possess the WTO and the IMF, it still influences many decisions 
made in those organizations. As South Korea is dependent on the U.S. as a protective power, 
it is not interested in challenging the U.S. or straining foreign relations. In addition, China 
cannot risk causing trouble in foreign relations, as the U.S. is deeply important as an export 
market and as a provider of foreign direct investments. Nevertheless, the two countries strive 
for fair representation and sometimes try to challenge the power of the U.S. in decisions that 
also affect them. These findings suggest that  it  is  unnecessary for the U.S. to further  the 
“China threat” theory. The U.S. must continue to cultivate foreign relations, especially with 
Central  Asian nations in order to  prevent the deepening of anti-western tendencies in  the 
region. As it is, the U.S. under president Obama is in favor of multilateralism and therefore 
welcomes other great powers to take responsibilities in the international field.
Regarding East Asia, Japan still is and will be a stumbling block for regionalism if the 
countries continue to avoid building up a common value orientation. The first “success” of 
building a common history came with the writing of a joint history textbook in 2005 and this 
was a step in the right direction, nevertheless, there is still a lot of work to be done. South  
Korea, China and Japan seem to only work together under the auspices of foreign influences. 
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While in the 1970’s and 1980’s regional organizations in Asia were built up under the guide of 
the U.S., in the 1990’s and after 2000, regional organizations were initiated, among others, by 
ASEAN. Also, bilateral agreements have been on the rise since that time. While it is highly 
unlikely for South Korea,  China and Japan to work together  on their  own, they do work 
together with ASEAN. ASEAN as an institution helps to build regionalism and also brings the 
three countries closer together. Working together in the institutions of ASEAN might help the 
countries to overcome at least some of their animosities. All in all, evidence suggests that 
regional  organizations  do  not  challenge  existing  international  institutions.  Regarding  the 
Chiang Mai Initiative, it even strengthens the work of the IMF as it helps the institution to 
collect data on financial developments in the region.
Recent developments with the current European debt crisis, at the very least on a minimal 
level, point towards some shift of power to China. Europe is turning to China for financial 
help while the U.S. offers only moral support. As China has the upper hand in this scenario, it 
can demand to participate more in financial institutions, especially the IMF. Still, as Europe is 
a very important export market for China, China cannot go too far and has to remain modest 
in its demands. If presently, they are unsuccessful in gaining a greater voice in international 
institutions, analysts suggest that over time they will gain more power.60 However, if Europe 
acknowledges some of the demands, the way is paved for China to become accepted as a 
powerful country alongside the U.S. and Europe. Consequently, it will be even more difficult 
for South Korea to balance between the U.S. and China in the future. As Schottenhammer 
stated, China desires to become a “regional superpower” through respect and the creation of 
strategic partnerships with important countries. (Schottenhammer 2006: 10; 36) The European 
debt  crisis  might give them the opportunity to  do just  that.  The future,  therefore,  will  be 
multilateral. In order to find a more congruent answer to a power shift, however, the relevance 
of  NGOs and the  emergence of  civil  society must  also be taken into  account  for  further 
research. 
60 “The euro-zone crisis. China to the rescue“ In: The Economist, Oct. 29th, 2011 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/10/euro-zone-crisis-4, accessed on Nov. 2nd, 2011.
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Appendix
List of Abbreviations
AEM ASEAN Economic Ministers
ASEAN+3 ASEAN plus South Korea, China and Japan 
ALADI Latin American Integration Association
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation AMF – Asian Monetary Fund
APT ASEAN plus three 
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BSA Bilateral Swap Agreement 
CAFTA China-ASEAN Free Trade Area
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative 
EAEC East Asian Economic Caucus
ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EU European Union
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTAA Free Trade Area of the Americas
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
G 7 Group of seven: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, 
United States.
G 20 Group of 20:  Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, 
South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of 
America
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO International Organization
MFA (Chinese) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN Most Favored Nation
MOF (Japanese) Ministry of Finance
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
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NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS Organization of American States
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ROK Republic of Korea
RTA Regional Trade Agreement 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
UN United Nations
U.S. United States (of America)
WTO World Trade Organization
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Abstract
This  paper  explores  the  question  of  whether  or  not  the  power  shift  in  economic 
strength and world production from the western world to Asia, – especially South Korea and 
China – among  others, has also translated into power dynamics in international organizations, 
in this paper being the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. As 
international organizations manage financial affairs, international conflicts and world trade, 
having  a  voice  within  these  organizations  is  of  utmost  importance.  While  international 
organizations have lost some of their legitimacy due to a few unfortunate decisions in recent 
years and are said to only exist for the advantage of western states, they still enjoy a great deal 
of trust.  States that would allegedly be disadvantaged in these organizations,  still  want to 
become members. 
This paper argues that if international organizations adapt their structures to the new 
world order and give emerging economies a greater voice within their organizations, they 
most likely can survive the challenges lying ahead. It is also argued that the recent surge of 
regionalism does  not  hurt  the  existence of  international  organizations  and,  at  times,  even 
strengthens the work of such institutions. This specific question leads to the main interest of 
this research: The role of South Korea and China in coping with these developments. As for 
China and South Korea, the current situation shows that while they want to gain an equal 
voice in international institutions, they are content with the U.S. as a leading power, especially 
in regard to their military strength. Although they voice their disagreements when necessary, 
they are careful not to strain relations with the U.S., as South Korea is deeply dependent on 
the U.S. as a protective power and China is greatly dependent on the U.S. for export markets 
and as a receiver of foreign direct investments. Despite this, recent developments, especially 
the European debt crisis, signal that China is in the process of succeeding in establishing itself 
as an important power alongside the U.S. and the EU. As well, this points to the fact that in 
the  near  future  emerging  economies  will  be  “more”  able  to  gain  a  greater  voice  within 
international organizations. This is also in line with U.S. president Obama’s foreign policy, 
which welcomes China as a responsible stakeholder in a multilateral world. Consequently, it 
will be even more difficult for South Korea to balance between the U.S. and China in the 
future.
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Abstract German
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob die Machtverschiebung wirtschaftlicher 
Stärke und der Weltproduktion vom Westen nach Asien, - speziell nach China und Südkorea – 
unter  anderen,  auch Auswirkungen auf Machtdynamiken in internationalen Organisationen 
nach  sich  zieht.  Da  sich  internationale  Organisationen  (in  dieser  Arbeit  die 
Welthandelsorganisation und der internationale Währungsfonds) mit Fragen des Welthandels 
und internationaler  Konflikte,  sowie  mit  finanziellen  Angelegenheiten  beschäftigen,  ist  es 
überaus  wichtig,  eine  Stimme  in  diesen  Organisationen  zu  besitzen,  um  sich  Gehör  zu 
verschaffen.  Während  internationale  Organisationen  in  den  letzten  Jahren  einiges  an 
Legitimität  einbüßen  mussten  und  ihnen  nachgesagt  wird,  dass  sie  nur  zum  Vorteil  des 
Westens  arbeiten,  genießen sie  durchaus noch Vertrauen,  sodass  Staaten,  die  angeblich in 
diesen Organisationen benachteiligt würden, nach wie vor Mitglieder darin werden wollen. 
In  dieser  Arbeit  wird  versucht  aufzuzeigen,  dass  internationale  Organisationen  die 
Herausforderungen der Zukunft  bewältigen können,  wenn sie  ihre Strukturen an die  neue 
Weltordnung  anpassen  und  aufstrebenden  Staaten  mehr  Entscheidungsrechte  einräumen. 
Darüber  hinaus  wird  argumentiert,  dass  jüngste  Bestrebungen  von  Staaten  in  Bezug  auf 
Regionalismus die Bedeutung von internationalen Organisationen nicht gefährden, sondern 
manchmal  sogar  stärken.  Dieser  Punkt  führt  zum  Hauptinteresse  dieser  Arbeit:  wie  die 
ostasiatischen Länder China und Südkorea mit derartigen Entwicklungen umgehen. Obwohl 
beide  Staaten  gegenwärtig  eine  gleichwertige  Stimme  in  internationalen  Organisationen 
anstreben,  akzeptieren sie  die  USA als  führende Macht,  vor allem was deren militärische 
Stärke  betrifft.  Auch  wenn  Vertreter  und  Vertreterinnen  von  China  und  Südkorea 
Unstimmigkeiten zum Ausdruck bringen, sind sie sehr vorsichtig, die Beziehungen zu den 
USA unangemessen zu belasten, da sie auf der Suche nach Exportmärkten und als Empfänger 
von Direktinvestitionen zutiefst abhängig von den USA sind. Außerdem benötigt Südkorea 
die USA als militärische Schutzmacht. Dennoch weisen jüngste Entwicklungen (speziell die 
Krise der Eurozone) darauf hin, dass China im Prozess ist, sich als wichtige Macht neben den 
USA und der EU zu positionieren. Dies signalisiert, dass aufstrebende Wirtschaftsmächte in 
naher  Zukunft  „vehementer“  als  früher  imstande  sind,  in  Aushandlungsprozessen  ihr 
politisches Gewicht in internationalen Organisationen als legitim zu vertreten. Dies steht im 
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Einklang  mit  der  Außenpolitik  von  US-Präsident  Obama,  der  China  als  verantwortlichen 
Akteur in einer multilateralen Welt willkommen heißt. Infolgedessen wird es für Südkorea in 
Zukunft noch schwieriger, ein Gleichgewicht zwischen den Beziehungen zu den USA und 
China zu wahren.
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